NEW PATHWAYS IN LINGUISTICS

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Preface

Emotions understood as cognitive processes are the essential context for cognitive and linguistic activeness of the communicator. One cannot expect to obtain an emotionless, purely impersonal and objective reaction, whether behavioral or communicative. Any action of the communicator contains some relation to his/her state of general well-being, thus, being subjective and context-sensitive. All that a person is to evaluate or give opinion on is, at some stage of the evaluation process, related to this person's subjective mental models, which are emotionally-marked themselves as well.

Emotional processes shortcut cognitive routes; this applies to the emotions being activated by the evaluation situation, but also to the emotions encoded in the cognitive models in the mental representation.

Considering all their functions, emotions introduce the local, personal, intimate, ego- or self-centric perspective into the mental, interpersonal, communicative and social activity of humans.

This year, we invited scholars and academics to join the discussion over the functions of emotions in the language process. What is of special value are the divergent viewpoints and complementary approaches to the key issue, presented by scholars who voice their own research interests and research work methodologies.

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Manipulation in communication. Or: how ecolinguistics returns a communicator's powers back to him/her

In this concise presentation, an attempt is made to look at a traditional linguistic theme of 'language manipulation' from the extended, ecolinguistic perspective. As a result , the illusory effect of the systemic understanding of language manipulation is discussed. In other words, it becomes quite visible that we can talk about and experience manipulation by means of language only when we treat human language as a system, in its traditional definitions. However, when we enter the interdisciplinary area of research and take into consideration the psycholinguistic, sociological, anthropological, biological research results, which are included in ecolinguistics as a metamodel, language manipulation becomes an illusion, and as such occupies some marginal place in the multilayer, pulsating communication process.

Keywords: language manipulation, ecolinguistics, communicator, frames of communication, cognitive emotions

1. Introduction

Ecology studies life processes from the perspective of the relations of organisms to their environment. A person's relations with the environment include relations with other people around who constitute a part of the environment. Hence, communication processes within ever-changing, multilayer grid of life processes become an object of investigation of ecolinguistics (cf. Bogusławska-Tafelska, et al. 2010: 22).

A broad, holistic view on language and communication is methodologically based on the nonseparability principle, formulated by quantum physicists (Penrose, 1995; Schroedinger, 2007). This presupposition has it that the value of the sum is not the result of the linear mathema-

tical process of adding the values of the components. When applied in the language studies, this principle brings a number of essential methodological and practical consequences:

(1) It questions the traditional systemic approach to language, in which the system of language is built up of components and/or pro-cesses scrutinized independently in 'local' linguistic research undertakings;

(2) It sees the process of language as a multilayer grid of pulsating and ever-evolving parameters and processes, so sensitive to intrapersonal and external environments that two-dimensional models proposed by systemic linguistics miss the essence of communication altogether;

(3) Thus, the nonseparability principle in modern linguistics naturally introduces dialog across scientific disciplines while analyzing language and communication; it is only through the interdisciplinary cooperation of scholars representing divergent scientific fields and methodologies, that the multilayer language grid be investi-gated functionally and effectively (cf. Bogusławska-Tafelska, 2009).

So, *the life of language*, with all its internal fluctuation, momentary nature and parameter-sensitivity can be studied through joint effort of specialists of divergent disciplines; by means of models built across the lines of divergent methodologies. In this sense, as I have been suggesting in my research for some time now, cognitive perspective in modern linguistics, ecolinguistics in particular, starts to take up the role of **a metamodel** which allows in and consolidates all local studies into selected aspects of the language process. Ecolinguistics seems to function as 'the model of models' (ibid).

As Patton notices (2002), nonlinear and complex language process becomes a methodological and psychological problem for those linguistics who look for formal and systemic order. Mühlhäusler (1995) points out that dissecting language into segments and subsystems seems a methodological mistake (see as well: Bogusławska-Tafelska, forthcoming).

In the present concise analysis, I will attempt to show in what sense this broad and dynamic approach to language and communication

(1) changes the linguist's perception on the mechanism of manipulation by means of language;

(2) returns the communicator's powers back to him/her, by reintroducing into linguistic models and the communicator's awareness the inborn *cognitive-biological equipment* the communicator naturally possesses but seems to have lost the contact with.

It has to be noted at this point that the proposed hypotheses and models need further elaboration and empirical testing. The current study offers but a novel perspective on the process of language, communication and the mechanism of manipulation.

2. Manipulation and communication. Sorting out reality from illusion

The illusion of manipulation in communication comes down to the purely theoretical aspect, namely to the starting-point definition of language. If we open our analysis of manipulation by describing language as a system, internally stratified, self-sufficient and self-generating, we then can look for ways of lying or intentional directing of the language exchange. Grammatical, lexical or stylistic steps, when analyzed from the systemic perspective, do create the possibility to lie verbally. This approach to language manipulation has been taken up by modern linguistics. In the present study, Puzynina's analyses will be outlined, as developed in her book *Język wartości* (1992) (Eng. *The Language of Values* – translation of the title M.B-T).

2.1. Puzynina's systemic approach to language manipulation: the illusion of manipulation supported and sanctioned

In her book (1992), Puzynina aims to discuss the issues of 'lie' and 'manipulation'; she adds several accompanying concepts, i.e. values, ethics. The main problem with the presented analyses is that the author – rather unintentionally or non-consciously – equates the linguistic/ systemic study with the psychological-sociological-cultural – anthropological study. In other words, for Puzynina, the psychological truth about communicators can be derived directly from lexemes, phrases, texts. Puzynina declares to use the semantic and systemic approach (1992: 11). The linguist writes:

> Let's, in turn, consider the strategies of manipulating people. Dictionary of the Czech language does not give any specific methods, English language dictionary, on the other hand, talks about craftiness or deceitfulness, by means of which one can influence the manipulated person (..) (cit. Puzynina, 1992: 210; English translation – M.B-T)[1].

So, next chapters of Puzynina's book discuss the psycholinguistic and cultural notions of *value*, *lie/lying*, and *manipulation* by reviewing a considerable collection of text samples and phrases in which these values are believed to be present. They are, naturally, present there linguistically – lexicologically; however, a psycholinguist has considerable doubts whether we can derive a psycholinguistic or cognitive truth from them.

While talking about 'values' which are present in a person's life from the moment of birth, and being individually selected throughout the person's life experiences, Puzynina happily observes that 'what is nice for Ann, may be ugly for Mary; what is just for Peter, may be unjust for Paul' (cit. 1992: 6; English translation – M.B-T)[2]. The author

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[1] Z kolei rozważmy sprawę sposobów postępowania, za pomocą których dokonuje się manipulacji człowiekiem. Słownik czeski nie wymienia żadnych sposobów szczególnych, słownik angielski natomiast mówi o przebiegłości lub kłamliwości, za pomocą której uzyskuje się wpływ na manipulowanego (…) (Puzynina, 1992: 210).

[2] Przede wszystkim, to, co dla Anny jest ładne, dla Marii może być brzydkie, co dla Piotra sprawiedliwe, dla Pawła – niesprawiedliwe (cit. Puzynina, 1992: 6).

admits the relativity with which such notions, as the notion of *value*, are to be treated. A visible inconsistency is, however, that in the following parts of the book Puzynina forgets about this essential relativity she has noticed, and undertakes a search for information in semantic studies of linguistic conventions. To illustrate, next sections of the book include:

(1) About lie and lying. The history of the lexeme.

(2) The verb 'to lie' in contemporary Polish

(3) The word 'manipulation' in the Polish language (cf. Puzynina, 1992).

The consequence of equating systemic knowledge with the psycholinguistic knowledge is that there is no awareness on the part of the linguist of the two levels of language:

1. Language as a cognitive process (the individual level)

2. Language as a social/cultural process (the macro level of language; here we can find conventionalization, generalizations, reductions, stereotypes, automatic communicative behavior, and other).

The analysis, which is undertaken by Puzynina, can reveal information about the collective consciousness/nonconsciouness and the way it categorizes the notions of *manipulation*, *value*, *lie*; in other words, Puzynina's analyses do provide us with information on how are such notions as *value*, *manipulation* or *lie* perceived by the public discourse. A psycholinguist understands, though, that in modern linguistics we shall distinguish between the mechanisms of the collective mind (which is the society, culture, language community) and the individual mind (a communicator with his/her 'truths', values, meanings, knowledge, strengths and deficiencies.

As concerns the mechanism of manipulation, in Puzynina's book the following systemic features and strategies are enumerated, which enable manipulation:

1. Language manipulation on the level of texts:

    a. it involves lie,

    b. it involves demagogy,

    c. it includes axiological elements,

    d. euphemisms,

    e. and hyperboles,

    f. it includes redundant portions of texts, to make an impression of talking to the point,

    g. avoidance of certain expressions and words,

    h. and usage of generalizing phrases (Puzynina, 1992: 218).

2. Language manipulation refers also to certain strategies of word selection and phraseology:

    a. certain features of words influence the receiver, without him/her realizing it consciously,

    b. elements of language which facilitate message reception and internalization as they create nice atmosphere and a sense of easiness: emotionality, or the esthetic value of the message, rituals, coloring, simplicity, rhymes, slogans, etc.

    c. lements of language which sent intended messages non-directly, non-explicationally: word play, suggestion, semantically ambiguous lexemes, ambiguous grammatical structures, grammatical structures which block negation, grammatical structures typical of objective truth formulation used for subjective, manipulative message construction, etc. (Puzynina, 1992: 218-221).

In the subsequent sections of this analysis, dynamic, 'eco' linguistics is proposing totally new approaches to the issues of *language*, *communication*, *value* and *manipulation*.

2.2. The pulsating, situationally parametrised nature of human language and communication

A broad, multidisciplinary approach to language and communication, in which language is defined as a multilayer process, demonstrates the unsubstantiated assumptions underlying the traditional claim that communicators can manipulate each other in communication. Disciplines which provide counterevidence to traditional linguistic stance are:

    a. psychology and psycholinguistics,

    b. natural sciences, biology, zoology,

    c. ecolinguistics.

The psychological and psycholinguistic research provides us with extended knowledge of emotions as cognitive processes, and microexpressions being cognitive-physiological programs which enable sending the emotional information to the interlocutor. Biological and zoological research provides knowledge of chemical signals, pheromones in intraspecies and interspecies communication. Ecolinguistics explores nonlinear, multilayer, momentary nature of human language and communication and invites the psychological, psycholinguistic and biological models into a joint research effort to study human communication.

2.2.1. Functions of emotions: an outlook in the present cognitive/psychological literature

The functions of emotions defined as cognitive processes can be summarized as follows (cf. Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Maruszewski and Ścigała, 1998; Ohme, 2007):

    a. Emotions are always switched on. Cognitively, we function using mental models built with help of emotions. All that we do mentally is supported and enabled by the emotional mechanisms.

b. The emotional system can be neutral, or can accelerate positive or negative emotions, depending on the ego-centric assessment the cognitive system does, assessment which directs the emotional programs towards some action, non-action being one of the options.

c. Even bioneurally speaking (after Ohme, 2007), the sensually received information goes for deciphering to the thalamus (nonconsciously) and then to the amygdale for emotional processing (nonconscious processing progresses); later, it may go either to bioneural regions which process signals within or beyond the scope of consciousness. In other words, the incoming stimulation, the one entering a person's mind, is initially verified by the nonconscious emotional neurocognitive regions.

d. Emotions judge the stimulation with reference to our well-being.

e. Emotions elicited in the communicators inform each other about each other.

f. Emotions provide feedback information - while we not always realize what goes on in our minds, our emotional reactions give us information about us. What is essential, emotions give us feedback information about our implicit knowledge, to which we have no direct access.

g. Emotions, through the microexpressions, enable the communicator's truth to be passed on; make manipulation, lie impossible.

h. Emotions enable adaptation.

i. Emotions may be dysfunctional if out of sync with the rest of the system; when either external or internal ecosystem has lost balance.

j. Emotions make it impossible to be objective, as they co-participate in building the communicator's mental map of the world. The cognitive system is not efficient enough, nor is it emotionless (that is, ego-independent) to enable neutral behavior or assessment.

In interpersonal communication, it is emotions which always communicate genuine intentions of the communicator. It is possible because of emotional programs operating beyond a person's awareness. In other words, we are not aware of the subtleties of our emotional minds processing, thus, we cannot alter our emotional processes. Although, we can lie, or manipulate our words or even some aspects of our body language, still, we are not able to steer the microexperssions or the biochemical signals we are sending out which carry the information about our genuine communicative intentions[3]. Thus, quite literarily, humans are equipped by nature with mechanisms and cognitive–emotional-physiological programs which, on the one hand, send out truth about us; on the other, enable us to read the truth in others with whom we come into contact.

The present study proposes a revision of approach to language manipulation; interdisciplinary, ecologically-oriented linguistics, which locates communication processes within a wide context of other life processes, notices the illusion of language manipulation.

3. The ecolinguistic model of communication: beyond systemic manipulation towards the communicator's might and control

It is in fact a communicator's choice whether, while entering a communicative situation, he/she stays within the collective mind frame. The communicator, every time he/she enters the communicative situation, has a two-way choice. If he/she believes in his/her total dependency and subjection on the collective mind voiced in the public discourse, the collective communicational frame is activated in his/her mind, which pre-selects cognitive and communicational tools to be used in this particular communicative situation. In simpler terms, when

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[3] It is not the purpose of the present analysis to concentrate on the biological or zoological research outcome. The report on what biologists have found about chemical or physiological intraspecies or interspecies communication will be undertaken in my book which will elaborate the proposed here model of communication.

we pre-select for ourselves the role of a member of the collective mind, we – literally – start thinking and behaving as a hebetudinous and torpid element of a higher-order decision-making mechanism. We give up our powers for self-determination and autonomy.

The other communicative-cognitive-interactional pathway available to us at the onset of any communicative situation is to go into the conversation as a fully autonomous agent, as an individual with his/her own decision-making powers. This pre-selected mode of communication handling will immediately open the cognitive, emotional and biochemical potential that we have at our disposal; this decision will start organismic programs different than in the first, 'collective-consciousness mode'. As if we decided to switch on our mental-physiological systems to work full-power. So, in the communicative event, a person can act either as a cultural/social being; or an individual being. This double-mode construction of the communicator's profile is illustrated in the Diagram 1 below. As a consequence of this dichotomous machinery we are equipped with, 4 alternative dyad patterns in communication are possible, which is marked in the diagram by means of four arrows. In my model, the sender and receiver switch roles, so the communication process is bi-directional.


Diagram 1. Four alternative patterns of communication dyad between Communicator 1 and Communicator 2.

3.1. Frames of communication

The frame-structures model of the human mind, in its manifold versions proposed by cognitivists in modern research, is based on the idea of human minds functioning as maps of the world, which enable us to 'read' or comprehend the reality and ourselves. For example, Lamb (1999) distinguishes three worlds:

(1) the real world,

(2) the mental system which attempts to reflect the real world,

(3) and the projected world, which is the compromise or the blend of the mental world being projected onto the real objective reality.

In other words, we are able to read or understand only these aspects of the reality to which we have the mental keys in our minds (cf. Mandler, 1984). Frames, as mental knowledge structures enable this 'reading' of the reality; they are defined as attribute-value sets, with the pre-established, fixed attributes of a given aspect of the reality, and the virtual, not-specified-yet values (cf. Bogusławska-Tafelska, 2002). In communication studies, the notion of frame of communication has been introduced, which refers to the mental structures being activated while initiating every communicative behavior (cf. Kiklewicz, 2007: 20). Such a communication frame will also specify our role and position in a given communication situation; it is proposed in the present study that such a communication frame will specify our psycholinguistic identity for the purpose of a particular communication situation. In simple terms, every time we enter communication situation, we switch on some selected mental structure, which will determine the complete mental-bevavioural-physiological program to be at work for a communicational intercourse – to – be.

The cognitive model of mind composed of frames can be helpful in understanding how it is possible that a communicator, at the onset of every communication situation, 'chooses' his/her role in the communication, chooses the communication dyad pattern to be realized in this

particular communication situation. The communicator, while entering the communication situation, defines himself/herself either as the social/cultural self, or the autonomous/self-determining self (see diagram 1). In the present preliminary analysis, only these two basic alternatives are discussed; in practice, however, a mediation between these two polar positions –the social self and the autonomous self – can happen within one communication process.

As a result of this initial, noncoscious, self-orchestration, the mental-behavioural-physiological recourse base gets opened, to be at help in communication. The two alternative levels of the person's linguistic-mental identity have their own recourse bases with mental, emotional, motivations, behavioural and physiological tools to be used in a given communication situation.

Furthermore, the communicator while entering every communicative situation has the two basic complementary routes he/she can go in the communication. As a result, the same communicative situation has at least two potential scenarios, from which one is pre-selected by the communicator. This choice determines the communication scenario that will be realized, as a result. The communication situation will get even more dynamic and pulsating when other interlocutors enter the scene, with their own communication frame choices and their identity choices.

3.2. The communicator as the social being

When the communicator chooses to act as the part of the collective mind, all his/her systems – cognitive, sensory, biological, neural, emotional are subject to the collective mind representation of the world. Just as the human mind navigates the functions of the organism; the collective mind can navigate them as well; the collective mind takes up the charge and starts steering the system's functions. Today, in the public discourse, an individual is totally deprived of his /her powers. The collective mind reflected in the public discourse has it that we can and eventually are continually manipulated, steered, subject to external mischievous influences of other ego-beings. We cannot help it. Conse-

quently, when a communicator chooses the frame of communication in which he/she acts as a part of the collective mind, he/she takes up all the belief patterns, automatic thought reactions and stereotypical, re-creative conceptualizations the collective mind operates on. And the next immediate consequence will be for the communicator to switch off or neglect the cognitive-emotional-physiological programs that enable creative, manipulation-less and fruitful communication to occur. It seems that quite literally we choose to be victims of communication manipulation, if we chose to believe in this possibility.

3.3. The communicator as the autonomous being

The cross-disciplinary research has been providing more and more evidence of such phenomena as: microexpressions or chemical informa-tion-carriers such as pheromones. In this preliminary study, I intend to point out that human communicators are naturally equipped with all mental and organismic tools to be fully autonomous and self-determin-ing in a communication situation. Humans as communicators can ac-cess the level of communication where they send, receive and read genuine communicative intentions of the interlocutors. This level of interaction rejects any possibility of language manipulation. On this level, manipulative efforts on the part of the interlocutor are read through immediately; they receive no attention, whatsoever. A commu-nicator opens himself/herself to read what is behind words, or what co-builds the message apart the wording of the message.

4. Preliminary conclusions

That said, I will set the following hypothesis for further consideration: communicative manipulation cannot occur when the targeted person is self-aware and consciously chooses to execute not only his/her so-cial/cultural self (which is, in a sense, anonymous, subordinate to collective consciousness forces); but also execute his/her cognitive-

biological- communicative potential as the individual being. Hence, self-awareness and the sense of sovereignty and personal autonomy, together with a communicator's choice (may it be conscious, semi-conscious or non-conscious), predetermine the degree of safe, equal and non-manipulative communication scenario.

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Elwira Szehidewicz

Emotions in a cognitive-behavioural therapy session – a relevance theory perspective

Being aware of how vast and multidisciplinary the study of emotions is (Cichmińska, 2010; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987), I limit the aim of the article to carrying an analysis of two pieces from cognitive-behavioral therapy session with the use of the relevance theory framework.

Relevance theory is a useful tool in analyzing communication (including emotion language) as it assumes that all human behavior is geared to the maximization of relevance and that each communicative act carries the assumption of its own optimal relevance (Cognitive and Communicative Principles of Relevance) (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995/2002).

In my paper I try to show that in order to understand the language of emotions, we are inclined to consider communication to be based on inferential processes of combining different kinds of information in order to strengthen or contradict old assumptions or to form new contextual implications. I also show that it is crucial for the speaker and the hearer to share some mutual assumptions about the world in order to communicate emotions successfully so as to solve the patient's problems.

Two examples from two different therapy sessions are analyzed. One of the examples includes naming and rating emotions felt by the patient and the other one involves the patient's difficulties in distinguishing bodily symptoms from emotions.

Keywords: discourse, emotions, relevance theory, cognitive-behavioural therapy

1. Introduction

Study of emotions is broadly discussed in many fields of scientific enquiry such as psychology, anthropology and linguistics (Cichmińska, 2010; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). The analysis of emotion concepts

presented in this article is limited to depicting some emotions appearing in a small piece of cognitive-behavioural therapy session and examining them with the use of relevance theory. In line with the theory's assumptions, in order to understand the language of emotions and communicate emotions successfully, we are inclined to consider communication to be based on inferential processes which include the speaker and the hearer having to draw relevant implicatures on the basis of speaker and hearer's mutual cognitive environment, appropriate explicatures and any new information available at hand.

The nature of cognitive-behavioural approach to therapy gives an impression that it allows for very clear expression and understanding of emotions. Psychotherapeutic communication of emotions in this type of therapy seems to produce a satisfying number of cognitive effects at a cost of expanding a lot of processing effort on the part of one or both of the participants taking part in therapy.

The article begins with a brief introduction to psychotherapeutic discourse studies and a short outline of the relevance theory of communication as well as cognitive behavioural psychotherapeutic theory. Before proceeding to the discussion of emotion talk in therapy, a short formulation of patients' problems, whose exchanges are analysed, and the therapist's psychotherapeutic experience are presented. One of the examples of exchanges from therapy sessions concerns naming an emotion and specifying its strength and the other one involves problems with distinguishing between emotions and physiological symptoms.

The transcription convention of the analyzed extracts was taken from Shiffrin (1994).

2. Discourse and psychotherapeutic discourse studies

The study of discourse is a very broad subject widely discussed in many sciences ranging from philosophy to linguistics and literature (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001). Among many theories of discourse there is space for pragmatics and relevance theory. There are many approaches such as, for example, conversational analysis, social con-

structionism, discursive psychology, narrative analysis, variation analysis and critical discourse analysis that have made a big impact on discourse and therapeutic discourse analysis (Jaworsky and Coupland, 1999; Shiffrin, 1994). In general, discourse analysis can be defined as "(…) the analysis of language in use. The discourse analyst is committed to an investigation of what language is used for" (Brown and Yule, 1983: 1). Also, "[d]iscourse analysis refers to (…) language above the sentence or above the clause(…), is also concerned with language in use in social contexts, and in particular with interaction or dialogue between speakers" (Stubbs, 1983: 1).

The study of emotion talk in therapy is a study of a specific kind of discourse that some have called therapeutic discourse (Labov and Fanshel, 1977; Mahoney, 1991), but others call it clinical discourse (Muller, Guendouzi and Wilson, 2008: 5). Clinical discourse analysis focuses on interactions of people with language and communicative impairments, which always has clinical purpose. Therapeutic discourse analysis, on the other hand, may have therapeutic purpose, but it may also concentrate on the linguistic analyses of talk in the context of therapy of patients without any visible language impairment. I would like to assume that neurotic patients should not suffer from a language impairment (Ball, et al. 2008), but, as some studies show, language of a patient may actually provide cues to the process of patient's diagnosis and intervention (Sherman and Skinner, 1988). For example, there are studies that analysed markers of different mental states in patients in therapy (eg. Lamboy, Blanchet and Lecomte, 2005).

Psychotherapeutic discourse has already been analysed within some of the previously mentioned approaches to discourse analysis. However, it should be noted that there are not many analyses which would be based on actual therapy session transcripts and there is very little cross-referencing between studies (Avdi and Georgaca, 2007: 158; Avdi, 2008). Labov and Fanshel (1977) were the protagonists of therapeutic discourse studies. They used variationist analysis in the thorough analysis of a 15 minute psychoanalytic therapy extract of a female patient. Other studies analysed patient's narratives from the constructivist perspective with a concentration on client micro-narratives

(McLeod, 1997, after Avdi and Georgaca, 2007a; Ferrara, 1992, after Avdi, 2008). Wodak (1997) discussed group therapy sessions from the perspective of critical discourse analysis and pointed at the fact that there are language barriers between doctors and patients that are attributable to social class differences and there exists the difference in power between the patient and the doctor-therapist. Lewis (1995) analysed an extract from his therapy with a female patient using Tannen's (1990) approach to discourse analysis and showed that therapeutic discourse is often like cross-cultural or cross-subcultural communication (Lewis, 1995: 6) with the therapist often talking in too much high-considerateness style and patient talking in too much high-involvement style. His analysis also showed that it is critical for therapeutic sessions to achieve a feeling of involvement and coherence. The therapeutic process really 'clicks' (Lewis, 1995: 3) if the participants share assumptions (largely unconscious ones) about how they proceed in discourse. "The assumptions that a participant brings to the conversation are his or her 'conversational style'. When conversational styles are matched and there is involvement, coherence is achieved"(Lewis, 1995: 3)

Even though relevance theory has already been successfully used in the analyses of clinical talk of children with pragmatic language impairments such as Asperger syndrome or autism and it proved very useful in depicting different levels of comprehension abilities or disabilities in these children (Leinonen and Ryder, 2008), I have not found any studies of therapeutic discourse within relevance theory.

3. Relevance theory – basic information

Relevance theory is a useful tool in analysing communication (including emotion language). It assumes that all human behaviour is geared to the maximization of relevance (Cognitive Principle of Relevance) (Sperber and Wilson, 2002: 256) and that each communicative act carries the assumption of its own optimal relevance (Communicative Principle of Relevance) (Sperber and Wilson, 2002: 258). Optimally relevant behaviour should be "relevant enough to be worth audience's process-

ing effort" as well as be "the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 259). An ostensive behaviour, which is made mutually manifest to the participants of the communicative event, has to be as relevant as possible for the information to be positively conveyed and understood. Thus, the aim of communication is to produce maximum cognitive effects (strengthening or contradicting old assumptions or forming new contextual implications) for the smallest processing effort.

In the process of comprehension, the hearer in order to retrieve the informative intention of the speaker needs to test the interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility in the task of forming appropriate explicatures (which involves such mental-linguistic processes as decoding, enrichment, disambiguation and reference assignment) and retrieving intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises) and intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions) (Sperber and Wilson, 2002: 262). Implicated premises usually come from the memory and assumptions held by the hearer while implicated conclusions are usually formed on the basis of the explicatures of the utterance and the context (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995: 182-196).

Relevance theory is very useful in the analysis of metaphor, which is treated as a kind of category extension, or broadening, of the conveyed concepts (Wilson and Sperber, 2002). The assumption is that the literal interpretation of a word does not have to be considered before its metaphorical interpretation by using ah hoc concepts which are an immediate explicature to the meaning of the words used where the literal meaning can be immediately overlooked (Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 272).

4. Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT)

Cognitive-behavioural therapy (Beck, 2005) is based on the assumption that in every situation people have thoughts whose consequences are threefold: emotional, physiological and behavioural. One of the many characteristics of thoughts (called Negative Automatic Thoughts) is that

they may produce emotions which may be much stronger and may last much longer than the initial thought. Apart from negative automatic thoughts, our cognitive appraisals are built on the basis of our experience about the world, about ourselves and others in the form of many functional and dysfunctional assumptions and beliefs which in turn direct the way we think we should act and live (Clark and Fairburn, 2006).

Therapeutic process should be based on the relationship of partnership and good understanding of the patient's core problem presented in the form of patient's formulation of his/her problem. The process of therapy incorporates many cognitive techniques (working with thoughts – e.g. reformulating, cognitive distortions; Socratic dialogue; arrow down technique; metaphors; etc.) (Leahy, 2003) as well as behavioural techniques involving different kinds of behavioural experiments.

> Even though it may seem that emotions are pushed aside in this approach to therapy, they are present every time a given situation is being analysed. Usually, emotions are openly stated and their strength is measured on a scale from 0 to 100%, where 0 means that the emotion is very weak and 100% means it is very strong. One of the main ways of helping a patient recover is to make him or her aware that emotions sprang from the cognitive appraisals we hold about a given situation. This is the starting point for almost every therapeutic process in cognitive-behavioural approach.

5. Patients

The first patient is a woman in her thirties. A wife and a mother of two. She works professionally in an international company. The problem with which she came into therapy was fears about going by bus to work and panic attacks on the bus. She lost hope for any improvement. It later turned out that she also had some minor personality problems with being too dependent and avoidant, but also equipped with some paranoiac personality traits. She believed that she was always in the center of everybody's attention and people usually had bad intentions

towards her. At the same time she avoided social meetings and public places not to be discovered about her true personality. After 17 therapy sessions she found new hope for herself, started going to work by bus and started believing that she is actually in control of her life and emotions. Although therapy should have continued longer, she decided to stop it for some unspecified period of time.

The other patient, also a woman in her thirties, a wife and a mother of one child, working for public administration, suffered from various fears about life and death which concentrated around the issue of her health which in turn resulted in panic attacks. Her psychiatric diagnosis sounded – extended psychosomatic neurosis. She participated just in few therapy sessions, because she found a solution to her problem in the form of pills. She believed that she is weak, hopeless, lonely and stupid. Her deepest assumptions concerned her responsibility for bringing up her daughter and the need to survive and be strong for the child. One of her main assumptions was that *If I die or become ill, I will not be able to bring my child up and she will forget me*. In her panic attacks she feared that she was having a heart attack or that she was suffocating and fainting. In the course of her therapy she was introducing a lot of information noise in order, it seems, to cognitively and emotionally avoid discussing the essence of her problem.

I worked with the first patient just after obtaining permission to carry individual psychotherapy issued by The Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapeutic Association in Poland in 2011 and with the second lady I worked as part of my psychotherapeutic training in 2009. What seems to be important is that I have not yet myself undertaken my own individual therapy, which means that the work I am trying to complete is also part of my self-discovery as a therapist and as a person.

6. Naming and rating emotions – the first patient

The first exchange takes place between the therapist and the first patient. It is an extract from the middle of the therapy course when fear of losing control on the bus was discussed.

(1). T: „Jakie emocje towarzyszą tej myśli?"

"What emotions come with this thought?"

P: „No ... to będzie dalej lęk."

"Well... it'll still be fear."

T: „A co się dzieje z lękiem? Czy osłabł?"

"And what has happened to fear? Has it become weaker?"

P: „Nie, dalej utrzymuje się."

"No, it is still the same."

T: „A procentowo na jakim jest poziomie?"

"And in percentages.. on what level is it?"

P: „tak 80–90%."

"around 80–90%."

The speaker and the hearer, here the patient and the therapist share mutual environment which is connected with a context of therapeutic session. The session concerned a thought that seemed to be prevailing in the patient's experience of a panic attack happening on a bus. The thought was *Zaraz stracę kontrolę (I'm losing control)*. After some time of discussing the invalidity of the thought, its strength and the strength of the resulting emotion are regularly checked.

This is a standard procedure in CBT.

The intention of the therapist is to weaken the belief in the existing thought and weaken the strength of the emotion. Even when the therapist is asking about the strength of the emotion there is an expectation that the values would be lower. Hence the question *Did it get weaker?* The intention of the patient may be to depict as closely and truly as it is possible the strength of the experience of the emotion with hope that something would be different/better.

At this stage of the therapy the patient and the therapist share some mutual assumptions about how they work on the problem. Apart

from sharing mutual assumptions about the world, the therapist possesses knowledge of the emotional experience of the patient and the patient possesses knowledge of the ways the therapist and therapy work. Mutual assumptions that may be crucial in the analyzed fragment (probably among many other assumptions) may be: 'If we talk about emotions, we need to measure them', 'If there is a thought, there is also an emotion', 'If the emotion is strong then it is 100% strong', 'If the emotion is weak, it is 0% weak', 'If I ask about the emotion, I need to get an answer', 'If I am asked about the emotion, it may be important to name it and give it a numerical value', 'If the strength of the emotion stays the same, then the discussion was fruitless', 'If the discussion was fruitless, we need to approach the problem from another angle'. 'If the strength of the emotion is the same, then I am not getting any better'.

The explicatures of the patient's input are: 'The emotion that I (the patient) continue to feel is fear and fear has not changed. The fear has not got any stronger or weaker since when we last measured it. The strength of fear is approximately between 80 and 90 percent.' The explicatures of the therapist's input are: 'I want to know whether the patient feels better', 'I want to know if fear got weaker'.

The contextual assumption of the therapist was: 'If nothing changes, then the discussion has no point and we need to start all over in a different way, which would be a disaster.' The contextual assumption is strengthened, because nothing has changed. For the therapist the process of undertaking this discussion takes some effort, but there is an additional cognitive effect for the therapist, who acquires information about the emotional state of the patient. There is also a chance that the strength of the emotion might have become lower and then a possible positive cognitive effect for the therapist would be satisfaction. However, in this example the cost is a low level anger at the fact that despite so much effort in illustrating the invalidity of the thought *I'll lose control*, the faith of the patient in the thought and the level of the emotion stay the same.

The implicated contextual assumption of the patient is probably: 'If the level of my fear is lower then I must feel better and something is

changing' or 'If the level of my fear is higher or the same, then nothing is changing'. New information is that fear turns out to be still on the same level between 80 and 90 percent. The contextual implication may be that nothing has changed and I feel the same, which is not good as well as therapy has done very little to change the way I feel. However, what sustains the process of therapy may be a belief that therapy should help and if we continue long enough and try long enough the positive cognitive effect to be attained is enormous and worth all the effort.

7. Emotions and the body – the second patient

The second exchange to be analyzed took place somewhere in the beginning of the course of the therapy. It might have been the second or the third meeting. What is being under discussion is what exactly happens when a panic attack occurs. In this session the discussion circles around bodily symptoms, emotions and behaviors. However, it is somehow difficult for the patient and the therapist to discuss the emotional state of the patient. In general, throughout therapy it was very hard to separate thoughts, emotions, physical symptoms and be-havior in the formulation of the patient's problem.

(2). T: "Czy pamięta Pani, co się działo w Pani ciele? Co było pierwszym impulsem do tego, że zaczęła Pani myśleć, że znowu się zaczyna, że muszę wstać?...Czy coś zadziało się gdzieś w ciele?

„Do you remember what was happening in your body? What was the first impulse to your thought that it started again and that you had to get up?… Has anything happened somewhere in your body?"

P: "NIE!? Tylko takie dziwne uczucie, jakby mnie coś ścisnęło w środku klatki piersiowej, takie tak jakby, o Jezu, tak czasami się zdarza jak człowiek z czegoś bardzo się cieszy,

że ŚCIŚNIE najpierw i taka radość, a to ściśnie i właśnie to ten atak."

„NO!? Only this strange feeling as if something gripped me in my chest, something as if, o God, this sometimes happens when you are very happy, it GRIPS you first and such a joy, and this grips you and so this is this attack."

Mutual cognitive environment of the two participants of the interaction consists of the context of the therapy, all the (often unsaid or unconscious) assumptions about the way they cooperate and all the information they have about each other. They are analyzing in detail what is happening in a panic attack. In order to do so, they need to find both emotional and physiological symptoms of the attack.

The therapist's intended contextual assumptions that the therapist wants the patient to retrieve are that there is something happening before the action of getting up and that there is something happening in the body before a behavioral response (the activity of getting up) occurs. The explicatures of the therapist's input may be that 'I want the patient to remember what was happening in the body of the patient, what was the first impulse that caused the thought that the panic attack started again and the patient feels the need to get up from her bed'. Then, after a short pause the therapist repeats the question *Has anything happened in your body?* with the same explicature that 'the therapist asks a question and wants to know what happened with the patient's body'. The repetition might have been a therapeutic mistake in the sense that probably it should not have occurred. By repeating the question, the therapist made her input stronger and possibly invasive or even aggressive for the patient. This, unfortunately, might have resulted from the therapist's negative assumptions about the patient such as 'she is a difficult patient, without self-reflection and desire to change'. Of course, the therapist had also many positive assumptions such as 'she is so nice she does not deserve to suffer like that'.

The answer to the therapist's question is a very strong *No*, which was also filled with a tone of a questioning surprise and indignation. The patient's implicated premises might have been that 'if the therapist

asks me a question, then I am to give her an answer', 'if the therapist asks me about my body, I need to tell her how I feel', 'I need to tell her something, because she will be satisfied/angry if I don't tell her, it may help me', 'she does not have to repeat the question. I am not stupid'. Her old assumptions might have been 'I am hopeless, so I need to say something', 'It feels so bad with the panic attack', 'I need an instant help, not going around and around the same things'. New information is that she is being asked about her physiological symptoms and all the retrieved bits of her memory about the way she felt in the discussed panic attack. New contextual implications may be that 'I will tell the therapist how I felt, but I am furious at such an inability to understand how I feel', 'The whole panic attack feels bad and it is not just in my body', but also 'There must have been something happening in my body'.

The explicatures of the patient's answer may be: 'In my body I – the patient – felt only a strange feeling as if something gripped me in my chest that resembled a feeling of being happy, which is a feeling when there is a sudden grip and a person starts to feel joyful. This is exactly how the panic attack grips the patient'. For the therapist, new contextual information is that the patient feels something in her body. It is similar to the feeling of being gripped by happiness, but probably with some negative repercussions. One of the therapist's old assumptions retrieved on hearing the patient is that the patient has problems with distinguishing between her bodily symptoms and emotions and she has problems with self-reflection. The most important contextual implication for the therapist is that the patient feels something very strongly in her chest and it is important to specify how exactly this grip in the chest is experienced.

The line of interpretation so far shows that processing effort for both participants of the exchange is great while there is very little positive cognitive effect for either the therapist or the patient. What may at least to an extent equal cognitive effects with cognitive effort is a possibility in which the patient's input is considered to be a metaphoric use of language, which would save processing effort by allowing the therapist to immediately adhere to an ad hoc concept of something

gripping somebody in the chest as something quick, strong, hurting heavily without releasing the subject and not necessarily imagining somebody or something performing the act of gripping. Along a similar line of reasoning, comparing real joyfulness with the negative feeling in the patient's chest may be considered to be a kind of category extension of the concept of extreme emotions and bodily experience. It proves that for this patient emotions belong to the same category as bodily feelings and are inseparable. To be true, the ad hoc concept that came to the therapist's mind was that the grip in the chest is a very positive and strong feeling. It is not a prototypical understanding of a feeling of being gripped by someone or something, because if you are gripped you do not feel comfortable at all. Actually, this would agree with the fact that this patient's panic attacks were very useful and important in the patient's life, because her problem was in the center of her family life, was sustained by family members and the patient had various and mostly unrealized profits from not being healthy. It might be possible that she got used to panic attacks to such an extent that her best choice for comparison was joyfulness. It is something that still needs to be thought about and I believe I have not yet exhausted the discussion of this exchange.

8. Conclusions

In the discussion of the two examples from therapy sessions, it seems clear that it is the ability to make inferences about speaker's intentions that helps in creating good understanding of the language of emotions. Relevance theory proves to be a useful tool in analyzing psychotherapeutic conversations about emotions. It shows the importance of mutual cognitive environment between the therapist and the patient in the context of psychological therapy. Communication in the first example seems to flow, because the therapist and the patient already share mutual assumptions about how they work and how they talk about emotions. In the second example, there are tensions and problems with naming bodily symptoms, the therapist and the patient put much more

effort into discussing emotions and bodily symptoms probably because the participants of the second therapy extract do not yet share enough mutual assumptions about the way they should cooperate and think about body and emotions. Moreover, both of the discussed examples show that being in cognitive-behavioral therapy requires a lot of cognitive processing effort both on the part of the therapist and the patient in order to arrive at some conclusions and gain at least a little amount of cognitive effects. Sometimes, these cognitive effects may arrive only after a longer period of time. A lot depends on the effort put in the process, but also on the speaker's cognitive abilities and range of emotional possibilities. A lot may also depend on the amount of shared experience and length of therapeutic relationship.

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Izabela Dixon

Fear – aspects of the language of control and manipulation

Wild and selfless, yet tame and selfish, controlling yet uncontrollable, fear is as relevant an emotion today as it was millennia ago – even before the start of human civilisation.

As felt by animals, fear is a mere instinctive reaction. However, for humans, it is an emotion that governs their minds and destinies. This authoritarian emotion acts like an entity which possesses the power to *speak* to the ego. Seeking self-preservation, people submit to fear, which has the capacity to enslave them, especially if used as a tool by the powerful.

In his *Emotion Concepts* (1990) Kövecses named a number of source domains for fear metaphors, among which he identified a FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR and FEAR IS AN OPPONENT IN THE STRUGGLE metaphor. These and other metaphors encapsulate fear's oppressive and controlling aspects in people's lives. The present article is an attempt to show that fear blends with ignorance, deceit, and danger, together with which it not infrequently disposes people to commit fiendish and cold-blooded acts, all of which have found justification through figurative expressions used in everyday discourse. Fear is one of the most toxic and forceful ego-centric emotions.

Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, blend, fear, control, manipulation

1. Introduction

Fear is a ubiquitous emotion experienced by both those who are virtuous and those who are corrupt. In traditional fables about brave knights one may find a hero who knows not what fear is. Similarly, in non-fiction literature, one may also read about selfless people who put their lives at risk performing heroic acts. Fear is instinctive and primeval; fearlessness, however, is not.

Primordial fear predates people, civilisation and language as an impulse to flee from danger; it first aided animals and later humans in their struggle for survival in competitive and hostile environments. Making a comparison of fear as felt by humans and animals Svendsen remarks: „Biologically speaking, we are to a great extent equipped with the same apparatus for feeling fear as other animals, but our cognitive, linguistic and symbolical skills provide us with a completely different register of emotion" (2008: 27). It is then people's cognitive skills coupled with speech that allow people to schematise fear, ruminate upon it, project it, and even plan how to instil it in other people. In dealing with fear, people's cognitive abilities are of some benefit to them – people can abstract, rationalise and possibly vanquish their terrors. However, language, can function as an adversary as it may be used as a powerful tool for arousing fear and elevating its levels.

The awareness of the power that speech possesses probably dates back to the early stages of language when people's capacity for abstract thinking allowed the development of persuasive devices along with those for the expression of imperatives. With the advancement of societies with hierarchical structures, there would be a man of words at the head of a tribe who possessed wisdom and the power of vision. From what is known, tribal leadership did not depend on language alone, but one can assume that language empowered rule making long before the rhetoric of political discourse had been formulated.

Aristotle sees a man as a «political animal» that, unlike any other animal, has received from nature the gift of language: „Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of speech" (Politics, 1253a7, translated T. A. Sinclair). Judging by how language is used today, especially in the field of politics, one can argue that language gives people the power not only to judge, evaluate and persuade, but also to coerce and manipulate. More importantly, while language can exist without politics, politics cannot exist without language. As Chilton and Schäffner note: „[w]hat is clear is that political activity does not exist without the use of language. It is true that other behaviours are involved: for instance, physical coercion. But the doing of politics is

predominantly constituted in language (2002: 3)". Newsmakers and politicians constantly plague readers with skilfully expressed *hair-raising* messages about *the stock's wild swings, sharp declines in GDP*, or *soaring prices.* Such stock phrases, along with many other expressions of this kind, are employed in order to keep anxiety levels at maximum pitch. Daily news perpetually warns people about palpable dangers, and emotive phraseology conjures up vivid, almost tangible, images of pending economic disasters, elusive mass murderers or other terrors to come. Fear, being innate, needs little conditioning, however, and those who control the discourse of fear can facilitate it to influence their audience.

Although life-expectancy in the western world has improved considerably since the Second World War, modern lifestyles are not free of dangers, including old or more recently acquired enemies which may put people's welfare and lives at risk. The context of modern fears has been summarised by Bauman as follows:

> Most fearsome is the ubiquity of fears; they may leak out of any nook or cranny of our homes and our planet. From dark streets and from brightly lit television screens. From our bedrooms and our kitchens. From our workplaces and from the underground train we take to get there and back. From people we meet and people whom we failed to notice. From something we ingested and something with which our bodies came in touch. From what we call «nature» (prone, and hardly ever before in our memory, to devastate our homes and workplaces and threatening to destroy our bodies through proliferation of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, mudslides, droughts or heat waves), or from other people (prone, as hardly ever before in our memory, to devastate our homes, workplaces and threatening to destroy our bodies through the sudden abundance of terrorist atrocities, violent crime, sexual assaults, poisonous food and polluted air or water) (2006: 4–5).

Because the media constantly remind people about their frailty, fear „becomes all-embracing, thereby undermining each individual's possibilities for realizing a positive vision of his life" (Svendsen, 2008: 105). Thus „life ends up as nothing but a cohesive defence against dangers that threaten from all sides" (Svendsen, 2008: 105), sometimes leading

to defensive aggression or mis-directed hostility. This omnipresence of fear, however, cannot easily be counteracted. Feelings of anxiety, or even dread, are perhaps ameliorable by various daily routines people perform, only to be aroused again by another disturbing piece of news in the local or national press.

Ever since the events of 9/11 2001, the general outlook on the world's safety and the perception of fear has subtly evolved. For hundreds of thousands of people who are unlikely to become direct victims of terrorist attacks the fear of terrorism has become a possible reality that has to be prevented at any cost, so missiles are launched, and international troops are dispatched to Afghanistan and Iraq – all under the deliberately elusive label of the «war on terror», coined by George Bush. The rule of terror is now firmly entrenched in the consciousness of the average person while political and journalistic narratives have stretched the semantic boundaries of many words, employing a variety of figurative structures to mystify and further induce the belief in new demons.

2. Fear as an emotion

Emotions are a part of people's mental structure and lexicon. In describing and shaping mental states and abstract ideas people need to adopt language (Kövecses, 2007: xi). In order to assimilate complex experiences equally complex mental structures are created. Clark compares such structures to „a mind-transforming cognitive scaffolding: a persisting, though never stationary, symbolic edifice…" (2011: 44) – this busy mental activity results in an intricate network of mental categories often symbolic in nature. Metaphorical and figurative expressions as a part of that complex network allow a speaker to elaborate on his or her experiences. The use of metaphors is justified by Ortony who claims that „[t]here are phenomenological and psychological reasons for supposing that metaphors are more image-evoking and more vivid than even their best literal equivalents" (1993: 78); hence, the more abstract the experience, the more symbolic the language required to express it.

The English lexeme *fear* can be classified as a feeling simply because *fear* can be *felt*. This common collocation refers to particular physical sensations resulting from biochemical reactions within the body when fear is being experienced. However, being also a cognitive state or reaction, *fear* can be referred to as an emotion. Svendsen (2008: 22) regards emotions as entities having both internal and external manifestations:

> Emotions are often viewed as being purely internal, accessible only via a kind of introspection on the part of the person who feels them. They are, however, not simply concealed, purely mental entities but also behaviour, actions and expressions that are visible from the outside.

Fear can even produce violent physical reactions. A frightened person may experience dizziness or faintness, heightened blood pressure, a quickened heart rate, heart tremors, or stomach cramps, such bodily reactions representing some of the internal sensations. The external expressions of fear can include goose bumps, perspiration, and/or a «wild» look in the eyes, while gasping or averting one's eyes from something are examples of fear-stimulated behaviours. Being both in the body and the mind, emotions, as Wierzbicka (1999: 2) points out, seem to require „three elements": „thoughts, feelings, and bodily events /processes)". Fear as an emotional response can be triggered by thoughts, sensations or situations and therefore it is more than a mere psycho-neural response; it is environment/culture and context bound. Indeed, Svendsen (2008: 21), goes even further in calling fear a „culturally conditioned *habit*".

3. Fear in metaphor and social context

The mores and social norms of any community rely on shared values and depend on the systems that protect them. The factors which shape the general set of attitudes and policies of a nation would have been evolved from the social history and experience of whole generations and this is why „knowledge and experience of emotions are not inde-

pendent of the social context in which they occur" (Svendsen, 2008: 24), particular fears and resentments being part of that experience. Islamophobia, to illustrate the point, is one of the most prevalent tendencies shared by a significant number of nations across Europe and North America and by many countries in other parts of the world which remain in alliance with the government of the USA. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Islamophobia is a universal experience as it is shared by many culturally diverse countries. It is already a deep-seated fear of the kind that may affect the safety of an individual and pose a threat to the integrity of different nations.

Metaphorically, fear is predominantly oppressive and pejorative. Kövecses (1990, in Kövecses 2007: 23) classified the following fear metaphors

FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER: The sight *filled* her with *fear.*

FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY: Fear slowly *crept up on* him. The thought continued to *prey on* her mind.

FEAR IS A TORMENTOR: My mother was *tormented* by fear.

FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING: He was *haunted* by fear.

FEAR IS AN ILLNESS: Jill was *sick with* fright.

FEAR IS INSANITY: Jack was *insane with* fear.

THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF: I was *beside* myself with fear.

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT IN THE STRUGGLE: Fear *took hold of* me.

FEAR IS A BURDEN: Fear *weighed heavily on* them.

FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE: She was *engulfed* by panic.

FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR: His actions were *dictated* by fear.

The above fear metaphors seem coherent with the general system of emotion metaphors, being a FLUID IN A CONTAINER, an OPPONENT and a BURDEN (Kövecses 2007: 23). Because biochemically fear

and anger are very similar (Svendsen, 2008: 25), it is not surprising that fear and anger metaphors share ceratin source domains: OPPONENT, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, and INSANITY (Lakoff: 1990: 380–395). Fear-specific source domains – the ones not available to other emotions – are HIDDEN ENEMY and SUPERNATURAL BEING (Kövecses 2007: 48).

The deep symbolic experience of fear allows scope for the formulation of other fear metaphors. On the basis of how fear is conceptualised and represented in English-speaking cultures it seems justifiable to introduce the following fear metaphors:

FEAR IS OMNIPRESENT: Fear is *ubiquitous.*

FEAR IS A NATURAL DISASTER: Fear *tremors shook* her body.

FEAR IS EVIL: If evil is the thing that prevents us from being or doing good, then fear is the greatest evil of them all.

FEAR IS A DEMON: The demons are at the door howling and trying to break through the ramparts and into my inner sanctum.

FEAR IS A SERPENT: When death is taboo, fear uncoils.

FEAR IS DARKNESS: I felt a gloomy foreboding of impending danger.

FEAR IS OMNIPRESENT is subordinate to EXISTENCE metaphors, particularly EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (Kövecses 2007: 41), while FEAR IS A DEMON is subordinate to the FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING metaphor. FEAR IS EVIL is an ontological metaphor. FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE is superordinate to FEAR IS A NATURAL DISASTER.

4. Fear is evil

In figurative and symbolic expression, as noted by social philosophers, fear is intricately connected with evil (Bauman 2006: 54), while Levy (2000: 27) says that fear has a pernicious influence. Fear is detrimental

to an individual's success and has many guises and these characteristics have frequently been utilised by the media. Svendsen, in his acknowledgement of the fact that „human life is frightening" observes that „[i]n fear we are met by something outside ourselves, and what we meet is a negation of what we want" (2008: 12). What a person fears resides in his or her mind, but usually it is something that poses a threat. People may have «scary» thoughts and dream «terrifying» dreams but objects of fear are all those things which can prevent people from having a future and which bring calamity into their very existence.

Evil, which is a source of harm and depravity, naturally arouses fear in people. Both fear and evil are entities that share the same mental space, and as particular concepts related to both of them are activated at the same time, they both also evoke similar imagery. When a person is confronted with evil, he or she is also almost inevitably confronted with fear.

What makes fear evil is its ability to take many forms while not having any one in particular, or to have many «faces» while at the same time being faceless. Dwelling in an abstract space both evil and fear share various qualities, as is shown in the following ontological correspondences:

Source: FEAR   Target: EVIL

Both fear and evil are

 – negative abstract entities

 – pernicious and dangerous

 – elusive

 – powerful

 – omnipresent

 – controlling but uncontrollable

Some epistemic correspondences:

Source: Fear is atrocious; it can cause turmoil and harm.

Target: Evil is feared for being malicious and scheming; having devious intentions.

Source: Fear is activated when confronted with something evil.

Target: Evil is shapeless but can take many forms. Amorphous entities cause terror.

Source: Fear is overpowering.

Target: Loss of control over one's life or body can be the result of malicious forces.

Source: Fear is ubiquitous.

Target: Evil that is everywhere but hidden instils fear.

Source: Fear is the controlling hand of evil.

Target: Evil manipulates people by spreading terror.

Being elusive and difficult to delineate, makes fear oppressive. As remarked by Bauman, „[f]ear is the name we give to our *uncertainty*: to our ignorance of the threat and what is to be done – what can and what can't be – to stop it in its tracks – or to fight it back if stopping it is beyond our power" (2006: 2). Similarly, ignorance is often seen as the root cause of evil: anything outside people's knowledge poses a potential threat. The following three examples clearly connect fear with evil:

(1) Fear is the root of all *evil.* (Roosevelt, 1933)

(2) If *evil* is the thing that prevents us from being or doing good, then *fear* is the greatest *evil* of them all.

(3) „An *evil spirit* is passing through the country," […] „An *evil spirit of fear* that the leadership is exploiting the threats around us in order to say that the world is against us, and that we

should unite over excluding those that are different, and hating foreigners."

In the first example the concept of root activates a FEAR/EVIL IS A PLANT metaphor (it has roots, it can grow, etc.). In the second example FEAR/EVIL are conceptualised as OBSTACLES TO DOING OR BEING GOOD. And in the third example fear and evil are seen as SUPERNATURAL BEINGS in the form of a spirit. Both fear and evil are markedly negative entities. The mapping that justifies the FEAR IS EVIL metaphor is in the harm that is central to both fear and evil:

$$FEAR \rightarrow harm \leftarrow EVIL$$

Evil is a wicked and deceitful entity – it intends and causes harm. Fear, by causing mental turmoil, harms the individual or causes the individual to inflict harm.

Fear, however, should be seen as distinct from evil in the fact that fear is an emotion and has both mental and non-mental states (Ortony, 1987: 349), while evil is a highly abstract concept.

4.1. Osama bin Laden – fear/evil incarnate

From medieval times well into the Renaissance the church preached death (Delumeau, 1994: 501-534). The media and the governments of today have taken on a similar creed. Preaching death and Armageddon has become largely the gospel of the present times. The abundance of fear strengthens its potency, and, aided by its rich symbolic expression, fear becomes all-powerful, all-consuming and highly contagious. Hence, into the focus of media reports come such spectacular events as natural disasters, occurrences of deadly viruses and violent terrorist attacks, along with numerous other sensational death scares. People have become willing and eager receptacles for media driven fears.

Fear has always been an important component in the workings of political regimes and democratic systems alike. Terror and intimidation have invariably been used by those who hold power in totalitarian

systems. Hoffman writes that „a system of government-sanctioned fear and coercion" was a convenient tool which enabled regimes to ensure total compliance. It also empowered regimes to declare «enemies of the state» and thus facilitate particular responses towards, for example, specific ethnic minorities (Hoffman, 2006: 35). The state has the power to manufacture and institutionalise fears as well as to identify supposed public enemies and strike them down, to follow particular interests or implement particular policies (consider the execution of bin Laden).

In the western world the general feeling of unrest has increased since the events of 9/11, which became a milestone in the international discourse concerning terrorism and its perpetrators. The FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY metaphor (Kövecses 1990, in Kövecses 2007: 23) neatly encapsulates what Bauman states about the nature of fear

> Fear is at its most fearsome when it is diffuse, scattered, unclear, unattached, unanchored, free floating, with no clear address or cause; when it haunts us with no visible rhyme or reason, when the menace we should be afraid of can be glimpsed everywhere but is nowhere to be seen (Bauman, 2006: 2).

In other words, fear needs a form, otherwise it is impossible to counteract. For more than a decade the elusive figure of Osama bin Laden was the face of terrorism and the fear it instilled. Closely associated with 9/11, Osama bin Laden, until his capture and summary execution on 2nd May 2011, was one of the most vilified men in the world. Being the founder of al-Qaida, he alone, through the process of scapegoatism, was blamed directly for the death tolls resulting from various terrorist attacks in America and across the Muslim world. Bin Laden remained a scarecrow throughout the duration of the witch hunt he was the object of, and, surprisingly, even yet is feared.

Metonymically – a part for the whole – Bin Laden, being the front figure for al-Qaeda, came to represent many things to many people. In the world's press releases, which followed his capture on 2nd May, a number of figurative references to his name can be found bearing strong axiological charges. All the analysed instantiations tend to incor-

porate conventional imagery and involve negative valuations of Osama. Krzeszowski states that „both the degrees of conventionality and the degrees of motivation tend to be in proportion to the degree of axiological stability of a given symbolic unit. Whatever differences arise across particular language users have to do with different experiences connected with particular concepts" (1997: 49); this seems to be confirmed by the range of the imagery employed in addressing Osama bin Laden or in the substituting of his name for a variety of negatively charged concepts for approximately a decade. These concepts range from the very conventional representations of evil to the somewhat less conventional „Ding, dong, Bin Laden is dead", a reference to a song from *The Wizard of Oz* film of 1939 (explained in detail later). Fear and evil seem to be the salient property of Osama as the referent.

In the attempt to analyse the linguistic material, several questions have arisen with regard to the motivation behind the replacing of the name or the indirectness in reference to Osama bin Laden, which made him an incarnation of fear an evil:

– Is it symptomatic of the «he-who-must-not-be-named» psychology proposed by J.K. Rowling in her Harry Potter series?

– Is it an example of providing a more adequate imagery?

– Is it a part of a process of naming one's fears?

– Is it more of a process of renaming of a particular concept (evil) or allocating a more symbolic value to a person?

– Is it to express value judgement while manipulating the opinions of readers?

– Is it a basic metaphorical substitution of X for Y?

Some of these questions have more philosophical overtones and are not discussed in this paper; they will, however, be addressed in a subsequent study.

5. Who, according to the press, was Osama bin Laden?

Writing in the Guardian on 5th of May, Deborah Orr expressed disappointment and disbelief over the triumphalist reactions to the news of Osama bin Laden's death.

> A lot of people, however, seem to believe that evil itself has been murdered, and not a man, *criminal mastermind* notwithstanding. Headlines proclaiming „Rot in Hell"? Triumphalist crowing about state-sponsored assassination? A snuff-movie feed to an invited audience at the White House? None of this is seemly. It's just inappropriate.

A symbol/icon of terrorism; an embodiment of evil *or* an evil doer; a criminal mastermind, a baddie *or* a bogeyman; a demonic terrifying figure; a cockroach *and a* nemesis – *anything but a man was Osama bin Laden in the reports of the English language press. The death of* the national hate figure, *was seen as a* victory *and* the end of an era, *as* justice being done *and* mission accomplished, *the last one mimicking the phrase used by George W. Bush at the capture of Saddam Hussein. The persuasive images are a part of the rhetorical mode adopted by those who control the bin Laden narrative.*

5.1. Butcher of 9/11

«The surgeon is a butcher» (Vega-Moreno, 2004) is a blend that is slightly differently structured to that of «Osama bin Laden is a butcher of 9/11» blend, which portrays Osama as a mass murderer rather than an incompetent physician. The context frame for the following examples is 9/11, Osama being seen as fully responsible for the attacks:

(4) That's because, for a lot of Americans, the purpose of the US war in Afghanistan remains inseparably linked to its initial cause: *9/11.* Now that *the arch-perpetrator of that crime* has been removed, why, many Americans will ask, do we need to stay?

(5) Across the US, local newspapers captured a similar sense of triumphalism, albeit in slightly more measured words. In Idaho, the Press-Tribune showed the Twin Towers burning on 9/11 after the planes had struck them with the headline „Justice has been done". The Examiner in San Francisco declared the „*Butcher of 9/11 is dead*". In Prescott, Arizona, just one word was deemed sufficient for the Daily Courier: „Dead".

(6) As *the perpetrator of the most lethal terrorist attack on US soil*, Bin Laden was a national hate figure, loathed far more viscerally than, say, Saddam Hussein.

The theory of blended spaces (or domains) proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1994, in Kövecses 2002: 227-229) suggests that the input spaces (domains) may not be related, as they are in the case of Osama (Input Space 1) and butcher (Input Space 2). The correspondences within the blend are established through the generic space which is common to both domains. The result is blended space. In the GENERIC SPACE common to Osama and a prototypical butcher are: an agent, a role, a goal and work space, as well as the methods or means used by the agent in achieving his/her goal. In the INPUT SPACE 1, Osama (agent) is the head of a terrorist organisation (role) which waged jihad – a holy war on infidels (goal). He staged violent terrorist attacks on the territories of different countries (work space) using violent methods and thus killing people (methods and/or means). In the INPUT SPACE 2, there is a butcher (agent), whose job is to slaughter animals (role) as a way of earning a living (goal) in a butcher's establishment or a slaughterhouse (workplace). He uses specialist methods to do this, killing animals and dressing the meat (methods). Additionally, there is a common belief that butchers are desensitised to the act of killing and the sight of blood. In the BLENDED SPACE is Osama, who caused many violent (bloody) deaths. Being the mastermind of operations by means of which thousands of people rather than animals were killed makes him *an arch-perpetrator of that [9/11] crime.* The epithet butcher in the case of Osama, means that he is seen as a ruthless insensitive slaughterer of people. OSAMA BIN LADEN IS A BUTCHER OF 9/11 blend:

5.2. The embodiment of global terrorism

The western world has come to associate present-day terrorism with Islam and violent extremism, which have reached global proportions. Since 11th September 2001, „the war on terror" has redefined the conflict into an endless brawl between the sides involved – a tug-of-war, which is kept in play rather than resolved. The rules for this new type of struggle differ from those which apply to a typical military conflict in that no longer is there a «frontal clash» as the reticent enemy is

scattered among ordinary people, biding its time and awaiting the orders to wreak violence and chaos (Eco, 2007: 17–20). As Eco points out:

> If September 11 was the start of a conflict, in this new phase of neowar the front completely vanished. Even those who see the Western world and the world of Islam clearly set against each other know that the conflict is no longer territorial. The infamous rogue states may be hotbeds of terrorism, but terrorism has no borders. It is also present in Western countries. This time the enemy is behind the lines (2007: 17).

But where do the media stand in this conflict? Eco (2007: 18) asserts that after 9/11 the media helped bin Laden to spread his message of doom by continuous broadcasts of how he had destroyed the centres of America's power. They also aided the government in relaying its definition of terrorism in which bin Laden functioned as the symbolic central figure:

(7) What lies ahead for the Middle East as it contemplates two contradictory realities: on the one hand, the massively popular peaceful revolutions taking place in the Arab world, and on the other, the death of *the symbol of violent extremism*, of a leader of tiny marginal and marginalized groups?

(8) Once the rejoicing at the elimination of bin Laden, the „*symbol of the cancer of terrorism*" is over, the West should move rapidly to review its regional policies.

(9) BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner says that, to many in the West, Bin Laden became *the embodiment of global terrorism*, but to others he was a hero, a devout Muslim who fought two world superpowers in the name of jihad.

The examples show that Osama bin Laden has become a symbol and the embodiment of terrorism – semantic substitution of one man for the whole phenomenon of terrorism.

5.3. The world's most wanted man

> (10) But for now at least, the killing of *the world's most wanted man* presents the president with an important opportunity.

THE WORLD'S MOST WANTED MAN does not have the appearance of a metaphor at first glance, but underneath the literal sense there is also an implied less literal meaning. In the context of the article the *man* is Osama bin Laden. The schema an average reader is likely to apply when interpreting this sentence is that relating to the concept of a WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE poster – a criminal is wanted for the crimes he/she has committed. Bearing the infamy of a war criminal and having a price on his head, bin Laden, really was a wanted person. The figurative meaning is therefore in the use of *the world's* and *most wanted*, when the world actually refers to the USA and extends to perhaps a number of nations involved in the „war on terror". The phrase *most wanted* shows the specific motivation of the speaker and an axiological valuation of the referent. It is, however, hard to imagine that there exists a league table of wanted people.

5.4. An enemy

OSAMA IS AN ENEMY or was an enemy is strongly supported in the statements below, ranging from *public enemy* to *hostis humani generis:*

> (11) The staging of the announcement, in the form of the American president's firm and carefully worded statement on live television, was designed to convey the impression of calm in the hour of victory over terrorism and over *America's public enemy number one.*

> (12) If he is remembered only as an *enemy of the United States of America*, as someone whose death is simply a vindication of US patriotism, this narrative obscures the terrible harm he did to the very Muslims he falsely claimed to be defending.

(13) American officials are clearly elated that, at last, their number *one enemy* is dead. But they must also be wondering whether, in death as in life, he will continue to haunt them.

(14) This is a moment to consolidate that view – by also emphasising bin Laden's regional crimes, rather than describing him solely as *the West's enemy-in-chief*.

(15) Reagan during the Cold War, took the few known facts about Bin Laden and Zawahiri and fitted them to the template they knew so well: *an evil enemy* with sleeper cells and „tentacles" throughout the world, whose sole aim was the destruction of western civilisation.

(16) Bin Laden was one such man, an *enemy of civilisation.*

(17) Let it not be forgotten that Osama bin Laden was not just a nemesis of the US, but with his advocacy of mass murder and extreme repression, was *an enemy of all humankind – hostis humani generis.*

Seeing a single man as an enemy of one country seems somewhat exaggerated; however, example (14) extends to the whole of the west, while (16) applies to civilisation in general, and (17) to the whole of human kind. The possible rationalisation for the use of this imagery is to evoke in people's minds a particular concept. Nobody who has seen the Twin Towers collapse in flames could doubt for one moment that bin Laden was the archenemy and a nemesis (17): visual imagery received a strong linguistic reinforcement, and as Semino points out, „metaphor is a particularly important linguistic and conceptual tool for the achievement of persuasion" (2008: 85).

5.5. The wicked witch

The Wicked Witch of the East is a character from a children story „The Wonderful Wizard of Oz" created by Frank L. Baum, which in 1939 was turned into a film. „Ding-Dong, the Witch Is Dead" is one of many

songs that became popular tunes. The song in the movie is sung by small people – the Munchkins – who revel in the death of their oppressor – the Wicked Witch of the East – when the house of Dorothy from Kansas lands on her. Interestingly, the same tune was heard among the crowds who celebrated the killing of bin Laden:

> (18) Such is the power of Twitter and Facebook, when combined with the more traditional grapevine of college students out drinking, that it was only minutes after President Obama's announcement that the first revellers arrived outside the White House and struck up the chant: „*Ding, Dong, Bin Laden is dead*".

Clearly the concept of the wicked witch from the tune blends with bin Laden at the point of them both being oppressors.

Witches were for centuries implicated in occult practices and it was believed that the «maleficent magic» that they could perform was due to a pact they had entered into with the Devil. It is not surprising then that witchcraft was considered to be a sin and a heresy (Thomas, 1997: 436–437). The long association of witches and evil still exists in the consciousness of many nations and the very fact that Osama eluded the witch-hunt for so long a period of time results in his having taken on a demonic or diabolical quality:

> (19) The US – with the help of a few Navy Seals – found the *elusive* Osama bin Laden, shot him in the face and then deep-sixed the *diabolical* diabetic somewhere in the Arabian Sea.

5.6. The ghost/supernatural being

A ghost, normally an evil spirit, may loom after the death of a person. This concept became entrenched in medieval times leaving a rich legacy of ghost stories. Thomas (1997: 588) notes that: „[I]t was a heinous offence for a dying person to promise to return to the land of the living". Bin Laden in his lifetime did not make such a threat but, following his death, his ideology is likely to linger on, which would

make it possible for him to *haunt* western civilisations through his followers and descendants, as is apparent from the following examples:

(20) Will Osama Bin Laden continue to *haunt* the US?

(21) Osama bin Laden: dead, but still a *spectre* for the world.

It is seems that the threat Osama posed did not die with him. The examples constitute an attempt to do justice to the convenient assertion that the evil influence is here to stay, until the legacy of bin Laden is quashed completely.

5.7. A dictator

The final example, below, contains a simile in which Osama bin Laden is compared to Hitler and Stalin:

(22) With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, Bin Laden was elevated to the realm of evil in the American imagination once reserved for dictators like *Hitler* and *Stalin*. He was a new national enemy, his face on wanted posters. He gloated on videotapes, taunting the United States and Western civilization.

The validity of this comparison can be questioned on the strength of the lack of direct parallelism. Hitler and Stalin were instigators of mass murders on a scale that was unmatched by bin Laden, and, in addition, they were leaders of countries and heads of parties and governments. Bin Laden was but a leader of a small diffuse group of ethnically diverse people.

What justifies this comparison as in all the previous metaphorical instantiations connected with Osama bin Laden is examined in this paper. The symbolic value of *evil, enemy, mass murderer*, and *war criminal* that were and continue to be attributed to bin Laden put him on a par with the most infamous figures in human history. The correspondences can be made in his political prominence as a replacement for America's

Cold War enemy – Stalin. Asymmetrical analogies are often used by journalists because they are very evocative and help create new demons.

6. Conclusions

Culture-based value judgements are often based on presuppositions arising from national stereotypes. In the assessment of, for example, what might be considered to be *the world's greatest evil*, one may have to take into account the cultural background and geographical setting of the assessor. Langacker (1987: 123) points out that „[f]or many types of conception – particularly those grounded in visual experience – the importance of viewpoint is self-evident" (1987: 122). Two notions are particularly important when forming a viewpoint about a particular object in physical space: «vantage point» and «orientation». Extrapolating from this view, it seems reasonable to suggest that when evaluating an idea, or even a person, similar criteria can be applied to those suggested by Langacker. Orientation could correspond to a person's cultural environment or his or her religious views, while vantage point would refer to his or her ethnicity or geographic location. The symbolic values attached to Osama bin Laden, particularly in the USA, are strongly connected with the vantage point of the American nation. The 9/11 attacks, which occurred on American soil, are the context or environment, while the Islamophobia which slightly pre-dates these attacks would serve as the point of reference or orientation in the discourse on terrorism.

How powerfully frightening one man can be is a question that has been answered in numerous press articles and personal blogs, where the imagery would extend to beast and *dragon*, and the like. The examples studied in this work come from the press only, as surveying the blogosphere would require a much more extensive study. The motivation for the metaphorical labels attached to the name/person of Osama bin Laden, reflect the deep-seated fear that he came to represent and the negative reactions are attributive of *fear, evil, danger*, and *decep-*

tion that in people's consciousness Osama stood for. The pejorative imagery is connotative of the concepts which correspond to different mental representations of fear. The symbolic imagery of *evil, enemy, ghost, butcher*, and *witch* are fully conventional.

The manner in which people identify individuals and label them stems from the natural need to arrange things into categories. The mental systems people create help them respond to the experience of the world and are a technique for the assimilation of experiences. A similar technique is used by children when they learn basic concepts about the world. The most probable motivation for the press to seek to employ such a range of concepts in the narrative about Osama bin Laden is the way he was branded by politicians. As stated by Adam Curtis writing in the Guardian:

> Journalists, many of whom also yearned for the simplicity of the old days, grabbed at this [the Bin Laden story]: from the outset, the reporting of the Islamist terror threat was distorted to reflect this dominant simplified narrative. And Bin Laden grabbed at it too. As the journalists who actually met him report, he was brilliant at publicity. All three – the neoconservatives, the „terror journalists", and Bin Laden himself – effectively worked together to create a dramatically simple story of looming apocalypse. (3.05.2011)

Osama in being categorised as *the symbol of violent terrorism* (in the more recent extension of the meaning of the word «terrorism»), is more of an icon of the modern times – the post-9/11 era. The culture of fear, a term coined and popularised by Barry Glassner in 1990, epitomizes the present-day reality that is basically fear driven. Fears that are entrenched in human consciousness have been forged in the furnace of human history, which is full of violence and deception. On such firm foundations it is easy to construct new models of fear and apprehension. The *cupboard monsters* are now *sleeper cell enemies*; for instance, members of al-Qaida. The media and politicians persistently fill the minds of people with apocalyptic visions of impending doom. New powerful enemies (Bush's „axis of evil") are identified by the authorities and, like every marketable merchandise, are branded. These, how-

ever, are branded with stigma (rather than a logo or trade mark) that helps people conceptualise the dangers attached to them. When terrified people, who might be ignorant of facts, do not seek knowledge, they turn their self-defence mechanisms on and accept the solutions proposed by the fear-mongers themselves, who expertly use their manipulative discourse to conjure up a vivid picture of the evil enemy in his secret lair.

Finally, „the war on terror" is an interesting phrase in itself. Why not „the war on terrorism", terrorism being a much more definable socio-political trend with tangible agents, which can be faced in direct combat and annihilated? Terror, is an elusive, formless and abstract entity and therefore is not really susceptible to destruction by conventional means. It would seem that the choice of words might not have been chance but deliberate as *terror* can be shaped to fit political agendas.

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Iwona Góralczyk

The grammar of (negative) emotions

This paper is an attempt at a cognitive linguistic analysis of a few non-lexical ways of expressing emotions. As shown in a handful of constructions, construing the scene of an emotionally charged event can amount to making syntactic and morphological choices in the linguistic coding of that event. Semantic in nature, the emotional charge can then "surface" as the preference for the passive, the reported or direct speech, the hyphen construction in compounding or diminutives.

Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, mimesis, subjectification, constructional meaning, construal

1. Introduction

Of a rich variety of means that any language has at its disposal to express human emotions grammar is in popular understanding probably the last that comes to mind. And yet, as we shall try to demonstrate below, in conceptualizing emotions and encoding such conceptualizations linguistically we systematically resort to what can most conveniently be couched as the grammar of a language. In other words, the focal interest of the present paper is such images, or construals of a conceptualized event, that amount to **syntactic** and **morphological** choices the conceptualizer makes to encode the event that is emotionally charged.

Arguably, language appears to be particularly resourceful in conventionalized mechanisms of expressing **negative emotions**, hence the focus of this analysis is on emotions valuated as negative.[1]

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[1] Let us assume, following Krzeszowski (1997:47–62) that valuation in cognitive grammar terms is an aspect of conceptualization and it marks high degree of centrality of an

As part of the goal of this research we shall attempt to investigate **cognitive motivation** for the analyzed grammatical constructions and identify **conceptual processes** involved that account for the access to such negative emotions.

It will be claimed that, underlying the syntactic, morphological, phonological and phonetic structures that we are going to discuss, there are such cognitive mechanisms at work as, among others, **conceptual metaphor** and **metonymy**, **mimesis** and **subjective viewing arrangement.**

Specifically, we shall claim as follows:

- Cognitive processing underlying the constructions discussed is mostly **metonymic** in nature;
- **Mimesis** (a verbatim report of somebody's words) has a huge expressive power and is a very productive conceptual strategy, particularly well suited to express (negative) emotions;
- **Pragmatic inferences** are relevant for the grammatical encoding of an event;
- Language is indeed **usage-based**, a linguistic unit is only fully meaningful in its social and cultural context;
- The pragmatic concept of **distance** is relevant for the characterizations of many of the structures encoding negative emotions; the concept can be "translated" into facets of construal (in Langacker's 1987, 1991 sense);
- If not part of the **schematic** characterizations of the presented structures, expressing emotions is nevertheless well motivated in such structures (Langacker 1987)[2];

The **methodology** adopted for the research will be that of **Cognitive Linguistics** and **Cognitive Grammar** and it is in the cognitive linguistic sense that we shall be using the above notions. Pursuing,

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axiological domain (Domain of Values) in the matrix of domains contributing to the conceptual content of an expression. Evoked by the concept of a given emotion, say FEAR, such a domain is furnished with bipolar, horizontal negative-positive axes on various levels of the hierarchy of values, which form the vertical dimension of the domain. Valuation involves profiling a region on the domain of values.

[2] For the distinction between a schema and a prototype compare Langacker (1987:371).

however, a more eclectic approach we shall also be relating, as noted above, to a generally accepted pragmatic notion of **negative distance**.

Even if emotions are undoubtedly part and parcel of the conceptualized scenes I shall be referring to, always there in their cultural and social background, in the human ideas and practices evoked by them, such emotions are not often overt or clearly delineated, so that we tend to conceptualize them simply as "positive" or, in focus in the present analysis, "negative". As we shall see, such covert, negative emotions cannot be readily separated from intellectual attitude. The examples provided come mostly from the Polish language. It is beyond doubt, however, that the mechanisms and structures referred to are not a unique property of Polish.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 centers first on the passive voice and then on reporting speech and how the syntactic choice of direct and/or indirect speech pattern may affect the emotional charge of the message. A verbatim, or mimetic report continues to be the focus also in Section 3, now in the morphological processes of compounding. Derivational morphology provides many more resources to convey emotion, our analysis further focuses on the diminutive and its expressive power. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4.

2.1. Syntactic structures: the passive and avoiding agens- as- subject

Non-cognitive English grammars characterize syntactic structures of the passive voice in the following manner: "Whether there is an agent or not, we think in the passive more about the person or thing acted upon and about the action itself than about its source, which becomes remote and impersonal" (Gethin 1992:156).

In light of the above, consider (1), a quote from a Radio Gdańsk broadcast about a world famous, very young Polish ballet dancer from Gdańsk, unhappily married to a Greek, who, in an act of domestic violence, broke the ballet dancer's (!) leg. Her dramatic and successful fight with cancer and then her determination in fighting her way

through the divorce were recorded in the radio reportage, which gained much public interest:

(1) *Dziecko zostało mi podane…..*

I was handed the baby…

This has been uttered in a speech situation involving three participants only: the ballet dancer, her husband and the baby[3]. One cannot possibly question a huge negative emotional charge of the utterance. And it appears justified to claim that those negative emotions are delivered not in the lexical choices but via the **syntactic construal of the clausal pattern.**

Rendering the analysis in cognitive grammar terms we would refer to such analytical tools as the **billiard-ball model**, **action chain**, **role archetypes** and canonical situation types or **event schemas,** the **transfer schema** and **construal**. In brief, the grammatical encoding (core) of the speech situation/event in (1) is equivalent to a specific conceptual situation/event (Langacker 2000, Radden and Driven 2007)[4]. The two cognitive models capturing our understanding of events, i.e. the billiard-ball model and the action chain model, assume that we perceive situations/events as an interaction, understood as the energy flow, between the participants of that situation. Conceptually, the participants and the interactions are polar opposites. The former are discrete physical objects instantiated in space, while the latter are energy transfers instantiated in time, dependent for their existence on the autonomous participants. Prototypically, they are respectively nouns and verbs.

Participating entities differ in their role archetypes, or semantic roles such as agent, patient, instrument, experiencer, mover, etc (Fillmore 1968, Croft 1991:157-163). Prototypically, the minimal action chain comprising a two-participant event/speech situation starts with the agent/head – the instigator, who volitionally initiates physical action

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[3] Note also an impersonal structure *Podano mi dziecko*. Arguably, it is a setting subject construction (Achard 1998: 282)

[4] Radden and Dirven (2007) assume some difference between event and state and propose the cover term for both: speech situation.

resulting in the energy transfer to the patient - the tail and the energy sink. In a three-participant situation in (1) the conceptual make-up is as follows: the brute is the agent, the baby the patient and the ballet dancer performs the archetypal role of the recipient/beneficiary. To put it in other words, (1) fleshes out, or instantiates, the **transfer schema**, in which the agent transfers a thing/instrument to a recipient. In a canonical arrangement the agent is construed as the most prominent participant, **profiled** as focal and grammatically coded as subject NP. The brute fully qualifies: he is human, acts volitionally, is exclusively responsible for the event and is its salient cause (Kemmer 1993, Taylor 1995, Givón 1984, Hopper and Thomson 1980). And yet, the speaker in (1) carefully avoids construing the situation in a canonical manner[5].

If not part of the schematic characterization of the construction, via selecting a secondary focal figure as the subject NP the syntactic construction of the passive voice may prove particularly well suited to convey **distance** and indirectly reveal strong negative emotions. The **motivation** in terms of cognitive operations for such a non-canonical construal will be sought in general human mechanisms of **perception** and **prominence**, such as, for example, human ability to foreground or background entities in perception and conception.

2.2. Syntactic structures: reporting speech and mimesis

The second syntactic construction selected for the analysis is built on a very different type of cognitive operations. We shall start with indirect reports. Instead of typical examples of the indirect speech construction, however, we shall discuss what I consider a most convincing example coming from Polish novelist W. Kuczok and his heartbreaking 2003 novel Gnój/ "Muck", both for the artistic merit and high expressive power of Kuczok's story-telling skill and for his experiments on the conceptual plane of narration.

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[5] Consider the unconventional construal of agentivity in a quote from a Polish cult movie *Dzień świra*, which can be said to mark the polar opposite from (1) on an imaginary non-agentive/ fully agentive axis: (excusez le mot) *Facet sra mi swoim psem pod samym balkonem.*

If you have read the novel you know it is all about emotions, about hate and hass-liebe of a child towards its parent, the troubled relation between the son and the father who regularly abuses his own son by whipping him until the boy is bleeding. In such context, when the son informed his mother that he started bleeding from his nose again, Kuczok describes Mother's habitual behaviour as illustrated:

(2) *Matka zaraz **jezusowała***.

Mother would start despairing, crying 'Jesus'.

Lit* Mother would verb-Jezus.

It surely is a case of reporting speech, in which a single event is coded as a single clause, apparently presenting the speaker/narrator's perspective, or voice, only. No personal deictic shifts, which typically accompany indirect reports, are involved but tense adjustments have been done relative to the speaker's (actual) ground, i.e. the speaker's conception of the here and now, the addressee of the utterance and the setting of the speech situation, by default the vantage point from which the conception has been viewed. The choice of the past tense represents the speaker´s/narrator's interpretation of the scene, or situation viewed as distant from the here and now of the speaker.

While apparently fitting the pattern of the indirect speech construction, (2) is nevertheless a mimetic report, so, technically, a case of direct speech (Langacker devotes scarce attention to the construction of direct speech, stipulating that here "S is obliged to **echo** the exact words of S‴"1991:254). As a matter of fact, it could not be more mimetic, so to speak. Accordingly, it will be doubted whether (2) is a linguistic coding of a canonical arrangement of the indirect speech construction. Instead, we shall postulate some other, extremely interesting processing mechanisms.

What we need for a cognitive grammar analysis of what is happening on the conceptual plane of the scene of the speech event is the distinction between viewing an event from an external perspective and an alternative: viewing an event in the situation when the viewer himself is part of the conceptualized scene. In the former, the OVA or

objective viewing arrangement, the object of conceptualization O is maximally distant and distinct from the subject S entertaining the conceptualization of O. In Achard's explanations, S is so involved in the activity of observing O that he 'loses all self-awareness', allowing the scene to be **objectively construed**. The linguistic coding of the situation reveals no presence of S within the area conceptualized – see the circle in Fig. 1. (Achard 1998:62).

Fig. 1. The Optimal Viewing Arrangement (OVA)

In the EVA, or egocentric viewing arrangement, while remaining the observer of the scene, the subject S entertaining a conceptualization/ object of conceptualization O, becomes part of that conceptualization himself. The event is now construed **subjectively.** See the figure below:[6]


Fig. 2. The Egocentric Viewing Arrangement (EVA)

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[6] In such light the process of subjectification, which is vital for the present analysis, would then consist in the OVA being replaced by the EVA. Langacker (2000: 298) proposes a modification to the effect that "(...) this subjective component is there all along, being imma-nent in the objective conception, and simply remains behind when the latter fades away." For the purpose of the present analysis we shall adopt this view, assuming that the subjectivity of construal implicitly accompanies also the objectively construed scenes of the speech event and its 'surfacing' is merely a result of attenuation of the objective basis for a given construal.

Armed with such cognitive linguistic machinery, we shall claim that the expressive power of (2) lies in the very fact that the speaker/narrator makes a conscious effort to reduce his/her own import into the onstage region, attempts at becoming transparent and producing merely a report, a fully objective conceptualization. To achieve a verbatim representation of the situation, however, the speaker/narrator makes recourse to a **neologism** and thus brings his own creativity and the creative process on stage. The presence of the speaker is uncovered, in the sense of **attenuation**, and his creative process is now part of the onstage region[7]. Such an arrangement of the scene viewed represents **subjective construal**, i.e. we are dealing with a case of the EVA. While being a facet of the ground, the speaker/narrator becomes himself the object and the subject of conceptualization.

Let us turn our attention to the neologism itself. The construal mechanisms in operation lead to the functional shift, which results in the **processual** profile instead of the stability of a **thing** in *jezusować*. Given the pragmatic context of the situation, the cries were initially the only verbal manifestations of the event, they were the outlet for a mixture of emotions, such as love, fear and despair, perhaps hatred and suspicion towards the father, and they were accompanied by a series of nervous actions, coded in the following:

(3) W*ypytywała, biegła po spongostan, mokry ręcznik i siadała przy mnie, ocierała, zmieniała tampony, aż przeszło.*

she would ask questions, hurry to fetch the sponge, a wet towel and sit by me, cleaning and changing tampons until [the bleeding] stopped (translation mine)

It will be claimed here that the cognitive processes leading to the creation of *jezusować* are metaphoric and metonymic in nature. First, we tend to view events as actions and the need to feed this **metaphoric**

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[7] The concept of stage comes from the stage model of events, which adds the human experience of observing an external event to the two models referred to previously. Specifically, our perception of events involves focusing our attention on a specific region, organized into a stable setting and participants in motion, all observed by a viewer from an external vantage point.

process EVENTS ARE ACTIONS creates the need for a verb in the grammatical coding of the situation. Postulated in the present analysis, the **metonymic** relation embodied in *jezusować* comes as a result of the exclamatory use of the taboo *Jezus!* as the vehicle providing mental access to a much more abstract, complex target such as a mixture of emotions described above. We shall claim that the vehicle and the target are here conceptually close enough to constitute a case of metonymy A VERBAL EXPRESSION OF EMOTION(S) FOR EMOTION(S).

2.3. Syntactic structures: direct reports and deixis

Let us turn now to direct speech and the way this construction may well be suited to convey emotions. The analysis pursued in this section is again a specimen of Kuczok's experiments with form and concept and it relates to a particularly dramatic scene in the novel. Impressionistic as such an evaluation is bound to be, the scene, quoted in (4) below, stands out from the whole novel. It will be claimed here that such an impact on the reader is due precisely to a specific construal of the conceptualized speech event. Consider (4), the passage describing Uncle's death in World War II, a Silesian forced into the German army:

(4) *No i właśnie wtedy* **ta** *wojna:*

to nas nie dotyczy, to się przetoczy bokiem

Ten *Wermacht:*

Wiem, że biorą Ślązaków, ale przecież gówniarzy

Ten *werbunek:*

Das ist Missverstandnis, ich habe ein Kind, ich habe gute Ausbilung!
A czy on mnie nie rozumie?

Te *koszary (…)* **Te** *koszmary (…)* **Ten** *wymarsz (…)*

Ten *okop:*

Pod Twoją obronę (...)

Ten *szturm:*

(…) schylić się schylić Boże daruj mi jeszcze tym razem (…) do leja schować się w leju nigdy nie trafi drugi raz w to samo miejsce… nie w tym mundurze….

*i wreszcie **ten** lej:*

(…)

And here comes this war: it does not concern us, it will pass over avoiding us

This Wehrmacht: I know that Silesian men are called up but only the young ones

This recruitment: Das ist Missverstandniss, ich habe ein Kind, ich habe gute Ausbuildung! Doesn't he understand me?

These barracks (…) These nightmares (…) this march (…) this trench (…) Into your defence (…)

This storm: (…) bend down bend down, oh, God save me just this time, one more time, to a bomb crater, hide in the bomb crater, it will never hit the same bomb crater twice….

And in the end this bomb crater (…)

What initially draws our attention here is the fact that in its form (4) is not a typical direct speech construction: note the ellipsis of the predicates in the main clauses, now reduced to noun phrases with the consistent, repeated in every sentence, intriguing use of the **grounding** expression *ten/this*. Let us recall that referring expressions, as *ten*, are grounding expressions, anchoring their referents to the speech situation, i.e. to the ground. Given that within the adopted framework the **ground** includes the subject/ speaker, the circumstances of the event and, crucially, **the addressee**, it will be claimed here that the use of *this* is very much responsible for the tremendous impact of the scene on the addressee/reader. The *ten/this* noun phrases preceding mimetic report of the exact words used by Uncle dying in a bomb crater, still wearing the deeply hated German army uniform, in panic and pain, perform an

extremely important function here. They attest to a **re-location of the vantage point**: specifically, it will be claimed that the vantage point from which the conceptualized scene is observed is **not** in the spatiotemporally distant speaker's/ narrator's ground. Instead, we shall argue, it is placed in the **surrogate speaker's ground,** which means Uncle's. The narrator has taken a step back and is there, in the here and now of the dying person, in this bomb crater. And so are we, the readers/addressee as part of this ground. In the **fictive motion** created by the grounded noun phrases preceding every direct report of Uncle's words we **iconically** zoom out from the safety of his own home, through barracks and trenches onto the setting of the final shot of this scene.

It will be argued here that such a construal of the scene departs from a canonical OVA report. What we have referred to as a step back to the surrogate speaker's ground is a case of the EVA: the distance is reduced and the speaker is involved in the conceptualized scene, his own involvement being part of the scene itself. We are then dealing with **subjectification** (Langacker 2002).

Finally, we shall not posit that mimesis in the direct speech construction can be schematically characterized as necessarily conveying emotions but it surely is capable of doing so.

In passing let us note the use of deixis in conveying emotional and not spatiotemporal distance, as in the analysis above. Consider the following example:

(5) *Powiedz tamtej babie, że……*

Tell that woman……

Within the cognitive linguistic framework emotional sense of the category of the demonstrative *that* is an extension from the prototypical spatiotemporal sense *that*, perhaps based on the metaphorical reasoning that mental proximity/distance is physical proximal/distal relation.

3.1. Derivational morphology: compounding and the hyphen construction

Let us turn now to constructions which in the traditional layering of language will be subsumed under the label derivational morphology. The first to be discussed essentially incorporates verbatim or **mimetic** reports, see the examples below (Królak 2005)

(6) *Hi-honey-I'm-home happiness*

(7) *a stupid stoicism of the–show-must-go-on variety*

(8) *(…) he gives me the fisheye the not-so-fast-fella, you-are bringing-that-bag-of bones-in-here? look*

And a couple more, now from the Polish language:

(9) *Świat się składa wyłącznie z dzieci, my zaś jesteśmy tegoż świata 'bozie-mój-bozie jakie to śliczne' pępkiem. (Kuczok)*

(10) *premier co ja mogę?/ nic nie mogę; Donald nic nie mogę Tusk (J. Kaczyński about Donald Tusk) ; prezes wszystko mogę Kaczyński (a retort in Gazeta Wyborcza daily)*

(11) *Pan Uhaha (St. Tym about a PiS opposition party MP, jumping over the fence during the burial ceremony of the late Lech Kaczyński, very happy about his own achievement, Wprost weekly)*

The first three examples illustrate the so called hyphen construction, in which the pre-modifying hyphenated clauses qualify head nouns signifying feelings, emotions, beliefs (Królak 2005: 201). Some linguistic analyses of the construction emphasize its utility in expressing **irony** (Gibbs 1994), others characterize it as attention catching and **emotionally loaded** (Królak 2005). Canonically, such emotions are negative and the construction marks the **distance** of the speaker from the mimicked proposition.

The next three examples are slightly different. Example (9) follows the pattern with regard to position of the modifier, if not the selection of the type of the head noun, while in (10) the head is post-modified

with a clause. Note also a particularly mean: *Donald nic nie mogę Tusk*, in which the clause interrupts the proper noun of unique reference. (11) is only different because we are not dealing with a clause, yet, as we shall claim, very similar cognitive processes are involved.

What all these examples seem to share is the fact that **negative valuation** and **distance** are conveyed **via compounding** and not directly. Looking for the mechanisms involved in such schematic character-izations of the construction will be the objective of the passages to follow.

Viewed through the prism of **autonomy/dependence** of the integrated structures, the head nouns are autonomous and they are the profile determinants, while the clausal structures are dependent compo-nents, modifiers of the heads (Langacker 1987:300). In other words, the pre-modifying clause *Hi, honey. I'm home* makes the meaning of the *happiness* more specific, yet we are still talking about the *happiness* and not the situation of greeting someone on return from work.

In terms of semantic functions conveyed by a noun, the component clauses will be here treated as **qualification** of the thing, once the thing has been instantiated, quantified and grounded (Langacker 1991, Rad-den and Dirven 2007)[8]. Specifically, we shall claim that the clausal components of the compounds in (6-11) are **qualifying situations**. In other words, in (7), for example, we are dealing with one specific instance of indefinite reference of the concept type *variety*, such that is characteristic for a situation when we continue doing something even if we are not really willing to, in such a way that the *show must go on* cliché expresses our attitude towards this fact. The presence of ground-ing, such as *a* or *the,* as in front of a very sophisticated (8), for example, attests to another cognitive operation. The event expressed by the clause becomes **reified**, it is now viewed more as a thing or a relation and not a temporal situation. Leaving an in-depth analysis of how exactly the reification proceeds and what factors are at play let us only state that such cognitive operations are easily handled in cognitive linguistic framework as facets of construal adopted by the conceptual-

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[8] Radden and Dirven (2007) refer to qualifying situations grammatically coded as relative clauses.

izer. Moreover, they appear to be well motivated as not only language-specific human abilities but properties of perception, for example.

Focusing now on the conceptual content of the pre- or post- modifying clauses, let us first note that they illustrate **metonymic processing**, in which the echoed utterances are the vehicle and, as convincingly argued by Królak (2005: 200), the target is some **scenario** in which such words might be uttered. In other words, metonymic processing participates in construing the situation by highlighting the whole scenario and not just the specific portion worded. If we consider (11), for example, the whole situation accessed involves the jump over the fence in most inappropriate circumstances of a public person and his pathetic enthusiasm about his own achievement.

Let us focus on the nature of the association between the vehicles and the targets above. The first issue that requires consideration is what triggers the selection of the **vehicle**, so very uneconomical, if we go for brevity and clarity. Yet, there is much in the clausal modifiers in (6-11) that compensates for the effort. First, they are all mimetic and human utterances are cognitively extremely salient, as human, concrete and interactional. Note that evoking the concept of communication and communication-related aspects, even with a view of encoding events or situations that are very distant from actual speech, is by no means rare in language (Pascual 2006)[9]. Then, some of the clausal modifiers include stereotypical, clichéd phrases that are culturally preferred (Kovecses and Radden 1998), while some other are very specific and then rare, they have actually been uttered and gained publicity and what we shall refer to as **pragmatic salience.** We shall return to this point shortly.

Let us now turn our attention to the targets. In (6) the happiness qualified by the pre-modifier can only be understood in light of the whole ICM of idealized, naďve, not-a-worry-in–this-world attitude in a happy marriage and family life. Perhaps too good to be true. *Hi, honey I'm home* greeting is specific for the type of a salient sub-event, or

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[9] Consider the following, for example: *The volcano cleared its throat; The cancer responded (to chemotherapy).; Ja mam przyjaciół, z którymi mogę pogadać, a on jest sam (a cancer patient about his illness).*

a situation in the scenario related to such ICM. In a metonymic activation the whole ICM is accessed and in this sense the target is not as clearly delineated as in referential metonymies, such as in *I have bought a Picasso* or in *the apple juice seat* case.

In parallel, examples (7–9) are SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC qualifications, in which the words uttered on a specific occasion stand for a type of a sub-event of a scenario that can be construed in relation to this event. In the first case that will be a human attitude to life in the face of extreme difficulties, in the second an unwelcoming look. In (9) the specific utterance is typical for a situation in a scenario related to the ICM capturing our culturally determined model of what children are and how much children mean in human society.

In all the above analyzed structures we have talked about the SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC metonymies providing access to ICMs, so relatively stable, well entrenched cultural models. In other words, the clausal pre-modifiers in (6–9) refer to qualifying situations which are considered stable. We shall attribute this property of the construction not to metonymy *per se*, but rather to the schematic meaning of the pre-modifying construction (Radden and Dirven 2007:140). In other words, the modifying hyphenated clauses can only enter the pre-modifying construction because they exhibit properties they do, i.e. stable qualification. Alternatively, the construction itself enforces the generic, stable "reading" of the qualifying situations.

Even if subsumed here under one heading of the hyphen construction, examples (6–9) and (10–11) differ markedly along this important dimension of the stability of qualification. Consider post-modifiers and-shall we call them inter-modifiers?- in (10–11): they all pertain to specific one-time events/situations and do not evoke the meaning of permanence of qualification. They rather convey the quality of a more temporary character, even if of considerable significance. Again, we shall attribute this fact to the schematic property of the post-modifying construction.

Let us now focus on the targets of (10–11). Surely, they are based on a metonymic association between the utterance on one particular occasion singled out to stand for the whole series of successive sub-events.

In this respect they are very much context dependent metonymies. However, the whole event itself doesn't seem to be sufficient to qualify for the ultimate target. (10–11) are construed to mock, ridicule, to show inaptness so they are only relevant if the negative valuation of the referent of the head NP is enforced, or encouraged in the addressee. It is doubtful whether the metonymy described above itself provides access to such negative valuation. Given that the events accessed via the vehicles in (10–11) are interpreted in light of the relevant ICMs, say, one of prototypical, strong, confident political leadership and the other of the properly dignified and solemn behavior at the burial ceremony of the late head-of-state, we shall assume that valuation is a matter of **pragmatic inferences** that the addressee makes. And the construction itself makes sure that such **valuations** are **negative**. To put it differently, mimesis and metonymy do not *per se* explain the irony, or mocking effect and **negative distance** of the speaker and one encouraged in the addressee. Moreover, they are certainly not predictable from the semantic properties of the component parts. Instead, they seem to be **constructional meaning**: the construction's own import into the conceptualized scene (Goldberg 1995). We shall then postulate that **negative emotional distance of the conceptualizer towards the qualified head NP** constitutes an important part of what is claimed to be the **schematic** meaning of the hyphen construction for clausal pre- and post- modifiers alike.

Given that pragmatic inferencing is in some linguistic research recast as metonymic reasoning one can attempt to attribute the negative valuation of the hyphen construction to mechanisms of metonymy (Bierwiaczonek 2001, Uwe-Panther and Thornburg 2005). We shall then be dealing with a constructionally coerced metonymy, when the negative valuation is a result of the coercive effect of the construction (Uwe-Panther and Thornburg 2005: 47)[10].

In passing, let us just note that the hyphen construction needs to be distinguished from other compounds of a similar structure which do

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[10] This is very much in line with Goldberg's (1995) construction grammar approach, on which it is the constructional meaning that dominates and modifies the component lexical meanings.

not involve negative emotional evaluation of the mimicked proposition. My favorite example comes from Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch's 2002 commentary on the difference between chimpanzees' and human children's acquisition of the ability to count to 9. As experiments demonstrate, chimps take equally long to learn to count from one to two and then from two to three, and then they struggle equally long to count from three to four and so on, and , as Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch put it:

(12) *There is no evidence of the kind of aha-experience that all human children of approximately 3.5 years acquire.*

3.2. Derivational morphology: diminutives

Remaining within the area of derivational morphology let us turn now to a very different means of expressing emotion and negative attitude. Consider the following:

(13) *(…) konfitury, porcelany, gramofony, ęteresanci poobiedni, melomani niedzielni, całe to **mieszczaństewko** z odwiecznymi pretensjami wyższego rzędu przez stulecia zachwycało się Haydnem* (Kuczok's *Gnój*)

Marmalade, porcelain, gramophones, after dinner clientele, music lovers in their Sunday best, all this little middle class with their everlasting high profile pretentiousness has for centuries been enchanted with Haydn (translation mine)

(14) *Polaczyszki, Żydek/Żydki, Rusek, Niemiaszki, Francuziki*

(15) *kolejna insynuacyjka* (Gazeta Wyborcza daily, about J. Kaczyński, the Polish main opposition party leader, insinuating that Angela Merkel has been appointed Chancellor thanks to some mysterious, unrevealed influences of the You-Know-Who, J. Kaczyński might equally well mean Dark Forces or Putin and Russian pressures, or Stasi, as he seems to mean in one of the ensuing interviews).

There are a number of cognitive linguistic studies of the diminutive as a radial category. In their light, the prototypical sense SMALL gives rise to a number of extensions, such as: young; feminine; insignificant/non-serious; affection/admiration; contempt and disdain for foreigners or socially marginal (Jurafski 1993). Viewed through the prism of its capacity to encode negative emotional valuation, such as is clearly part of the meanings of the diminutives in (13-15), the category appears to exhibit interesting properties of construal. Let us postulate the following analysis: the ultimate motivation for the construction can be found in the human ability to construe abstract activities and events such as insinuating, or a number of people, such as middle class members or nationalities, as objects in their ontological status. Like in perception, we can view such objects from a bigger or a smaller distance. Depending on the distance, or **perspective** adopted in viewing, we can see the objects as small in size or bigger. With a much conventionalized metaphor capturing the relatedness between physical and emotional proximity and distance the utility of the construction of the diminutive for conveying negative emotional evaluation, also mixed with negative intellectual attitude becomes obvious. We should, perhaps, postulate a sub-schematic characterization of the construction along these lines, encompassing senses that are sometimes treated as separate.

4. Summary and conclusions

Concluding, let us notice that when the language user encodes emotions the "pool" he has at his disposal is richer than it might appear at first sight. In this analysis we have focused on the grammatical means offered by Polish. The syntactic and morphological constructions discussed above allow for construing the scene of the conceptualized event in such a way that the conceptualizer's emotions, albeit not always very clearly delineated and perhaps mixed with intellectual attitude, find their way to the attentive addressee. In the analyzed structures a variety of mechanisms have been employed: the *agens* of an action disappears altogether from the linguistic coding of that

action, exclamatory taboo expressions creatively incorporated into the text metonymically activate the emotions they are a reaction to, the conceptualizer's here and now shifts back in time to the here and now of the dramatic event in the past, or, alternatively, it intentionally departs from what could "objectively" be spatiotemporal vicinity, the words uttered both in a very specific speech situation and in very conventionalized circumstances trigger a metonymic link to both types of scenarios and invoke negative, emotional reaction in the addressee, reflecting the intentions of the conceptualizer. Finally, entities of considerable abstractness are conceptualized as objects and viewed with an unfriendly or hostile attitude as lesser ones. The cognitive linguistic framework adopted for the analysis accounts for the above in a straightforward manner: such mechanisms are semantic in nature, if they "surface"as syntactic and morphological structures it is because these syntactic and morphological structures schematically convey meanings intended by the conceptualizer. The construals of the conceptualized scenes incorporate such facets as non-canonical profiling in intentional violation of the transfer schema in (1), the egocentric viewing arrangement in (2), the choice of the vantage point in (4) and (5), quantification as pre- and post- modification in (6–11) and perspective in (13–16). In the analysis we have repeatedly referred to human ability to think metaphorically and to form metonymic associations. Many of the metonymic links that underlie the constructions discussed in the paper are established due to mimesis. As demonstrated in Kuczok's novel, mimesis can be a most powerful literary weapon, unleashing considerable expressive power and a fascinating potential for a creative, artful mind. It is also central for many conventionalized constructions, apparently a cognitively salient, attractive vehicle for many targets.

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Natalia Malenko

Anger and malice in proverbial expressions.
An insight into negative traits of character in proverbs

The aim of the article is to analyse the proverbs which belong to the concept of ANGER/MALICE cross-linguistically in order to state if such linguistic elements as proverbial expressions can be categorized by schema rather than by prototype, as propounded by Taylor (1995). Additionally, the article aims at defining a linguistic status of proverbs and their place in language and finally, presents a brief analysis of the proverbial expressions which belong to the aforementioned concept.

Keywords: proverb, trait, schema, concept, metaphor, metonymy, prototypical

1. Introduction

Traits of character are traced and expressed in proverbs and sayings very aptly. Among dictionary definitions of the word *trait* the following ones can be found: a personal quality in someone's character; a particular quality, especially of a person. Personal or character traits possess either positive or negative value. The former are also known as virtues whilst the latter are commonly referred to as vices. Negative traits alongside with negative emotions are prototypical categories, for instance, falsehood, hypocrisy, cowardice, stupidity, meanness, jealousy, malice and many others.

The prototype theory, which was introduced by an American psychologist Eleanor Rosch in 1973 as an alternative to the classical componential theory developed by Plato and Aristotle, can be an interesting approach in terms of contrastive proverb analysis. In accordance with the classical theory, concepts can be expressed in terms of their defining properties, so in order to become an instance of a concept an

item must have a range of necessary and sufficient attributes[1]. The prototype theory is a theory of concept formation which incorporates the observation of Wittgenstein (1953) that some concepts do not have such attributes and hence defining properties as, for example, Wittgenstein's commonly known instance of the concept of *game*. According to prototype theory, instances of a natural concept are defined by their resemblance to a prototype that is a most typical example of the concept, which shares the maximum number of attributes with other instances and a minimum number with instances of other concepts. Concepts have indistinct boundaries and may be represented by *fuzzy sets*.

2. Definitions of a prototype in reference to concepts

Langacker (1987:371) gives the following definition of a prototype: "A prototype is a typical instance of a category, and other elements assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype; there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity" (cited in Taylor 1995:66). In Taylor's (1995:59) view a prototype, on the one hand, can be referred to as the "central member, or perhaps to the cluster of central members, of a category" and applied to a particular prototypical entity, on the other hand it "can be understood as a schematic representation of the conceptual core of a category [which] *instantiates* the prototype." Taylor also asserts that in both cases the internal or mental representation of the prototype is schematic. Moreover, if a prototype is a specific exemplar, a member of a category, it can represent a category. In case of abstract notions and their categories, for instance, ANGER/MALICE, it is impossible to find a prototype at the conceptual level. We can only single out more or less prototypical instances which can be applied to this concept. We assign an exemplar to a category by its relevance to the prototype, the more

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[1] Taylor (1995) emphasizes after Wittgenstein that "the classical theory fails to predict the referential range of at least some words"… He also reports on the empirical confirmation of the thesis by Labov's (1973) studies of linguistic categorization.

similar an exemplar to the prototype is the more central its status in a certain category (Taylor 1995, Ungerer, Schmid 1996). According to Taylor's line of argumentation "similarity is a graded concept." This assertion seems to be more relevant to artifacts than to abstract notions. How can we grade similarity between *A bad penny always turns up* and *Evil doers are evil dreaders* in reference to *Ill weeds grow apace*. How can we state or establish a prototypical example or a prototype of an abstract concept? Why is that this particular example should be a prototypical one? Due to its familiarity or frequency in reference to proverbs, perhaps? It seems quite complicated or even impossible in some cases to answer these questions in a clear-cut way. In my view, we can either state whether they both belong to one and the same category and can be prototypical examples representing the concept of ANGER/MALICE or not. In this respect the notion of schema seems to be more plausible.

In Langacker's (1987:371) definition schema is "an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (so membership is not a matter of degree); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways."

Taylor asserts that when set beside categorization by prototype, which implies a full compatibility between an entity and its abstract representation, categorization by schema anticipates only its partial compatibility; still the two ways of categorization are interrelated.

It is necessary to underline the central salience of conceptual metaphors and metonymies in categorization processes of abstract notions where they work as complex networks though can be locked into discrete words (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Taylor 1995). The concept of ANGER/MALICE can be represented by a number of proverbs at a language level. Proverbs, as many other metaphorical and conventionalized language structures, reflect complex relations between conceptual metaphors and metonymies.

3. Proverbs and their place in language

We can hardly find more "pieces of folk knowledge and belief" else-where different from proverbs, as they are, metaphorically speaking, an inexhaustible well of folk wisdom. They will always provide food for thought to those, who are interested in metaphoric realizations locked in them. Every author, who tries to define what a proverb is, emphasiz-es its brevity and exactness. This is how Jennifer Speake, the editor of the Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs describes it: "A proverb is a common saying which offers advice or presents a moral in a short or pithy manner."

According to Ilya Galperin, proverbs are facts of language. They represent the embodiment of a few very special features, which they are characterized by. These are specific rhyme and rhythm combined with brevity and exactness of the thought expressed. This idea can be supported by a proverb *Brevity is the soul of wit*, but the most salient feature of a proverb does not lie in its form. "The peculiarity of the use of a proverb lies in the fact that the actual wording becomes a pattern which needs no new wording to suggest extensions of meaning which are contextual. In other words, a proverb presupposes simultaneous application of two meanings: the face-value or primary meaning, and an extended meaning drawn from the context, but bridled by the face-value meaning" (Galperin 1981:181).

States (2001) considers proverbs "a sort of an instant wisdom an endorphin for all occasions." It "is shorter than a bird's beak, and [...] the brevity enables the proverb to hit the mark, just as it enables the early bird to catch the worm" (States 2001:105–106). Again, paraphras-ing and citing Trench, the peculiarity of a proverb is proved by its ability not only to appeal to the intellectual faculties of a person, but also to "the feelings, to the fancy or even to the imagination (...)" (Mieder 2003:17).

In the literature on proverbs, there is a thesis that proverbs can be easily produced. Trench, however, argues that in such a case it is not "the wisdom of many, it has not stood the test of experience." By using proverbs we utter the words of faith and conviction which cannot

possibly belong to us or a single person. The idea is represented by Lord Bacon's observation "[proverbs] serve not only for ornament and delight, but also for active and civil use; as being the edge tools of speech which cut and penetrate the knots of business and affairs" (Mieder: 14-15). By the same token, he disagrees with an attempt to stereotypically classify a proverb as "a saying without an author" substantiating his disagreement by a sound explanation that there is an author but he is unknown, he must have expressed in a proverb "the floating convictions of the society round him," he attired "in happier form what others had already felt, or even already uttered; for often a proverb has been in this aspect, "the wit of one, and the wisdom of many" (Mieder 2003:15). Thus, the constitutive element of the proverb according to the scholar "is not the utterance on the part of the one, but the acceptance on the part of the many."

4. Anger and malice in proverbial expressions

Good and evil have always been on the opposing ends of the scale of values. An evil or angry person is often compared to an animal or plant which possesses specific qualities of doing harm to the others[2]. Consider the following examples:

(1) *Ill weeds grow apace,*

(2) *Złe ziele najlepiej się krzewi*

(3) *Złego drzewa i korzeń wykop*

(4) *Mala hierba (Bicho malo) nunca muere.*

Not only do we understand the proverbs metaphorically in terms of conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, but we also realise that it additionally suggests a submetaphor EVIL PEOPLE ARE WEEDS,

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[2] We have to differentiate, however, between the trait, which is a stable feature of someone's character e.g. an evil person and a temporary emotional state an angry person, which is not the subject of my considerations, but will be commented upon. I perceive repetitive emotional states as stepping stones to developing a trait (N.M.).

which can be traced in the instances given above in English, Polish and Spanish. It seems that folk wisdom emphasizes a strong inclination to being evil on the part of women cross-culturally, which finds reflection in the following proverbs:

(5) *Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned*

(6) *Nad diabła rogatego gorsza zła kobieta*

(7) *Taka złośliwa, że gdyby spojrzała na mleko, to by się zwarzyło*

(8) *No hay más de temer que una mujer despechada*

(9) *Где ногой ступит – трава не растёт*

(10) *Nic gorszego nad złą niewiastę*

(11) *У злой Натальи все люди канальи*

(12) *Złość piękności szkodzi.*

That is why proverb *(12)* warns women against displaying negative emotions, stating their unfavourable impact on appearance.

According to a popular belief, doing good or bad things is based on reciprocity, so it seems reasonable to expect either positive or negative things respectively, in return. Moreover, the proverbs function as precepts to avoid negative patterns of behaviour so as not to live in misery. In many religious societies, for example, it is considered morally wrong even to think evil. It is connected with a deeply rooted conviction in people's minds that God never helps evil people and does not protect them from misfortunes. This is how the idea is reflected in the following proverbial expressions.

(13) *Evil doers are evil dreaders*

(14) *Tue nichts Böses, so widerfährt dir nichts Böses*

(15) *Kto drugiemu źle knuje, ten sam na siebie złe sieci gotuje*

(16) *Quien haga mal, que espere otro tal*

(17) *Si haces mal, espera otro tal*

(18) *Kto innym szkodzi, temu się źle powodzi*

(19) *Kto sieje złość, będzie żał nędzę*

(20) *Во зле жить – по миру ходить*

(21) *Злой человек не проживёт в добре век*

(22) *Evil to him who evil thinks*

(23) *Krzyż złego nie obroni*

A similar idea finds its extension in the following adages, which are based on cognitive principles HUMAN>NON-HUMAN and ANIMATE>INANIMATE:

(24) *Anger punishes itself*

(25) *Złościwego sama złość jego pobije.*

There is a high degree of social intolerance towards evil people. People believe that nothing wrong ever happens to those who are evil, even death does not want them. There is another common belief which exists in so-called folk mentality of different cultures. Namely, people think that it is better to be an object of the evil behaviour than to act in an evil way or be an evil person which is probably grounded in the Christian tradition, which also influences people's perception of the evil and affects their attitude towards evil doers.The following adages seem to reflect my considerations to a certain extent.

(26) *A bad penny always turns up*

(27) *Zła siekiera nigdy nie zginie*

(28) *Złego i śmierć nie chce*

(29) *Lepiej jest złość cierpieć, niż czynić*

(30) *Lepiej się nigdy nie rodzić, niż zlym być*

As for the notion of anger, whose cognitive model is given a meticulous analysis by Kövecses (1986), it is represented in the proverbs in terms of conceptual metaphor ANGER IS MADNESS.

A stereotypical cultural model of anger, which is based on a number of its physiological effects, is perceived similarly in different cultures. Despite the fact that anger is short-lived, angry and violent behaviour deprives a person of rational thinking. The emotion is so intense that it overpowers the other mental processes in the brain. On the other hand, there is also a proverb which reflects a positive effect of anger, consider the adage: *Anger edges valor*. Anger can motivate courage, as well as a range of other emotional reactions. An angry person is unable to use critical thinking when he or she is angry and reacts instinctively in most cases. That is why due to the fact that people's reactions are different even to similar stimuli, there is no point in expecting empathy or understanding from an angry person:

(31) *Anger is a short madness*

(32) *La ira es locura, el tiempo que dur*

(33) *Anger and haste hinder good counsel*

(34) *Anger is often more hurtful than the injury that caused it*

(35) *W złości nie ma litości*

(36) *Перестань от злого милости искать.*

Physical states seem to play an important part in connection with emotional states and, as has already been mentioned, are understood in terms of physiology-related emotional states.

(37) *A hungry man is an angry man*

(38) *Polak jak głodny, to zły*

   Ему на голодный зуб не попадайся[3]

These negative traits are reflected in the adages referring to the evil and their behaviour. There is also stereotypical thinking in different cultures that a person acquires positive traits and habits with difficulty

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[3] Expressions which are not numbered are not proverbs, they are proverbial expressions. (N.M.)

whereas bad patterns of behaviour come to a person effortlessly. A person seems to possess a certain degree of evil inherently. The proverb – *Гневаться – дело человеческое, а зло помнить – диавольское* – says that it is human to get angry, but it is devilish to remember the evil done. This is how the idea is revealed in other proverbs:

(39) *Człowiek nie bez złości, krowa nie bez kości*

(40) *Nie ma ryby bez ości, nie ma człeka bez złości*

(41) *Риба не без кості, а чоловік не без злості.*

According to folk perception even the smallest amount of evil is enough to spoil or seriously affect something which is good. Actually, all of us have probably experienced a situation when a seemingly minor cause inflicted a really serious consequence or did a lot of harm.

Again, some of the proverbs are understood literally and some other – metaphorically. As for the simile *Mały jak palec, a zły jak padalec*, it is understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS. The following proverbs illustrate these considerations:

(42) *Więcej złości jak kości*

(43) *Jeden zły wielu dobrym zaszkodzi*

(44) *Do złego dość jeden przywódca, na dobre nie dosyć dziesięciu*

(45) *Człek do złego leci jako wóz z góry, a do dobrego jak wóz pod górę*

(46) *До добра – як до ярма, а до зла – як до меду*

It is necessary to emphasise that understanding of conceptual structure of folk models helps with understanding of various conventionalized metonymies, consider the example: *Człek do złego leci jako wóz z góry, a do dobrego jak wóz pod górę,* which is motivated by the conceptual metaphor NEGATIVE IS DOWN/POSITIVE IS UP.

Similarly, an evil person can never change someone who is evil into a good person. This correlation can be understood in terms of a cognitive principle GOOD GESTALTS>BAD GESTALTS.

(47) *Zły złego nie naprawi*

(48) *Кривого кривым не исправишь*

(49) *Zły dobrego nigdy nie chwali*

The following instances can also be a good illustration of understanding metaphorical relations locked in the proverbs through the conceptual metaphors PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS and NEGATIVE IS DARK: *Zły człowiek, jak węgiel: jeżeli nie spali, to usmoli*, so it is better not to have anything in common with such a person. Among the most frequent ones, used in proverbs, is the metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, alongside with the submetaphor DANGEROUS PEOPLE ARE DANGEROUS PLANTS: *Когда б на крапиву не мороз, то б с нею и ладов не было* ≈ But for the frost, the nettle would scold people all year round, and its Ukrainian equivalent *Якби на кропиву не мороз, вона ще б людей жалила* ≈ But for the frost the nettle would scold people all year round. In the expression, the word *крапива/кропива* – nettle stands for *evil person* and *мороз* – frost stands for even more evil one. Actually, both metaphorical adages could be semantically represented by the literal *Złego (człowieka) karze Pan Bóg przez gorszego* ≈ God sends an evil person even a more evil one as a punishment.

(50) *Zły człowiek, jak węgiel: jeżeli nie spali, to usmoli*[4]

(51) *Sam sobie szkodzi co ze złym w rzecz wdaje*

(52) *Złego (człowieka) karze Pan Bóg przez gorszego*

(53) *Когда б на крапиву не мороз, то б с нею и ладов не было*

(54) *Якби на кропиву не мороз, вона ще б людей жалила*

The family members or neighbours, who are evil, are perceived by folk wisdom as enemies. Moreover, they are considered to be a close company of a devil or are thought to have common roots with it. We

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[4] There is also a similar example but in reference to lies: Брехня – що вугілля: не впече, то замаже ≈ Lie is like coal: if it doesn't burn you, it will make you dirty. This may suggest that conceptual metaphors constitute metaphorical networks which are interconnected (N.M.).

understand the proverb *Sąsiad zły za nieprzyjaciela stoi* – literally, and the conventional metaphor in the proverb *Zła żona, zły sąsiad, diabeł trzeci – jednej matki dzieci. Jednej matki dzieci* – born from the same mother is understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS.

(55) *Sąsiad zły za nieprzyjaciela stoi*

(56) *Zła żona, zły sąsiad, diabeł trzeci – jednej matki dzieci*

Another proverb reflects the idea that anything tastes bitter for the one who has gall in his/her mouth. The word *gall* is used metaphorically for evil words and caustic remarks irrespective of what or who these words and remarks refer to (cf. *58*). The adage goes to show that the person is unable to notice a real value of something because of his or her evil nature.

(57) *У кого жёлчь во рту, тому всё горько*

Folk wisdom also claims that you can get rid of the devil if you cross yourself, you can chase away a pig with a stick but nothing can help you to get rid of an evil person. The proverb also warns you against evil so that it can be avoided. An evil person is often compared to a devil, so sometimes it is difficult to tell the difference between the two. These ideas find their realizations in the following proverbs:

(58) *От чёрта крестом, от свиньи пестом, а от лихого человека – ничем*

(59) *Не бійся чорта, але лихого чоловіка*

(60) *Мав вилупитися чорт, та півні заспівали – вилупився чоловік.*

The proverb *Мав вилупитися чорт, та півні заспівали – вилупився чоловік* ≈ The devil was supposed to hatch, but the roosters crowed and a man hatched instead – reflects the mythical character of folk beliefs. According to these beliefs, the dark power, say witches, devils, vampires and the like are active during the night but at dawn their power is gone. The crucial moment is the third crow of a rooster, after that the "dark empire" withdraws its forces until midnight the following day. The man, who actually hatched at that unfortunate hour acquired features

of the devil, so the interference of the third party severely affected the person's character, causing its formidable transformation.

A number of proverbial sayings reflect the behaviour which is commonly associated with evil intentions, consider the following examples: *Он давно на меня нож точит* ≈ He has been sharpening his knife for a long time to use it on me ≈ His intentions are evil, *Он тебя и в ложке утопит* ≈ He will make you drown in a spoon. Both expressions are metonymy-motivated metaphors. In the former a usual activity of sharpening a knife is projected onto a variety of default negative actions which could have unpleasant consequences for the speaker. In the latter, on the other hand, a degree of someone's malice is metaphorically projected onto the explicit and unambiguous intent of having someone drown in a spoon. Quite a lot of sayings reflect the similar idea *Такий злий, аж в роті чорно* ≈ He is so angry that the inside of his mouth is black, conceptually – NEGATIVE IS DARK. *Zły, że bez kija nie podchodź* ≈ He is so angry that you'd better not approach him without a stick. People usually use a stick as a kind of protection against a dangerous animal, for instance a dog or a snake.

Consider the sayings *Сердце с перцем, душа с чесноком, Серце з перцем, а душа з часником* ≈ The heart is flavoured with pepper and the soul – with garlic. Both the Russian and Ukrainian sayings are identical equivalents, which reflect the abruptness of a person due to the use of metaphor *сердце с перцем/серце з перцем* ≈ heart is flavoured with pepper. This definition can both have a positive and negative axiological load but *душа с чесноком/з часником* ≈ the soul tastes/smells of garlic, connotes the sayings in the negative, as people commonly perceive the smell of garlic as very intense and not necessarily nice. Consider the Ukrainian proverb *Не їла душа часнику, то й смердіти не буде* ≈ The soul hasn't eaten any garlic, so it won't stink. The verb *stink* adds negative connotation to the perception of the smell of garlic.

The simile *Zły jak stary diabeł* ≈ He is as malicious as an old devil exposes a vice that seems to aggravate with age. The saying *Пальця до рота не клади, бо відкусить* is based on metonymy and functions as a warning against an evil person. Again, it is conceptually based on the

metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS as well as the two following ones: *Нехай бог боронить від скаженої воші* ≈ God forbade from a mad louse and *Мов спасівська муха, усім очі виїдає*[5] ≈ He/she is like a fly at the time of Spas: he/she eats everyone's eyes out. The saying *Он сатане в дядьки годится* ≈ He could be a Satan's uncle – reflects similarity in character features due to family ties and is understood through the conceptual metaphor SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS.

У него чёрт в подкладке, Сатана в заплатке ≈ There is a devil in the lining of his coat and a Satan under the patch on it, which is probably understood in terms of metaphorical projection of malice as a personal trait of someone's character onto *чёрт в подкладке/Сатана в заплатке* ≈ *a devil in the lining/a Satan under the patch*. The character trait is also camouflaged, as we do not normally see either a lining or the inside of a patch, thus, understanding of the expression can be based upon the cognitive principle VISIBLE > INVISIBLE and the submetaphor DEVIL/SATAN IS EVIL/MALICE.

Another example which can be similar conceptually is *Продав чортові душу* ≈ He has sold his soul to the devil, although in this case the idea also conceptually extends to POSSESSION IS CONTROL. The person who has sold his or her soul is not its owner any longer, so neither he nor she can control it or bare responsibility for it.

As can be seen some proverbs and sayings can belong to more than one category or central tendency in terms of the prototype theory. For instance the following ones, which also belong to the categories APPEARANCES ARE DECEPTIVE and HABIT IS THE SECOND NATURE function both semantically and pragmatically to reflect the idea of "being malicious, evil":

(61) *Змея кусает не для сытости, а ради лихости*

(62) *Гадюка хоч не вкусить, то засичить*

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[5] Flies become especially angry and tend to bite in August when the Uspenski Lent begins. August is the time of Spas holidays 14.08. 19.08. and 29.08. According to the Orthodox Church calendar, the holidays are called: Honey Spas, Apple Spas and Nut Spas. The adjective "спасівська" /spasiws'ka/ originates from the name of the holidays, the noun "Spas" (N.M.). http://www.russian-language-for-lovers.com/russian-holidays.html

(63) *Гадюку як не грій, вона все одно вкусить*

(64) *Собака и хлеба не съест, не порычав*

(65) *Така вже вдача собача.*

(66) *Amamantar a una víbora*

(67) *Criar una sierpe (sierpente) en el propio seno*

Again, we understand metaphors conceptually in terms of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS → DANGEROUS PEOPLE ARE DANGEROUS ANIMALS, though people's preferences are always on the side of animals, consider the saying *Lepszy dobry pies niż zły człowiek* for the simple reason that an evil person is neither afraid of God nor ashamed of people:

(68) *Злий чоловік ні Бога не боїться, ні людей не стидається.*

5. Concluding remarks

Proverbs are mainly metaphorical. Metaphors are grounded in human perception "the starting point of linguistic metaphor is a basic process of seeing or understanding one kind of thing as if it were a different kind of thing and that this process is fundamentally perceptual" (Dent-Read and Szokolszky 1993:227). Within the concept frames of ANGER/MALICE, a negative trait of character, the idea is supported by the following proverbial examples: *Ill weeds grow apace, Zła siekiera nigdy nie zginie* or *Когда б на крапиву не мороз, то б с нею и ладов не было* etc. A metaphor should be perceived as both the property of language and of our conceptual system. The fact that some proverbs have more than one linguistic representation of the same concept should testify that cognitive, experiential concepts seem to underlie many if not a majority of metaphors exploited in proverbs. The link between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy seems to have a powerful effect on human conceptualization in general. The present paper contains some evidence which testifies to that.

Gibbs and Beitel (1995:133) perceive proverbs as a source of metaphoric schemes of thought. According to the scholars "the ability to understand many proverbs reveals the presence of metaphorical schemes that are ubiquitous in everyday thought." As has been stated in the present analysis, there are numerous and recurrent similarities in proverb conceptualization which can be observed cross-linguistically. This fact confirms the semiotic character of the proverbs and testifies to the idea of representational function of the human mind. I assume, that I can dare a speculation that this evidence reflects the aptness of the inferences that people of different cultural backgrounds make in order to understand proverbs. There is also an unquestionable similarity in the metaphorical representations of the analyzed proverbs. At the same time, it is necessary to state culture-specific differences between proverbs of different nations. There are systemic differences of the general level and detailed differences which can be observed in connotative and metaphorical codes of the proverbs.

Familiarity and frequency are relevant factors for categorizing proverbs. Taylor's (1995) assertion that categorization by schema is more applicable for abstract concepts seems to be true, at least in the case of proverbs.

The link between conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy seems to have a powerful effect on human conceptualization in general. The present paper contains some evidence which testifies that proverbs have in their semantic structures both metaphor and metonymy. Metonymy seems to be the driving force for metaphor creation in proverbs.

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Stanisław Puppel

Human communication and communicative skills: a general philosophy and evolving practical guidelines

The present article comes in the form of a manifesto concerned with the nature of human communication. As such, it offers a set of remarks on the philosophy of communication as well as it outlines a set of practical guidelines for becoming effective, successful, and comfortable 'ecocratic' transcommunicators. The trans- and ecocratic perspectives applied here entail that all natural languages and the underlying local cultures are viewed as equal and thus equally worthy of preservation as the key indicators of the human communicator's identity.

Keywords: human communication, human communicating agent, communicative niche, ecocratic perspective, general mechanism of linking, hybrid communication, transcommunicator, communicology

1. Introduction

The present article is proposed to assume the form of a manifesto which is thought to serve as a possible source of information on the nature of human communication. It is planned as a two-part document focusing on various aspects of communication in the broad perspective of applied linguistics and a somewhat narrower perspective of communicology (cf. Puppel, 2008a). Part One contains a set of remarks on the philosophy of communication, while Part Two contains an outline of practical guidelines addressed to communication instructors.

2. Philosophy of communication (P)

2.1. The Preamble:

Humans are expulsive communicators and it is communication that has always been a major type of activity exercised throughout the entire span of our human condition both through social interactions (transpersonally) and individually (intrapersonally). The need to express ourselves, that is, perform communicative acts by means of the activation and use of the language and non-language resources in countless many communicative encounters is the essence of our human communicative condition. In both types of communication, we have been expressing our uniquely human predicament, both to others and to ourselves, which may be compressed to the simple statement:

communico ergo sum!

2.2. Statements concerning the Philosophy of Communication (P):

P/1. The foundations of communicative skills are provided by the very essence of the human condition which is determined by the evolutionarily predetermined social, cohabitational and interactive character of the entire species, *Homo sapiens sapiens*.

P/2. The predominantly social character of the species, that is, of the entire human population consisting of all individual members of the species, has been more than amply demonstrated through the sense of community, that is, our unprecedented sociality, developed and exercised by the human species with unparalleled intensity and complexity.

P/3. In the human community, all the members may (and do) connect with each other via a General Mechanism of Linking within the global network of communicators (hence GML), where communication proper constitutes a major sub-component. Communicatively, the linking mechanism is secured by the symbol-driven language code which has its universal and language-specific char-

acteristics, as well as by the semiotically and semantically relevant non-language codes governing the management and use of non-language resources, such as gestures, facial expressions, and body postures.

P/4. The GML secures every human individual's sense of belonging to the species and, more narrowly, to a particular cultural-linguistic-communicative milieu, via the general processes of inter-action and communication which comprise the following:

(a) the sharing of the communicative resources, including the symbol-based and symbol-driven linguistic resources, in all aspects of the species life (the so-called 'reciprocal communi-cative altruism') with other members of the species,

(b) in particular, the sharing of the linguistic-communicative (i.e. verbal) and non-linguistic-communicative (i.e. non-ver-bal) resources which co-participate in human communication (cf. Mehrabian, 1972, 1970/1981)

(c) maintenance of both individual and group (i.e. community) identity,

(d) incessant and inevitable exchange of information (i.e. via seeking and reciprocal exchange of information).

P/5. As indicated above, human community life is a fundamental ingredient of humanness. The general purpose of the human com-munity is expressed by the following premises:

(a) maintaining unperturbed and unjeopardized physical exist-ence of every individual human being in the biological-so-cial-cultural spheres, that is, as a biological organism, as a social being, and as a cultural institution, respectively,

(b) maintaining and exercising social interaction via participa-tion in social networks, both real and virtual,

(c) maintaining group identity and group integration (i.e. main-taining cohesion),

(d) maintaining individual identity and personal integration,

(e) maintaining participation in the community life via:
  – competition
  – cooperation
  – healing (i.e. therapeutic activities directed towards others with the participation of language and non-language resources)

(f) maintaining the practice of constant generation and sharing of knowledge,

(g) maintaining cultural life.

P/6. As stated in the Preamble, communication constitutes the very essence of the human condition, since <u>the human communicating agents (hence the HCA, or transcommunicators)</u> have always indulged in and expressed themselves through the necessary hybridity of various modalities, most notably through the combined potential of the major human communicative modalities, that is, the vocal-auditory and visual-tactile modalities, and various communication media, as well as through the complex communication process while communicating their mutual social bondages on at least three distinctly different, however, interrelated and interlocked levels (i.e. in three different communicative niches; cf. Puppel, 2008). The latter represent the generality and overall communicative fitness of every HCA which is distributed either on separate levels or in an optimal admixture of the three. The afore mentioned niches comprise the following (nb: they have been arranged here in the ascending order of magnitude and commonality maintained among the communicators):

– <u>the citizenship niche</u> (which refers to the narrowly specialized resources and discourses of the legal character of human social life),

– <u>the professional niche</u> (which refers to the plethora of professions with their specific and restricted resources and discourses),

— the daily routine and general culture niche (which comprises the broadest possible linguistic resources and contexts of language and non-language use).

P/7. The interdependent presence of the three different niches mentioned above requires that the particular HCAs have access to and are capable of managing the cognitive (i.e. rational/conceptual/emotional), linguistic and non-linguistic resources most appropriate for each niche and for the particular communicative context, as well as in accordance with the communicator's affordable and thus highly individualized and currently accessible volumes of these resources.

P/8. The individual HCA's ability to manage the communicative resources underlies his/her diversified cultural-linguistic-communicative competence and thus appears most important in defining and accomplishing, among others, the following:

— the sense of personal growth

— cognitive satisfaction and professional advancement

— social (collective/group) goal pursuit

— individual and social well-being

— positive evaluation of socio-cultural and linguistic diversity including the communicator's own native cultural heritage and language resources.

3. Practical guidelines (G)

3.1. Statements concerning the Guidelines:

G/1. In teaching communicative skills especially in the formal school environment, we should follow the Seven Principles for Good Practice in Undergraduate Education, formulated by Chickering

and Gamson (1987). According to these authors, good practice in undergraduate education comprises the following:

– <u>it</u> encourages contact between students and faculty members (versus 'no such contact')

– <u>it</u> develops reciprocity and cooperation among students (versus 'selfish behaviour')

– it encourages active learning (versus 'passive, apathetic and generally uninterested attitude')

– it gives prompt feedback (versus 'no feedback')

– <u>it</u> emphasizes time on task completion (versus 'undisciplined timelessness and clumsiness' in individual task execution)

– it allows to communicate high expectations (versus 'no such expectations')

– it respects students' diverse talents (i.e. their different intelligences, cf. Gardner, 1983, 1999) and different styles of learning (versus 'lack of recognition of individuality and the fear of its social display').

G/2. In our work with the students, we should aim to attain the most concrete and most cherished goal of helping them to become competent transcommunicators (see P/6 above), that is, transcultural, trans-ethnic, translinguistic and transmodal (i.e. hybrid oral-verbal, graphic-verbal and non-verbal, both oral and graphic, communicators), thus helping them to become conscious communication engineers capable of expressing themselves in the most dignified, diversified and comfortable way which entails a high degree of student autonomy (i.e. individualization of student work) and the necessary presence of the principle of 'fair play' between the instructor and the student.

3.2. Typology of the human communicating agents:

G/3. Transcultural communicators (TCC): the TCCs are made highly sensitive to the native and other cultural milieus in the transcultural/trans-ethnic/translinguistic and thus entirely 'ecocratic' perspective (i.e. in this perspective, cultures/ethnicities/languages are regarded as equally important and worthy of maintenance and conservation for the purpose of human sustainable living and human wellbeing).

G/4. Translinguistic communicators (TLC): the TLCs are made sensitive to the native and other natural languages in the ecocratic perspective (i.e. all natural languages are regarded as equally important and worthy of maintenance and conservation for the purpose of human sustainable living and human wellbeing).

G/5. Hybrid communicators (HC): the HCs in the sense defined above are made capable of expert communication both in the traditional audio-vocal (i.e. through traditional oral communication) and visual-tactile (i.e. through non-verbal communication) modalities, as well as by way of the combined and technologically advanced hybrid (i.e. augmented) interactive systems where the competent and smooth control of both modalities gains in importance and is thus expected of the HCs from the point of view of today's world essentially hybrid and globalized communications. Hybrid communicators participate in three different and highly interrelated communication orders: the oral communication order, the graphic communication order, and the hybrid oral-graphic communication order.

G/6. Meaningful and contextualized communicators (MCC): the MCCs act within the Universal Communication Space in a meaningful and context-determined fashion (cf. Puppel, 2004). That is, they are able to activate their cultural, language and non-language resources, both in quality and quantity, upon prior and proper recognition of the contingencies of the entire communication process, the communicative encounters and communicative events.

G/7. <u>Communication engineers (CE):</u> the particular HCAs may serve as CEs by treating the language resource as an engineering material. In this capacity, by combining various aspects of the university educational process, that is, the components of theory and practice (i.e. the acquired knowledge of various scholarly disciplines, concepts, as well as acquired individual expressive power by means of the afore mentioned modalities necessarily taught in blended instruction), the HCAs as CEs should subsequently be able to function as <u>effective</u> (i.e. as being able to participate in the communication with others), <u>successful</u> (i.e. as being able to adjust their language and non-language resources smoothly to the changing cultural-linguistic-communicative contexts) and <u>comfortable</u> (i.e. as being able to switch swiftly to various registers of their cultural-linguistic-communicative resources, including the highest resources, of which they are in full control) communicators. Furthermore, as CEs, they should be capable of solving all the practical matters related to access to and management of the communicative resources in various online communication engineering tasks. In particular, these tasks may include the following:

– maintaining the HCA's so-called 'ductility', that is, overall cultural-linguistic-communicative competence (i.e. power and efficiency of language and non-language resources use),

– maintaining the HCA's 'impact strength', that is, in particular, demonstrating:
  a. the art and skill of effective self presentation,
  b. effective rhetorical skills (i.e. the art of performing discourse in order to persuade, influence, and please the interlocutors, cf. Hauser, 2002),
  c. the overall power and efficiency of presentation by means of any verbal exchange,

– maintaining the HCA's 'plasticity', that is, in particular, demonstrating:

  a. the overall power and efficiency of negotiation and mediation

b. the overall power and efficiency of verbal and non-verbal communication,

– maintaining the HCA's native language 'resilience', that is, the ability to withstand shock loading (especially in the area of the lexis) of the native language due to the contact of the native language with any foreign language(s) under the conditions of external linguopressure (cf. Gunderson et al., 2002; Puppel, 2007a),

– maintaining the HCA's appropriate measure of his/her 'toughness' (i.e. native language 'hardness', awareness), that is, the ability to demonstrate conscious concern for the presence and quality of native cultural-linguistic-communicative resources so that native language resilience is properly secured.

G/8 Treat language and non-language resources as manageable resources:
The following ten principles of natural language and non-language resource management may be postulated:

1. Necessarily appreciate the importance of language and non-language resource management.

2. Necessarily consider the environment, both communicator-internal and communicator-external, for language and non-language resource use.

3. Be aware and apply the planning and organizing process to increase and assure the highest quality of language and non-language resource use in various communicative events.

4. Necessarily incorporate ethics and social responsibility in your language and non-language resource use.

5. Build and use your personal commitment in language and non-language resource use.

6. Be <u>effective</u> (i.e. responsive) in your language and non-language resource use (the presence of the so-called Oskar Syndrome).

7. Be <u>successful</u> (i.e. flexible) in your language and non-language resource use (the presence of the so-called Gulliver Syndrome).

8. Be <u>comfortable</u> (i.e. language and non-language resource-conscious) in your language and non-language resource use (the presence of the so-called Petronius Syndrome).

9. Constantly monitor and improve your language and non-language performance in the public sphere.

10. Gain and maintain the overall skills of a resourceful transnational, trans-ethnic, transcultural, and translinguistic communicator and thus strive towards the fullest possible cultural-linguistic-communicative competence.

4. Final comments

The present article has briefly sketched the nature of human communication. Its presence has materialized at a point when communicology has never been more significant, for it has reemerged in a climate of transnational, transcultural and translinguistic discussions on the ever increasing role of communication worldwide. In this vein, communication appears to be endorsed by many a researcher and practitioner as the single most important skill that should be mastered and exercised by all the human (trans)communicators.

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