

**Edited by
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MIGRATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD:

**A case of Africa
Politics, economic and social issues**

*Migrations
in the contemporary world:
A case of Africa*

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INTRODUCTION

The major focus of the analysis in this book concentrates on the key features of migration in Africa in the context of political, economic and social aspects. There is an evidence of the historical early human race migration from Africa to other parts of the world when sovereign states and migration laws did not exist. On the contrary, the reality of contemporary migrations from Africa and within Africa shows multifaceted sources of domestic and international problems. After the end of the Cold War, fundamental political and social changes have taken place in Africa. These changes had a colossal influence on internal social and political relations, inter-state conflicts, as well as regional situations. The consequence of these variations had led to a humanitarian and enormous migration crisis.

Mostly African migrants are forced to move externally or internally for several reasons, among others, economic crisis, conflict, political persecutions, and climate changes. During the last decades, these problems became one of the top international agenda without a significant solution. For this reason, the challenge of joint investigations and cooperation between Polish and Tanzanian researchers to explore problems and seek a practical remedy is the best model to be continued. This book is the second volume of collections of articles, prepared under the same main title but with different focus. This volume focuses on African politics, economics and social issues hence entitled: “Migrations in the contemporary world: A case of Africa, Politics, economic and social issues”, whereas the first publication entitled. “Migrations in the contemporary world: A case of Africa, Cultural and social issues (edited by Helena E. Myeya and

Maciej Ząbek, Bernardinum Publishing House, Warsaw – Iringa 2020) focused only on cultural and social issues.

Both publications are the outcome of diverse fields of scholarly collaboration between Polish and Tanzanian researchers and other contributors. The scientific cooperation between the two partners has shown significant progress which led to organise the second Mkwawa International Conference entitled “Migrations in the Contemporary World”, which took place on 1st – 2nd October 2019 in Iringa, Tanzania at Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE) a Constituent College of the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). Scholars from various educational institutions participated in the conference which include: Tanzanian researchers, from the University of Dar es Salaam, Jordan University, and the University of Dodoma; scholars from Poland: University of Warsaw, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, University of Łódź and Pedagogical University of Kraków.

This volume, in particular, is the result of scientific cooperation between the Institute of Political Science, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, from Polish scholars side and the two departments: Department of Geography and Economics and Department of History, Political Science and Development Studies at Mkwawa University College of Education in Iringa, from Tanzanian side.

In chapter one, Konrad Czernichowski commences with the theoretical review of Adam Smith, the theory of absolute costs, David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and H-O-S theory of the International economy. He further explains the movement of people to another country for a longer period which decreases the price of labour in the country of immigration and increases in the country of emigration. He also raised the main reasons for importing labour, such as brain drain, shortages of labour, deficiency of labour in jobs that the citizens do not want to take and toleration of illegal immigration.

Jerzy Gilarowski, assessed the problem of African migrants within the continent and those who were able to migrate to Europe in chapter two. In his investigation, he revealed the highest number of international refugees which was around 258 million in the middle of 2017, concerning African migrants, nearly 90% who stayed in Sub-Saharan Africa in the same period. His investigations show that migrants move within the same region and between neighboring regions in Africa, which he mentioned as the main characteristic feature of African migration. In this chapter, the author classified Eastern Africa as the most diversified region regarding the origin of international migrants from Africa, as it receives significant shares of migrants from all other regions except Western Africa. Armed conflict and political instability are also highlighted as the main cause of migration in the region.

In chapter three, Degefe Kebede Gemechu focused on the problem of African refugees to the European Union. He used theoretical concepts, such as push and pull conditions and other theoretical backgrounds to examine the root causes of African migration in the context of economic crisis and various political problems in unstable states. He pointed out that, most refugees escape from persecution, abuses of human rights, repression, civil wars, and other forms of conflict. The author in his further explanation indicated the main route of African refugees which pass through Libya to Europe as a gateway, because of long civil war and political instability in this country. In the text, the author tries to show, the complex problem facing migrants concerning the risk of crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe and situations of legal challenges after their arrival to EU states.

Shakila H. Mteti, in chapter four, presented a rarely paid attention by scholars, the issue of African footballers in Diaspora in a system of the capitalist world. She disclosed the evidence of how Africans began to be involved in international football, how both the host and the home countries benefit from these migrants and which challenges African footballers face both at home and abroad. The author revealed the significant number of African origin footballers from Angola,

Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, in previous colonial power states, such as Portugal, France and Belgium. On the other hand, in her findings, the author tries to show that Africa benefited from its emigrant football players through educational services facilitated by those players.

The scale of white emigration from South Africa after the collapse of apartheid as well as their main purposes and targets are reviewed in chapter five, by Arkadiusz Żukowski. The political, economic, social and other reasons of white South Africans emigration are analysed according to the push and pull factors approach. The chapter also concerned the consequences of this emigration from South Africa, especially for the South African economy (among others the “brain drain” of skill professionals). The perspectives of future white emigration were also formulated.

The next chapter in this volume is devoted to the internal migration related to the development of universities in Tanzania. This study was undertaken by Anasia E. Saria, in chapter six. The author used qualitative and quantitative approaches to analyze, three campuses in the Iringa municipality; Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), Ruaha Catholic University (RUCU) and University of Iringa (UoI) which was formerly known as Iringa College Tumaini University. The chapter shows that, majority of people who migrated into urban areas have settled nearby Universities to conduct different economic activities such as food vending, selling clothes, stationeries shop, hair salons, supermarkets and other commodities shops; whereas the natives of the area especially those who are living nearby universities are mostly involved in formal and non-formal activities as well as agricultural activities.

The study of the colonial economy and its linkage with labour migration in Mbeya Rural District in Tanzania is presented in chapter seven, by Ashura Jackson Ngoya. She comprehensively discussed the need for labourers for the colonial economy to meet requirements of things such as raw materials, markets and areas to invest their

surplus capital. The author further reviewed the most important element in production that means, human labor-power, which produces value and displayed attentiveness of the colonial power for ensuring the production of raw materials required to feed metropolitan industries.

Specific characteristics of pre-colonial Tanzanian and African people in general regarding the form of production and gender relation was discussed in chapter eight, by Shakila H. Mteti. The author refers to male out-migration which had a negative impact, it increases on women's burden and difficulties of basic survival, such as responsibility for both their own and their husband's duties, tasks and roles. The study shows as the result, the increase of stress and strains to women due to increased management responsibilities. Furthermore, male out-migration led to divorce, family disintegration and lesser ability to monitor children and loneliness. Investigation of the author of the text also includes the pre-colonial Africa which experienced immigrants from Asia and Europe who come in large numbers and settled along the coast of Africa particularly along the coast of East Africa, mainly in Zanzibar, Kilwa and Mafia and then by the early 16th century the arrival of Portuguese who moved in and seized control over a number of the trade along the coast of Africa.

The phenomenon, that rural people are steadily moving out of farming causes local economies more diversified which offers alternative income-generating opportunities in services and industry. This survey was presented in chapter nine, by Mkubya R. Wambura. The study was conducted at Kibaigwa Township which is one of the administrative wards in Kongwa district of the Dodoma region. The Township was selected because of its rapid development into an urban centre that is largely attributed to the establishment of maize market. The Township authority is fast-growing in terms of population growth as well as economic activities. The outcome of the author's investigation mixed-method research shows that, the majority (60%) of respondents live in urban areas and emphasize the importance of

natural products, traditional crafts, and sustainable production. Thus making the entrepreneurship as one of the contributing factor for rural urban linkage in Kibaigwa.

Climate change can have unfavorable impacts on global food production and causes the displacement of people. The case of significant effects on the environment, crop production, water resources, and livestock production in the context of rural-urban migration in Tanzania is discussed in chapter ten, by Matilda Sabayi. In line, with the investigation, the author conferred the climate change that is expected to bring about significant changes in migration patterns throughout the developing world, increases the frequency and severity of chronic environmental threats and unexpected disasters. The analysis of the study shows that climate change causes population movements by making certain parts of the world less viable to live in, causing food and water supplies to become more unreliable, therefore people move to urban areas seeking for alternative livelihoods. The author proposes other solutions for farmers that should involve alternative income generation activities such as mining, business, and fishing.

Migration is an extremely crucial challenge confronting Africa. There are some relatively constant migration factors, such as demographic trends and economic inequality. Others are qualified as conditional, because they vary in line with the change of time, and others are determined by disparities of labour demand. On the other hand, the outbreak of conflict which causes the significant number of internal and external migration is generally difficult to envisage. This volume is the outcome of the above concepts enriched by contributors from the different academic backgrounds who reviewed the problem of migration in a diversified viewpoint from different perspectives. This volume is recommended for all academic, research and professional individuals and institutions for reference. It is favourable for both private and public institutions for furtherance of migration discourses and research endeavors.

Chapter 1.

Konrad Czernichowski

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MOVEMENT OF LABOUR – THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Labour as a production factor

International economy focused on movement of goods for tens of years. Classical (e.g. Adam Smith's Theory of Absolute Costs, David Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage) and neoclassical theories of trade (e.g. H-O-S Theory, whose authors were Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin and Paul Anthony Samuelson) assume no movement of production factors. According to the latter, abundance of labour and capital in different countries is regulated by movement of labour-intensive and capital-intensive products. Thus, the differences between prices of production factors in various states decrease. However, in reality both labour and capital do move from the countries where they are cheap to the countries where they are expensive. It is related not only to abundance, but also to the effectiveness of the production factors (they move to the areas where they can be more effectively used), as well as to the tendency to earn more (higher wages in case of labour, higher percentage in case of capital)¹.

¹ P. Bożyk (2008), *Międzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 97.

A movement of people to another country for a longer period of time (at least one year) is called a migration. Therefore, the price of labour decreases in the country of immigration and increases in the country of emigration. Thus, the local employees in the immigration states are not interested in the migration of labour. However, globally, both migration of labour and capital is favourable because it raises national product and income².

Trade has also impact on the level of wages of workers. The level of wages in the sectors competing with import is on average lower than in a general population of workers. This is one of the reasons of protectionism in trade, which is supported by the society despite clear advantages of free trade, which increases total consumption, decreases level of prices in the economy and ensures more jobs in the export sectors. Why then is protectionism (especially non-tariff barriers) so popular in the world? According to Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Melitz, groups that lose the most because of the trade liberalization are better organized than those that benefit from it. Their lobby to put on limitations on trade is often successful. As a result of higher prices, companies tend to move to countries with fewer or no restrictions. They create jobs there, what attracts immigrants³.

The stage of regional integration, in which the movement of production factors such as labour and capital is liberalized, is called common market. Labour, however, is not as mobile as capital⁴. Furthermore, there are more restrictions on the movement of labour than those put on the movement of capital⁵. The construction of the wall between the USA and Mexico is a distinct example.

² Ibidem, pp. 97–98.


³ P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld & M. Melitz (2018), *Ekonomia międzynarodowa. Teoria i polityka*, vol. 1, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, pp. 119–122.

⁴ M. Guzek (2006), *Międzynarodowe stosunki gospodarcze. Zarys teorii i polityki handlowej*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 125.

⁵ P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld & M. Melitz (2018), op. cit., p. 125.

The model of international mobility of labour presented in Graph 1: International mobility of labour assumes existence of only one product, two countries (X and Y) and two production factors – labour and area (or capital). The marginal product of labour indicates the level of wages in the countries X and Y. In the beginning, the number of workers in the country X is equal AB and the salary – AG_x , whereas the number of workers in the country Y is equal BD and the salary – DE_y . Higher wages (which can be a result of higher technology, better skills of employees or greater abundance of area or alternatively, capital) in the country X motivate employees from the country Y to move to the country X. Therefore, the disparity between salaries in both countries decreases until they come level with each other in the point F. The migration is thus equal BC, which means that now AC people are employed in the country X and CD people – in the country Y. The area BCFG accounts for the increase of production in the country X and BCFE – the decrease of production in the country Y. It means that the total production in this economy increased by EFG⁶.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 109–127.

Graph 1: International mobility of labour

Source: Author's own study on the basis: P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld & M. Melitz (2018), *Ekonomia międzynarodowa. Teoria i polityka*, vol. 1, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 127.

Just as international trade, free movement of labour potentially brings profit to everyone, yet in reality some groups of people may lose (local employees in the country of immigration, for instance). The theory of convergence of wages due to the mobility of labour is supported by reality. In 1990, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) united with German Democratic Republic (GDR), the salaries of the employees working in the industrial sector grew from 7 percent to 37 percent. Five years later they reached 72 percent – over ten times this rate before the union. Similarly, in 1997 the average salaries of workers employed in the industry in Central Europe were 14 percent of that in Western Europe. In 2004 the EU was enlarged by Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia (apart from five other states). As a result of convergence of wages, in 2015 the rate of 14 percent almost doubled to 27 percent in the five countries mentioned above. The decrease in wages caused by immigration is not huge. It

is estimated that the average salaries in the United States of America are lower by 3 percent than they amounted without 16.7 percent of workers born abroad⁷.

Although the brain drain is generally an adverse phenomenon, in such cases the government may wish to get rid of the excess of the workforce, especially the cheapest and unskilled one to prevent an economic crisis related to the high rate of unemployment. When Poland entered the EU, the unemployment rate was high. The EU members successively ensured the access to their labour markets for the employees from the new member states. The then Polish prime minister Donald Tusk publicly encouraged his compatriots to go abroad to get a job. The movement of capital to countries and regions with the labour shortages is an alternative solution to the uneven distribution of the workforce. Another difference between labour and capital is the attitude of the government of the hosting state. While the capital is welcome for a long time, the government sometimes wishes to get rid of labour when it is no longer necessary⁸. The immigration is favourable from the economic point of view, however it may bring social tensions. As Max Frisch from Switzerland once stated, “they asked for labour, but they received people”⁹. Thus, the regulation of migration processes is advocated, as Benedict XVI mentioned in his Encyclical Letter “*Caritas in veritate*” (*Charity in truth*)¹⁰.

Another production factor is the area (including natural resources). The main difference between labour and natural resources is the implication of existing excess. The excess of minerals does not generate any costs, but the surplus of the labour supply over the demand for labour is a burden for the society, which will to a larger (in developed

⁷ Ibidem, pp. 127–130.

⁸ M. Guzek (2006), op. cit., pp. 123–127.

⁹ P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld & M. Melitz (2018), op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁰ Benedict XVI (2009), *Caritas in veritate*, Vatican, p. 67.

countries) or lesser (in underdeveloped or developing countries) extent try to ensure social minimum for all its citizens¹¹.

The movement of production factors can be considered as the substitution of the international trade, which was for the first time noticed by the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences winner Robert Mundell in his article “International Trade and Factor Mobility”, published in “American Economic Review” 1957, no. 47. The inflow of immigrants makes the labour-intensive sector more profitable, increasing production possibilities of the economy. Those who possess relatively abundant production factors profit from international trade, and those who administer rare production factors – lose. Therefore, we may expect that international trade will limit advantages of unskilled workers in highly developed countries¹².

Free movement of people vs. free movement of labour

The movement of labour should be distinguished from the right of residence, just as it is done in the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market regulating free movement of goods in Part C (article 6), free movement of persons and labour in Part D (Articles 7-12), rights of establishment and residence in Part E (Articles 13-15), free movement of services in Part F (Articles 16-23) and free movement of capital in Part G (Articles 24-28)¹³. Interestingly enough, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union from 2016 does not discern the free movement of labour from the free movement of people. There are only four freedoms: free movements of goods (Part III, Title II, Articles 28-37),

¹¹ M. Guzek (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹² P.R. Krugman, M. Obstfeld & M. Melitz (2018), *op. cit.*, pp. 132–160.

¹³ *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market*, East African Community, 20.11.2009.

persons, services and capital (Part III, Title IV, Articles 45-66)¹⁴. The free movement of persons encompasses in this case the free movement of workers (Chapter 1 of the Title IV) and the right of establishment (Chapter 2 of the Title IV). People in the EU may travel not only without acquiring a visa, but also without controlling their passports (the passports are being controlled only at the external border of the EU) within the Schengen area. They are allowed to settle in another EU member state and take up a job without a work permit¹⁵.

Historically, the movement of people was usually not a consequence of searching for a job in a global labour market, but rather it was a reason why labour shifted from one country to another for masses of people tended to look for more favourable conditions for settling and later even took over other people's land¹⁶. When some of them are disappointed, they may wish to return home (re-emigration)¹⁷. If the migration was on a large scale, it could cause national domination over domestic culture and language. During the time of geographic discoveries and later colonization new employment and life opportunities emerged, which encouraged many people to move¹⁸.

Migrations result in changing the migrants' interaction system. They leave their country and absorb new culture. They often integrate with new environment. If they do not integrate, it may cause problems mentioned in the previous point¹⁹.

¹⁴ *The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union*, "Official Journal of the European Union" C 202, 7.06.2016.

¹⁵ M. Guzek (2006), op. cit., p. 123.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ P. Bożyk (2008), op. cit., p. 98.

¹⁸ M. Guzek (2006), op. cit., pp. 123–125.

¹⁹ B. Szopa & A. Pollok (eds.) (2017), *Ekonomia globalna. Wybrane zagadnienia*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, p. 107.

Directions of migrations

Traditional migration took place from the industrial revolution to the Second World War. Around 66 million people emigrated from Europe (mainly from United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Poland) to the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina (the current Pope Francis' parents were Italian immigrants there), Brazil, among others. Migrants usually had no education, did not speak foreign languages and did not know exactly where they would settle. From time to time the migrations were massive due to conflicts, persecutions and economic crises. Nowadays the migration encompasses also highly qualified people²⁰. The main directions of the contemporary migrations are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Main directions of contemporary migrations

Region of origin	Region of destination
Mediterranean states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Greece, the Balkans)	Western Europe (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy)
Developing countries in Asia (Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea) and Latin America (Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Peru)	Canada, the United States of America, Australia
Former British colonies (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)	United Kingdom

Source: Author's own study on the basis: P. Bożyk (2008), *Międzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 99.

²⁰ P. Bożyk (2008), op. cit., pp. 98–99.

Reasons of contemporary migrations

We may distinguish a good number of reasons for contemporary migrations. Among political ones there can be conflicts or political persecutions. In case of ethnical or religious persecutions we talk about emotional reasons. Besides, there are also economic and environmental arguments (e.g. escaping an ecological catastrophe). Of course, personal causes are no less important. The most frequent ones, are finding a job, education and the desire to learn new things and develop skills²¹, apart from religious motives of a missionary character, for instance, the migration of priests and religious from Europe decreased from 16 thousand in 1978 to 7 thousand in 2017, whereas the migration of diocesan priests from Africa increased from 1236 to 5762, respectively, and from Asia, it grew from 1644 to 3272. There are two main reasons: lack of vocations in Europe with many vocations elsewhere, and also a temptation for individuals to live in peace and better financial conditions (in Tanzanian villages it happens for instance that diocesan priests live in an extreme poverty), as some people would believe²².

Economic migration can be either forced (when the unemployment, famine or very low salaries make it hard to survive in the country of origin) or voluntary (when citizens do have job, but wish to improve their and their families' standard of living. By forced migration we mean fleeing of people to other regions (such people are called *internally displaced persons* – IDPs) or states (we call them *refugees*) due to ethnical, religious, political or ideological persecution²³. In 2019 the states mostly stricken by forced migration are: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia (Table 2). These

²¹ B. Szopa & A. Pollok (eds.) (2017), op. cit., p. 111.

²² R. Skitek (2019), *Książka z eksportu*, "Gość Niedzielny" 21 July, p. 36.

²³ M. Guzek (2006), op. cit., p. 123.

five states accounted for as much as two-thirds of all refugees worldwide. The states hosting refugees are presented in Table 3.

Table 2: Countries of refugees' origin in 2017

State	Number of refugees [thousand]
Syria	6,300.0
Afghanistan	2,600.0
South Sudan	2,400.0
Myanmar	1,200.0
Somalia	986.4

Source: *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017* (2018), Geneva: UNHCR, p. 3.

Table 3: Countries hosting refugees in 2017

State	Number of refugees [thousand]
Turkey	3,500.0
Pakistan	1,400.0
Uganda	1,400.0
Lebanon	998.9
Iran	979.4
Germany	970.4
Bangladesh	932.2
Sudan	906.6

Source: *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017* (2018), Geneva: UNHCR, p. 3.

Recently we have observed mass migration from underdeveloped and developing countries to the EU member states. There are at least three reasons for this phenomenon:

- escaping from the conflict-stricken regions;
- a large surplus of labour force in poor countries;
- demand for work in Europe due to the demographic crisis.

Some economists argue that the automatization of work reduces the demand for employees²⁴, but the opposite consequence is also possible. Replacing people by machines makes the economic growth more effective and contributes to the creation of new job opportunities in other sectors, such as services.

There are four different reasons why a country may want to import labour²⁵:

- brain drain (no costs for educating specialists; consequently, a comparative advantage is increasing in the sectors employing these experts whereas decreasing in the countries of their origin);
- shortages of labour (the comparative advantage in the respective sectors in the countries of origin of the workforce is increasing only in the case when the surplus of labour is exported);
- deficiency of labour in jobs that the citizens do not want to take;
- tolerating illegal immigration (because it is easy to get rid of it when unemployment appears – if the share of immigrants in a society is high, discrimination and xenophobic sentiments become a real problem as immigrants are blamed for crowding out natives of the labour market).

The effects for the country of emigration and the country of immigration are presented in Table 4. Both sides take advantage

²⁴ Ibidem, pp. 124–125.

²⁵ Ibidem, pp. 126–130.


of the international division of labour, what is illustrated in Graphs 2 and 3.

Table 4: Positive and negative effects of migrations

	Positive effects	Negative effects
For the country of immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relative cheap and qualified labour; • decrease in costs of local education. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • possible increase in the unemployment rate; • possible social, cultural and religious tensions; • deterioration of the balance of payments due to the money sent by the immigrants to their families.
For the country of emigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money transfers to families; • decrease in the unemployment rate; • gaining professional qualifications by immigrants, which contributes to the spillover effect when they come back home. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • brain drain; • increase in the average citizens' age, what raises the employees' burden to finance pensions.


Source: Author's own study on the basis: P. Bożyk (2008), *Międzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 100.

Graph 2: Production possibilities before migration of labour



Source: Author's own study on the basis: P. Bożyk (2008), *Międzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 100.

Graph 3: Production possibilities after migration of labour from country I to country II



Source: Author's own study on the basis: P. Bożyk (2008), *Międzynarodowe stosunki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa: PWE, p. 100.

The rectangle ABCD represents GDP in the country I, whereas the rectangle BEFG – GDP in the country II. The segments HC and GI show the marginal productivity²⁶ in the country I and the country II, respectively. Since the marginal productivity of labour in the country II is higher than in the country I, so are the wages. It motivates employees from the country I to emigrate to the country II to look for a better-paid job. People will move from one country to another until marginal productivity of labour is equal in both countries. Thus, the segment OB in Graph 3 accounts for the number of employees who emigrated from the country I to the country II²⁷.

Classifications of migrations

Migrations can be classified according to the period of time spent abroad²⁸:

- local border traffic regime (going to work every day or every week, for at least a year);
- seasonal workers' migrations (regular seasonal work, after which employees come back home);
- going abroad for a certain period of time (usually several years) for a contract, studies or internship;
- shifting to another country as a permanent residence to join a family, marry a citizen or take up an interesting job.

²⁶ The productivity of labour is an amount of production per one person or an output per labour-hour. The marginal productivity of labour is the change in the total productivity of labour resulting from employing an additional worker.

²⁷ P. Bożyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 99–100.

The migrations may also be²⁹:

- legal;
- transitional (before a migrant is granted asylum);
- illegal.

Conclusion

Migration is compared to trade and the movement of capital in economic theories. Labour is however a specific production factor, which cannot be managed to the same extent as goods or capital. Usually, labour (that is people) move from the countries with low average wages to the countries with high average wages. It is a natural process, which is very often disturbed by receiving states, whose habitants are afraid of losing their jobs. The complexity of this phenomenon results from the fact that it can be analyzed from both economic, geographical, demographic³⁰, sociological, psychological and other perspectives.

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²⁹ B. Szopa & A. Pollok (eds.) (2017), op. cit., p. 111.

³⁰ Compare: Ibidem, p. 111.

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Movement of Labour – Theoretical Aspects

Abstract

International Economy focused on movement of goods for tens of years. Such theories as Adam Smith's Theory of Absolute Costs, David Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage or H-O-S Theory, whose authors were Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin and Paul Anthony Samuelson, assumed that production factors such as labour, capital and area did not move from one country to another. The aim of the article is to review historical and contemporary economic theories of migrations.

Key words: migrations, movement of production factors, brain drain, labour market

Chapter 2.

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CONTEMPORARY MIGRATIONS IN AFRICA WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON EAST AFRICA COMMUNITY

The main directions of migrations in Africa

In the middle of 2017, the World witnessed nearly 258 million of international migrants. Nearly 10% of them stayed in Africa. 90% of African migrants stayed in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 30% of them in East African countries.

Table 1: International migrant stock

DESTINATION	INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK AT MIDYEAR		INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION (PERCENTAGE)		SHARE OF TOTAL INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS (PERCENTAGE)		WOMEN MIGRANTS AS SHARE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK (PERCENTAGE)		ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE OF MIGRANT STOCK		MEDIAN AGE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS (YEARS)	
	2000	2017	2000	2017	2000	2017	2000	2017	2000–2005	2015–2017	2000	2017
World	172 604 257	257 715 425	2.8	3.4	100	100	49	48	2.0	2.0	38	39
Africa	14 800 306	24 650 223	1.8	2.0	9	10	47	47	0.9	2.5	28	31
Eastern Africa	4 844 795	7 591 799	1.9	1.8	3	3	49	50	-0.4	4.6	29	30
Middle Africa	1 756 687	3 539 697	1.8	2.2	1	1	49	48	1.9	1.5	27	29
Northern Africa	1 885 650	2 410 056	1.1	1.0	1	1	44	42	-1.7	1.2	28	32
Southern Africa	1 222 314	4 338 205	2.3	6.7	1	2	41	45	3.3	2.7	35	34
Western Africa	5 090 860	6 770 466	2.2	1.8	3	3	47	47	2.0	1.2	25	30
Sub-Saharan Africa	13 716 539	22 975 988	2.0	2.2	8	9	47	48	0.8	2.8	27	31

Source: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

The majority of African emigrants stay within this continent. In 2017, the percentage of emigrants who lived in other African countries was equal to 53,4. The characteristic feature of African migration is that migrants move within the same region and between neighboring regions. East and West Africa are the main destinations; however, migration occurs primarily within the same region. For example, 71% of the international migrants in East Africa originated from within the region. “Eastern Africa is the most diversified region regarding the origin of international migrants from Africa, as it receives significant shares of migrants from all other regions except Western Africa. In addition to economic factors driving migration to diversified economies such as Kenya and Rwanda, the latter’s visa for foreign workers may attract migrants to the region”¹. The table below shows a stock of emigrants living within and outside of Africa.

Table 2: Intra-African and extra-continental emigrants


ORIGIN	TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS	TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS LIVING WITHIN AFRICA	STOCK OF EMIGRANTS LIVING WITHIN AFRICA AS SHARE OF TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS (PERCENTAGE)	TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS LIVING OUTSIDE AFRICA	STOCK OF EMIGRANTS LIVING OUTSIDE AFRICA AS SHARE OF TOTAL STOCK OF EMIGRANTS (PERCENTAGE)
Total Africa	36 266 428	19 359 848	53.4	16 906 580	46.6
Eastern Africa	10 533 239	7 475 553	71.0	3 057 686	29.0
Middle Africa	4 099 426	3 229 786	78.8	869 640	21.2
Northern Africa	11 175 732	1 477 069	13.2	9 698 663	86.8
Southern Africa	1 586 875	821 006	51.7	765 869	48.3
Western Africa	8 871 156	6 356 434	71.7	2 514 722	28.3

Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, see: UNCTAD (2018), *Economic Development in Africa, Report 2018. Migration for Structural Transformation*, New York and Geneva: United Nations, p. 44.


¹ UNCTAD (2018), *Economic Development in Africa, Report 2018, Migration for Structural Transformation*, New York and Geneva: United Nations, p. 51, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

As it is shown at the table above, the significant exception to this pattern occurs in North African countries. High level of unemployment and short distance to Europe are the main drivers of extra-continental migration. Emigration from Egypt, Algeria and Morocco is mostly oriented to Europe. These countries, together with Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo are the main sending countries in Africa. On the other hand, the main receivers of African migrants are: South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

Figure 1: Countries with largest number of emigrants, 2017 (millions)




Source: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

Figure 2: Countries with largest stock of immigrants, 2017 (millions)

Source: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

Today, the main migration corridor in Africa is from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire. The main reason is the ending of the civil war in the latter country and coming back home of the Ivoirians from Burkina Faso. The next migration corridors are from South Sudan to Uganda (civil war), Mozambique to South Africa (economic migration), Sudan to South Sudan (climatic variations, the independence of South Sudan and the political unrest in Sudan). Apart from the last example, other significant migration corridors within East Africa are Somalia to Kenya, Somalia to Ethiopia, South Sudan to Ethiopia (all of them are due to civil wars and conflicts).

Figure 3: Main intra-African migration corridors in 2017

Source: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

Emigration from and within East African Community


Within the last 30 years, EAC witnessed two huge waves of migration. The first was from Rwanda after the civil war between Hutu and Tutsi in 1994, the second from South Sudan, after an ethnic conflict between Dinka and Nuer was initiated in December 2013.

“In 1994, half of the 7.5 million people in Rwanda were forced to flee their homes. Of these displaced persons, 2.4 million refugees fled to neighboring countries. In 1996, violence in Burundi forced 100,000 Rwandans to repatriate. After the civil war in the DRC in October of 1996, 720,000 of the 1.1 million Rwandan refugees were forced to repatriate. In 1996 and early 1997, Tanzania returned 480,000 Rwandan refugees from its western regions. By the end of 1997, fewer than 100,000 Rwandans remained outside the country”².

In Southern Sudan the war, drought and ensuing famine has resulted in the displacement within the country of nearly 1.9 million people, with 2 million others having fled, mainly to Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan (see figure below). In Uganda alone, the number of South Sudanese refugees surpassed the 1 million mark in August 2017³.


² <https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Rwanda-MIGRATION.html> [accessed 22 April 2019].

³ <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spiraling-violence-and-drought-drive-refugee-crisis-south-sudan>, [accessed 19 April 2019].

Figure 4: Top Host Countries for South Sudanese Refugees, 2013-2017

Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *South Sudan Situation: Information Sharing Portal*, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spiraling-violence-and-drought-drive-refugee-crisis-south-sudan> [accessed 19 April 2019].

In 2017, among EAC countries, the most sending country was Southern Sudan (1.8 million people born in this country were living abroad). On the second place was Uganda (739,700 people). The country of the lowest number of emigrants was Tanzania (324,400).

Figure 5: The number of people born in a country living abroad

Source: https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_origin&t=1990&cm49=728 [accessed 19 April 2019].

Because of armed conflict and political instability, a huge number of migrants constitute refugees⁴ and people in refugee-like situations⁵. Between 2000 and 2017 the number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations, who stayed within EAC countries, more than doubled. In 2017 EAC countries hosted more than 2,5 million people having this status, and only Uganda hosted more than 1,3 million. Apart from Tanzania, in all EAC countries the number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations increases. In 2000 Tanzania hosted 680,862 people with this status, and since then, until 2014 their number constantly has been decreasing. Within the last years, this

⁴ Refugees: Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. In the absence of Government figures, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in many industrialized countries based on 10 years of individual asylum-seeker recognition.

⁵ This category is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

number rose again, mostly due to political instability in Burundi. The table no. 3 shows the number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations in EAC countries.

Table 3: Refugees and people in refugee-like situations by country/territory of asylum, end of the year

Country	2000	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017
Burundi	27,136	20,681	24,483	21,093	24,967	29,365	35,659	41,813	45,490	52,936	53,363	62,361
Kenya	206,106	251,271	265,729	320,605	358,928	402,905	566,487	564,933	534,938	551,352	553,912	431,901
Rwanda	30,118	45,206	53,577	55,062	54,016	55,398	55,325	58,212	73,349	73,820	144,737	162,263
South Sudan							105,023	202,581	229,587	248,152	263,016	283,409
Tanzania	680,862	548,824	435,630	321,909	118,731	109,286	131,243	101,021	102,099	88,492	211,845	308,528
Uganda	236,622	257,256	228,959	162,132	127,345	135,801	139,448	197,877	220,555	385,513	477,187	1,350,504
EAC							1,033,185	1,166,437	1,206,018	1,400,265	1,704,060	2,598,966

Source: United Nations, *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/excom/unhcrannual/> [accessed 19 April 2019].

The table below shows the origins and destinations of migrants within EAC and in the world in 2017. The main sending country was South Sudan, from which emigrated 1,750,000 people, of whom 993,000 stayed in EAC, mostly in Uganda (900 000 people). The second sending country was Uganda (740,000 people, of whom 45% stayed in neighboring Kenya). The majority of emigrants from Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania stayed outside of EAC. Table no. 5 shows, that a huge portion of emigrants from Kenya stayed in the USA and UK (52%), from Tanzania also in the USA and UK (28%), and 53% of emigrants from Rwanda lived in DRC.

Table 4: Origins and destinations of migrants within EAC and in the World in 2017

In: From:	Burundi	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tan- zania	Uganda	From a country in EAC	From a country in the world
Burundi	x	<10 000	60 000	<1 000	210 000	60 000	341 000	435 600
Kenya	<10 000	x	<10 000	<10 000	30 000	60 000	120 000	501 200
Rwanda	70 000	<10 000	x	<1 000	<1 000	110 000	192 000	568 800
South Sudan	<1 000	90 000	<1 000	x	<1 000	900 000	993 000	1 800 000
Tanzania	30 000	40 000	40 000	<1 000	x	40 000	151 000	324 400
Uganda	<1 000	330 000	90 000	150 000	<10 000	x	581 000	739 700
From EAC in a country	112 000	480 000	201 000	163 000	252 000	1 170 000	x	x
From the world in a country	300 000	1 080 000	440 000	850 000	490 000	1 690 000	x	x

Source: Pew Research Center, *Global Attitudes&Trends*, <http://www.pew-global.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=TZ&date=2017> and https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_origin&t=1990&cm49=728 [accessed 19 April 2019].

Table 5: Emigrants from EAU countries worldwide in 2017

Country	1 st host	2 nd host	3 rd host	4 th host	5 th host	Worldwide
Burundi	Tanzania (210 000)	Rwanda (60 000)	Uganda (60 000)	DRC (40 000)	South Africa (10 000)	435 600
Kenya	UK (140 000)	USA (120 000)	Uganda (60 000)	Tanzania (30 000)	Canada (30 000)	501 200
Rwanda	DRC (300 000)	Uganda (110 000)	Burundi (70 000)	Rep. of Congo (30 000)	Zambia (<10 000)	568 800
South Sudan	Uganda (900 000)	Ethiopia (420 000)	Sudan (300 000)	Kenya (90 000)	UAE (20 000)	1 800 000
Tanzania	USA (50 000)	UK (40 000)	Rwanda (40 000)	Kenya (40 000)	Uganda (40 000)	324 400
Uganda	Kenya 330 000	South Sudan 150 000	Rwanda 90 000	UK 60 000	USA 40 000	739 700

Source: Pew Research Center, *Global Attitudes&Trends*, <http://www.pew-global.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=TZ&date=2017> and https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_origin&t=1990&cm49=728 [accessed 19 April 2019].

International migrations and their impacts on the economies of East African Community countries

As it is shown in table 1, international migrant stock in Africa has risen from around 14,8 million people in 2000 to 24,6 million in 2017. This table also shows that migrants consist mostly of young people. According to UNCTAD (2018), Africa has the lowest median age of migrants in the world. Driving forces for migration are not only wars, political instability and climate change, but also unemployment. Taking into consideration the high portion of jobless people, youth probably will continue to move to other countries in

aim to find a job. In East African Community it will be facilitated by the deepening of regional integration and the facilitated movement of people.

According to the projections of the African Development Bank (2019), GDP in East Africa will reach 5.9% in 2019, and 6.1% in 2020 (compared to only 1-2% in the majority of West European countries). This economic development, together with increased trade and transportation, will enable more people to migrate and this, as a feedback, may more strengthen the deepening of regional integration. Sending countries can potentially harness established Diasporas of their own citizens in receiving countries for growth and investment. It may be done partially and indirectly through personal remittances, which are being sent by emigrants to their families remaining in the countries of origin. As tables no. 6 and 7 show, personal remittances constitute a significant part of GDP in EAC countries. In South Sudan 1 of 5 USD in GDP comes from personal remittances.

Table 6: Personal remittances, receives (in thousand USD)

Country	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
Burundi				72	34 499	51 041	33 650
Kenya	139 260	87 498	537 900	424 991	685 757	1 569 000	1 962 000
Rwanda	2 628	21 127	6 626	8 869	106 472	159 200	215 292
South Sudan	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	1 139 000	633 830
Tanzania	nd	840	8 000	19 366	344 289	387 768	402 635
Uganda	nd	nd	238 100	321 808	770 789	902 158	1 240 000

nd – no data

Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?end=2017&locations=IN-BI-KE-RW&start=1975> [accessed 5 January 2019].

Table 7: Personal remittances as a share of GDP

Country	2000		2010		2015		2017	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Burundi	0.870	nd	2.032	1,70	3.104	1,64	3.172	1,06
Kenya	12.705	4,23	40.000	1,71	64.008	1,97	79.263	2,47
Rwanda	1.735	0,38	5.773	1,84	8.278	1,92	9.135	2,35
South Sudan	nd	nd	17.273 ¹	nd	10.907	10,44	2.904 ²	21,83 ²
Tanzania	10.186	0,08	31.895	1,08	45.628	0,85	52.090	0,77
Uganda	6.193	3,84	20.186	3,81	27.103	3,33	25.995	4,77

¹: 2011

A: GDP in billion USD.

²: 2016

B: Personal remittances as a share of GDP (%)

nd: no data

Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?end=2017&locations=IN-BI-KE-RW&start=1975> [accessed 5 January 2019].

Migration reduces poverty for migrants and their families in origin and destination countries. Through wages in the destination country and remittances in the origin country, migrants and their families benefit from increased income, which gives them the opportunity to make investments, meet basic needs and have access to education and better health services. Through expenditures in origin country households stimulate economic growth and in destination country migrants fill labour gaps and contribute to services and the fiscal balance through taxes⁶.

The emigration from Africa will be enforced in the future by the aging of the European population. Low fertility rates, low death rates and the large informal sector in Southern Europe will stimulate emigration of Africans. On the other hand, the high economic growth in African countries will attract migrants from outside the continent⁷.

⁶ UNCTAD (2018), op. cit.

⁷ Ibidem.

Conclusion and recommendation

Despite significant emigration from Africa to Europe, very often tragic, with sinking boats with migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, the much bigger is intracontinental migration. 90% of African migrants stay in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 30% of them in East African countries. The majority of migrants in East African Community come from other East African Community countries. They contribute to regional integration and economic growth, both in sending and receiving countries. Through expenditures in the origin country households stimulate economic growth and in destination country migrants fill labour gaps and contribute to services and the fiscal balance through taxes. Because of that, the migration should be better managed. Due to the fact that the remittances constitute significant part of GDP, the governments of EAC countries should develop common rules that would reduce the cost of making money transfers within EAC.

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<https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Rwanda-MIGRATION.html> [accessed 22 April 2019].

https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2018_en.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

Contemporary migrations in Africa with a special focus on East Africa Community

Abstract

A huge portion of migration in Africa is taking place within the continent. In 2017, 53% of continent's emigrants stayed in Africa. In East Africa, this share was even more significant; 71% emigrants from East African countries lived in other countries of this region. In case of East African Community this share was equal to 55%. Unfortunately, in some cases, majority of migrants are refugees, who have been forced to leave their countries due to armed conflict and insecurity. However, the report of United Nation titled "*Economic Development in East Africa. Migration*

for Structural Transformation” argues that this intra-African migration is an essential ingredient for deeper regional and continental integration. Of course, there are some exceptions. For example, majority of peoples, who have been born in Kenya and Tanzania, stay in USA and UK mostly. Remittances transferred by those migrants constitute a significant share in GDP of these countries. This migration out of Africa gives a very positive contribution of migrants to the structural transformation of origin countries.

Key words: contemporary migrations, Africa, East African Community, remittances

Chapter 3.

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THE DILEMMA OF AFRICAN REFUGEES TO EUROPEAN UNION: MIGRATION CRISIS, CAUSES AND REPERCUSSIONS

Theoretical framework of international migration and displacement

Investigation of the background of migration indicates the fundamental structural and systemic circumstances as well as the origins of this phenomenon. In terms of the theoretical concept, there are push and pull conditions which incorporates macro, micro, meso and voluntary aspects of migrations, which include economic crisis, numerous problems in fragile states, social disintegration, and migration systems determining relations between the origin of refugees and host countries.

The study of migration is many-sided and gives useful background for international migration analysis and explanations. The core points of investigation consider the root causes and problems of migration. In this field of investigation there are different theoretical models which are based on variable concepts, expectations and levels of study. Lucia Kurekova, states that, currently, “the dominant theory in explaining causes of migration is the neoclassical theory with its underlying assumption that migration is stimulated primarily by

rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs, mostly financial but also psychological”; she adds that this view has been debated conceptually as well as on practical studies¹. There is also various theoretical basis for enlightenment of migration problems. In line with academic views of international migration theories, the following interrelated models of explanation are used for the better understanding of refugee flows across the globe.

Macro and micro theories

The macro aspect highlights the structural, unbiased situations which try to enlighten “push” and “pull” aspects for migration. For example, concerning economic migration, the push factor would naturally encompass economic situations. This include unemployment, low salaries or low per capita income compared to the place or country of destination. In this case the pull factors would embrace, liberal migration regulation and the employment market and other conditions related to host countries are taken into consideration. On the other hand, forced migration would be described through reasons such as state authoritarianism or fear of violence as well as civil disorder and conflicts².

The micro model of migration study focuses on the reasons influencing specific individual choices for migration. This approach examines how potential refugees consider various costs and benefits concepts of migration. This includes costs regarding financial and

¹ L. Kurekova (2011), *Theories of migration: Conceptual review and empirical testing in the context of the EU East West flows*, Paper prepared for Interdisciplinary conference on Migration. *Economic Change, Social Challenge*, University College London, April 6-9, pp. 4–5.

² C. Boswell (2002), *Addressing the causes of migratory and refugee movements: the role of the European Union*, *New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper* no. 73, December, p. 2.

psychological calculations devoted for the activities of integration in the host country, whereas benefits consider higher payment or personal security. Christina Boswell, states that micro theories often draw on rational choice theory, which helps to measure various situations generating migration³.

Pioneer, voluntary migrations

Voluntary migration can be seen mainly as groupings of voluntary migrants, labour migrants and family members of previous refugees. This theory explains migration network theory which refers to the extent to which previous migration experience and the settlement of migrants in particular places of destination enables the arrival of new migrants which includes links of families, friends or simply from the same country. This process reduces the risk of migration in the place of destination⁴.

Oxford learners dictionary, defines the term “pioneer” as “the first people to go to a particular area in order to live and work or a person who is the first to study and develop a particular area of knowledge, culture, etc. that other people then continue to develop”⁵. The history of migration activities confirms that, in Europe for centuries great numbers of migrations have been observed. This activity was caused mainly following the Roman conquests, trade tracks, mass movements, seasonal migration, colonization of new lands and colonial beginning colonial empires. This fact shows, the early stage and development of transnational network of migration from different parts of the

³ Ibidem.

⁴ O. Bakewell, H. de Haas & A. Kubal (2011), *Migration systems, pioneers and the role of agency*, Norface Migration Discussion Paper no. 23, p. 10, http://www.norface-migration.org/publ_uploads/NDP_23_11.pdf [accessed 26 July 2019].

⁵ *Oxford learners dictionary*, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/pioneer_1 [accessed 26 July 2019].

globe. Further, basic factors such as warfare, immigration policies, labour employment, or economic development also played substantial role to create the circumstances shaping the prospect of formation of pioneer system of migration⁶.

Meso theories

Meso theories reject the concept of macro focus on push and pull factors. This theoretical view explains migration movements in the context of a multifaceted system of relationships between countries. Meso theory directs its central focus on two basic concepts, the first one refers to systems and networks in which a group of states are related to each other by economic, political and cultural stalemates, which facilitates migration movements. According to this concept circumstances causing movement are simply the result of the dynamics or relations between two areas, instead of objective indicators. This system may concern individual, groups of people, families, firms etc. The main factors are all common values shared between two countries or places which in turn influences the directions of mobilities of people for economic or social support reasons⁷. C. Boswell argues that, meso level is less relevant for explaining forced displacement, although it can help explain the choice of destination for refugees⁸.

⁶ O. Bakewell, H. de Haas, A. Kubal (2012), *Migration Systems, Pioneer Migrants and the Role of Agency*, "Journal of Critical Realism" 11(4), p. 2.

⁷ C. Boswell (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

The root causes of wave of migration

Forced migrants

A huge number of global migrants have been forced to leave their own countries and seek asylum in foreign states. Most of them escape from persecution, abuses of human rights, repression, civil wars and other forms of conflict. They leave on their individual initiative to get rid of these dangerous circumstances. In other cases, they are driven from their origin of places by governments or rebellious groups committed to relocate or shift the ethnic, religious or other structure in each area, region or country⁹.

If Europe seriously want to solve the current problem of refugee crisis, the main focus must be on the roots of global conflict and displacement. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, explaining current refugee problems, argues that, “this is a crisis largely born out of war, and one that will be with us for decades to come. Understanding this reality is essential if Europe is to mount an effective response”¹⁰. He adds that deadly conflict, above all, is driving the massive exodus of refugees. As an example, he gives, wars in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria alone which were responsible for more than half of the world’s refugee population as of mid-2015. On the other hand, two-thirds of the globally forcibly dislocated people remain within their own countries. J.-M. Guéhenno, also mentions other factors refugee crisis, such as increasing the risk of violence as the result of weakening of the world’s collective capacity for conflict management, geopolitical shifts, intensifying rivalries between major powers, and rising of

⁹ S.F. Martin (2001), *Global migration trends and asylum*, Working Paper no. 41 Washington, p. 7.

¹⁰ J.-M. Guéhenno (2016), *Strategic Europe, Conflict is Key to Understanding Migration*, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=63578> [accessed 28 July 2019].

regional tensions which had great impact on conflict and refugee crisis¹¹.

Presently there are millions of migrants in the world. Among serious causes of migration, Andrew Dunn, mentions, economic inequality, increased globalization, political instability and climatic changes. Further escalation of the problem is expected to increase in the future¹².

FAO investigations regarding migration in Africa, show that, this phenomenon is widespread in Africa. The evidence indicates that at least families have one member, internally or externally migrated. The dominant number of internal migrants have their origin in rural areas, while external migrants mostly come from city inhabitants. The study also reveals that migrants are mainly male, aged between 15 and 34, comparatively better educated among the households. The major motive and driver for migration is said to be employment, whereas education and family reasons appear as the second and third most common motives. The investigation also states that women migrate largely for family-related reasons, comparing with the rest of migrants. In case of migrants, particularly with external refugees, the study shows that, they have wealthier families than households without migrants. The conclusion is that their higher capacity of expense power could be considered as consequence of migration, or even thought to be as the prerequisite for the possibility of migration¹³.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² A. Dunn (2017), *African Migration: Root Causes and Regulatory Dynamics* (AMIREG), <https://unu.edu/projects/african-migration-root-causes-and-regulatory-dynamics-amireg.html> [accessed 1 June 2017].

¹³ FAO (2017), *Evidence on internal and international migration patterns in selected African countries*, Rome, <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7468e.pdf> [accessed 26 July 2019].

Climate change as the cause of migration

The increase of global temperature and its effects have been a great threat for the livelihood of human beings. This tendency is still worsening, which was estimated to increase by 3°C to 5°C, at the end of the next century. Following this dramatic climate changes millions of people may face serious problems. This motivates peoples from different parts of the world to look for alternatives. The immediate solution so far observed is migration, to save lives. Practically Africans in different parts of the continent face this problem¹⁴. For example, the National Human Development Report 2010 on Liberia, shows that, agriculture and rural-based activities are the main source of livelihoods for the majority of Liberians. This report explicitly clarifies that, how the revival of these activities has great impact on the further reconstruction and expansion of infrastructure – roads, bridges, ports, water and sanitation facilities, and telecommunications. On the other hand, the lack of appropriate climate condition and other forms of natural disaster would affect the overall development of the society and furthermore cause displacement people¹⁵.

It is obvious that agriculture is the most important sector of the economy for Africans. Regional and global climate cause an expected problems which dramatically affects ways of life enforces for displacement¹⁶. The problem of climate change is also related to

¹⁴ Q. Wodon, A. Liverani, G. Joseph & N. Bougnoux (eds.) (2014), *Climate Change and Migration Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa*, Washington: The World Bank, p. 4.

¹⁵ *National Human Development Report 2010 Liberia, Promoting Human Development Through Shared Growth: A Special Focus on Infrastructure and Agriculture*, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/liberia_2010.pdf [accessed 20 June 2019].

¹⁶ M. Behnassi & K. McGlade (eds.) (2017), *Environmental Change and Human Security in Africa and the Middle East*, Heidelberg: Springer, p. 50.

floods, and droughts, and well-being of people which also leads to considerable dislocation as well as the migration of people to every direction to secure their lives. There is also a great link between climate change and gender problems. Internal or external migrants are mostly males. Women are largely left at the place of origin being more vulnerable to the worst consequences of the problem. Among others, regarding this issue, Quentin Wodon, Andrea Liverani, George Joseph, and Nathalie Bougnoux argue that, “those women who do migrate, job opportunities tend to be less attractive than those of their male counterparts”¹⁷.

Desperate exodus and dangerous routes to Europe – consequences

The UNHCR global report trends in 2015 report estimated the number of globally displaced as the highest since the aftermath of the Second World War. Millions of people have been forcibly displaced globally¹⁸:

- In 2011 – 42.5 million;
- In 2012 – 45.2 million;
- In 2013 – 51.2 million ;
- In 2014 – 59.5 million;
- In 2015 – 65.3 million.

Within five years the number of globally displaced people has been increased by 5%. The continued conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic led to substantial increase of global refugee flows and

¹⁷ Q. Wodon, A. Liverani, G. Joseph & N. Bougnoux (eds.) (2014), op. cit., p. 4.


¹⁸ *Forced displacement continued to affect an ever-increasing number of people, reaching 65.3 million 4 individuals by the end of the year*, <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html> [accessed 20 June 2019].

humanitarian needs in 2015. In addition to that previous unsolved conflicts and new unrest in Africa and the middle east significantly contributed to the upsurge in the internationally forced movement of refugees. According to the UNHCR global trends report in 2015, conflicts in countries such as Burundi, Iraq, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria, together with previous or unresolved crises in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen caused the increase of global refugee crisis. As a result, in 2015, 1.8 million new refugees were observed, compared to 1.2 million in 2014. On the other hand, the number of people newly displaced within their own country due to conflict and violence in 2015 remained high at 8.6 million, which was less than the record of 11 million IDPs in 2014¹⁹.

According to the UNHCR report, even though the Arab world refugee crisis has got more global attention, the problem of refugees in Africa has been continued. The report by the UNHCR exposes that the situation in Africa in 2015 was worsening. The map below indicates situations of the refugee crisis in 10 African states²⁰.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ UNHCR Report, *Worsening refugee situation in Africa*, <https://www.dw.com/en/unhcr-report-worsening-refugee-situation-in-africa/a-19338619-0> [accessed 20 July 2019].

Map 1: Displacement of people in Africa in 2016

Source: UNHCR Report, *Worsening refugee situation in Africa*, <https://www.dw.com/en/unhcr-report-worsening-refugee-situation-in-africa/a-19338619-0> [accessed 20 July 2019].

This trend was continued in 2016, which affected Africa. At the end of 2015, UNHCR report shows that, about 16 million people in Africa were either displaced or forced to flee to other countries. This figure was increased by 1.5 million from 2014; about 10.7 million of them, were internally displaced persons (IDPs). The rest 5.2 million were people that fled to other countries, most of them, about 4.4 million, escaped to bordering states.

The civil war in Somalia contributed as one of the factors concerning the increase of the number of refugees. The boiling clashes in South Sudan and Sudan were also among the reasons for displacement of people. In Burundi, disorder following President Pierre Nkurunziza declaration of running for a third term, and in Nigeria, the Boko Haram crisis caused large number of refugees to escape to the neighboring states²¹.

²¹ Ibidem.

The internationally displaced persons forcibly raised significantly from 43.3 million in 2009 to 70.8 million in 2018²². Conflicts in the Middle East, in Iraq and Yemen and in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, as well as the massive flow of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh at the end of 2017, contributed to the higher number of displaced people. Comparing the number of forcibly displaced people in 2018, Ethiopia surpassed Syria; this increased the number of globally displaced people. In 2018, 13.6 million people were newly displaced, including 2.8 million who sought protection abroad and 10.8 million remained in their own countries. Ethiopians, broke the record and became the largest newly displaced population in 2018, having 1,560,800 displaced people: among them, 98% internally. Syrians were categorized as the second in raking, with 889,400 people in the same period²³.


The main route of African refugees passes through Libya to Europe as a gateway. It is obvious that, Libya is unsafe direction, because of its long civil war and political instability. The additional problem facing migrants is also the risk of crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. So, the basic question is, why do African refugees risk life, being aware after miserable life in Libya and a series of loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea?

Amanda Sakuma concerning the crisis of migration in Africa, states that, migrants coming from the south, escape conflicts that have collapsed the whole nation. From the east, they escape vicious conflicts, and from the west, they avoid poverty and rulers that indiscriminately put them in to prison. He adds that, some of the migrants arrive by choice, where the rest are enforced. He described

²² UNHCR Global Trends, *Forced Displacement in 2018*, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2018-0> [accessed 20 June 2019].

²³ Ibidem.

Map 2: Migration routes from different parts of African states to Libya.



Source: A. Sakuma (2016), *Damned for Trying: A massive wave of migration is crashing through North Africa, but there is only one major gateway to Europe — and it’s through Libya*, <http://www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/libya> [accessed 20 July 2019].

Libya, as “the hell where most migrants prepare to face the deadliest stretch of the Mediterranean Sea”²⁴.

The route of a wave of migration to Libya is from different countries. One of the reasons, Libya became a favorite route is linked with

²⁴ A. Sakuma (2016), *Damned for Trying: A massive wave of migration is crashing through North Africa, but there is only one major gateway to Europe – and it’s through Libya*, <http://www.msnbc.com/specials/migrant-crisis/libya> [accessed 20 July 2019].

fragmentation and political disorder as the result of power vacuum filled by rivaling factions to take power. According to A. Sakuma, the anarchy opened an opportunity for human trafficking systems to flourish, unexpectedly opening a profitable market intended to turnover transaction of persons like other properties. Libya's 1,100-mile coastline became an open border, out of control of government authorities. Smugglers used this opportunity to transfer hundreds of refugees at a time to transport them by sea to Italy²⁵.

Table 1: Sea arrivals to Southern Europe (Italy, Cyprus and Malta Greece and Spain) land and sea arrivals 2014-2018.

Previous years	Arrivals	Dead and missing
2018	141,472	2,277
2017	185,139	3,139
2016	373,652	5,096
2015	1,032,408	3,771
2014	225,455	3,538

Source: *Operational portal, Refugee situations*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean> [accessed 29 July 2019].

The recent updated data shows, the increase of sea and land arrivals as well as migrant fatalities²⁶:

- The recent updated data of sea arrivals (29 July 2019), shows 44,236, which includes refugees and migrants arriving by sea to Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Malta.
- Refugees and migrants arriving by land to Greece and Spain 9,296, (29 July 2019)
- Dead and missing in 2019 (estimate) – 820, (29 July 2019)

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ *Operational portal, Refugee situations*, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean> [accessed 29 July 2019].

Migrants arrivals by sea and land to Spain increased by 131% in 2018 compared to 2017²⁷:

- 2018 – 65,400 (58,600 by sea and 6,800 by land)
- 2017 – 28,300 (22,100 by sea and 6,200 by land)
- 2016 – 14,100 (by sea and land)
- 2015 – 16,300 (by sea and land)

Dead and missing at sea:

- 2017 – 202
- 2018 – 777

Demographic breakdown:

- 11% women
- 78% men
- 11% children

Arrivals' most common countries of origin:

- 13,000 – Morocco
- 13,000 – Guinea
- 10,300 – Mali
- 5,800 – Côte d'Ivoire
- 5,300 – Algeria

Migrants arrivals by sea to Italy decreased by 80% in 2018 compared to 2017²⁸:

- 2018 – 23,400 (by sea)
- 2017 – 119,400 (by sea)
- 2016 – 181,400 (by sea)
- 2015 – 153,800 (by sea)

Dead and missing at sea:

- 2017 – 2,873
- 2018 – 1,312

²⁷ *Desperate Journeys, January, Spain, Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe's borders*, December 2018, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67712> [accessed 20 July 2019].

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

Demographic breakdown:

- 10% women
- 18% children
- 72% men

Arrivals' most common countries of origin:

- 5,200 – Tunisia
- 3,300 – Eritrea
- 1,700 – Iraq
- 1,600 – Sudan
- 1,600 – Pakistan

Migrants arrivals by sea and land to Greece increased by 45% in 2018 compared to 2017²⁹:

- 2018 – 50,500 (32,500 by sea and 18,000 by land)
- 2017 – 35,400 (29,700 by sea 6,700 by land)
- 2016 – 176,800 (173,500 by sea and 3,300 by land)
- 2015 – 856,700 (by sea)

Dead and missing at sea:

- 2017 – 59
- 2018 – 187

Demographic breakdown:

- 23% women
- 37% children
- 40% men


Sea arrivals' most common countries of origin:

- 7,900 – Syrian Arab Republic
- 9,000 – Afghanistan
- 5,900 – Iraq
- 1,800 – Republic of Congo
- 1,600 – State of Palestine

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports, the number of asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean

²⁹ Ibidem.

Table 2: Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in southern Europe (2018–2019)

 IOM UN MIGRATION Mediterranean Developments Table 1					
TOTAL ARRIVALS BY SEA AND DEATHS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 2018-2019					
Country of Arrival	1 JANUARY - 13 MARCH 2019		1 - 13 MARCH 2019	1 JANUARY - 13 MARCH 2018	
	Arrivals	Deaths	Arrivals	Arrivals	Deaths
Italy	335	153	73	5,945	358
Malta	136	(Central Med. route)	87	N/A	(Central Med. route)
Greece	4,483	8	855	3,562	1
Cyprus	132	(Eastern Med. route)	0	47	(Eastern Med. route)
Spain	5,222	73	182	2,764	107
	(Western Med. route)			(Western Med. route)	
Estimated Total	10,308	234	1,197	12,318	466
Data on deaths of migrants compiled by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. All numbers are minimum estimates. Arrivals based on data from respective governments and IOM field offices.					
14 Mar 19					

Source: IOM, UN Migration, *Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 10,308 in 2019; Deaths Reach 234*, <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-10308-2019-deaths-reach-234> [accessed 15 March 2019].

in 2019 reached 10,308 and 234 refugees dead. Refugees arrived in Europe by the sea in 2019 was thought to be decreased by 16% compared to 12,318 arriving during the same period before a year. In case of fatalities on the three main Mediterranean Sea routes during the first ten weeks of 2019, 234 persons have lost their lives, compared to 466 deaths that happened during the same period in 2018³⁰.

³⁰ IOM, UN Migration, *Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 10,308 in 2019; Deaths Reach 234*, <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-10308-2019-deaths-reach-234> [accessed 15 March 2019].

The problem of Common EU Migration and Asylum Policy and its realization

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes a common immigration policy in Article 79, § 1, which states that “The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings”³¹.

The Green Paper on a Common European Asylum System sets out four basic elements of the Common European Asylum System: Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin Regulation), Directive 2003/9/EC (Reception Conditions Directive), Directive 2004/83/EC (Qualification Directive) and Directive 85/2005/EC (Asylum Procedures Directive). These legal instruments aimed at establishing equal and harmonized way of practical cooperation, including a system that guarantees those who really need protection; access to a high level of protection under equivalent conditions in all Member States; with simultaneous fair and effective action concerning people who need protection³².

The final goal of the Common European Asylum System is provided in the Hague Program and establishes a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for people in need of international protection, valid throughout the EU. For this purpose, to be achieved, the Hague Program empowers the Commission to submit the draft documents to the Council and the European Parliament for adoption. The Green Paper presents a comprehensive range of issues defining four main

³¹ *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Official Journal of the European Union*, 9 May 2008, Art. 79, § 1.

³² *Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System*, MEMO/07/229, Brussels, 6 June 2007, p. 1.

areas where further action is needed, legislative instruments, means of implementation, i.e. solidarity and burden sharing, and the external dimension of asylum. As a first step, the aim was to harmonize the legal framework of the Member States on the basis of common minimum standards, the second stage to achieve common protection and greater equality in protection across the EU, and to ensure a greater degree of solidarity between EU Member States³³.

Council's Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 regulates minimum standards for the granting of temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures to promote a balance of efforts between Member States was agreed in the Treaty establishing the European Community, in Article 63, § 2 a. and b³⁴.

In Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, the European Council decided to make efforts to establish a Common European Asylum System, based on the International Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967. At the same time, the principle of non-refoulement has been confirmed and ensuring that no one is sent back where he is exposed to persecution. Member States in Tampere agreed on the development of effective asylum procedures, and in the long-term EU legislation leading to a common asylum principle³⁵.

The common asylum policy, including the common European asylum arrangements, is provided as an integral part of the European Union's objective. A systematic enlargement of the area of freedom, security and justice was also established, open to all those whose situations compel them to seek legal protection in the European Union. In addition, in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their country of origin, it provides the need to

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, Brussels.

³⁵ Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013, Brussels.

establish specific procedures and actions aimed at allowing immediate temporary protection³⁶.

Despite significant progress in the development of the Common European Asylum System, there are still significant differences in the procedures applied and the conditions for admission of applicants to international protection by the Member States. The developed system guarantees applicants for asylum, proper treatment regardless of their place of residence within the EU, ensuring quick identification of persons who really need international protection and enabling return of persons who are not entitled to it. Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection. Consequently, Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 sets out uniform rules on refugees or persons eligible for protection and the status of third-country nationals. Article 79, § 2a Treaty on the Functioning of EU is the legal basis for the proposed amendment of Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residents regarding beneficiaries of international protection³⁷.

Refugee relocation disputes between EU members

The EU recognized the crisis of migratory flows in the Mediterranean as exceptional and decided to take concrete measures of solidarity towards the Member States in the region. At a joint meeting of Foreign Ministers and Home Affairs Ministers on 20 April 2015, the Commission presented a ten-point plan to address the crisis, thereby underlining the possibility of a relocation mechanism. On the basis of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular its Article 78,

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ *Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013*, Brussels.

§ 3, in the event that one or more Member States encounters an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of third-country nationals, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take provisional measures in favor of the the Member State or Member States concerned. Also included in the controversial Article 80 Treaty on the Functioning of EU, joint policies on border control, asylum, immigration and their implementation are subject to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States. Adopted acts in this field, contain appropriate measures to apply this principle³⁸.

The implementation of the principle of relocation, on 20 July 2015, would be by consensus, but particular situations of individual Member States were considered such as relocation from Greece and Italy, 40,000 people obviously in need of international protection. Within two years, 24,000 people were to be relocated from Italy, and 16,000 people from Greece. In addition, the Council confirmed the above mentioned provisions on 14 September 2015, Decision (EU) 2015/1523 (1) establishing a temporary and exceptional mechanism for relocation from Italy and Greece to other Member States, clearly in need of international protection. Based on this, on 22 September 2015, the Council mentioned the willingness of the Member States to take part in accordance with the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States³⁹. Although this decision was implemented by most of the member states of EU, it also raised doubts and objections by several EU Member States, which didn't abide by this common vision and regulation.

³⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, L 248/80 of 24.9.2015, Council Decision (EU) laying down provisional measures in the area of international protection for Italy and Greece, 2015/1601, of 22 September 2015, Brussels.

³⁹ Ibidem.

Conclusion

The large number of migrant flows in recent years to Europe needs an effective and efficient asylum system. The European Union has repeatedly tried to develop a common, balanced and comprehensive migration policy. This principle was to take into account solidarity and a fair share of responsibility for effective functioning in times of peace and crisis. In this regard, the European program was adopted to provide an effective response to current and long-term problems related to the control of migration flows. But it is not enough to tackle the problem without solving root problems of migration. The justification for the creation of a common European asylum system has been defined as the responsibility of the Member States for international protection based on common standards of asylum procedures. The larger part of these problems are leaders of the origin of refugees. Generally, the problem of African refugees cannot be solved in Europe. Joint solutions of EU and African leaders will contribute to decrease the crisis, but the last solution is in the hand's African leaders and peoples of Africa to end the human tragedy. This problem must be considered by African Union members as the top priority to save the lives of thousands of African refugees trapped in Libya and threatened to end their lives in the Mediterranean Sea.

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The Dilemma of African Refugees to European Union: Migration Crisis, Causes and Repercussions

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to examine the root causes of wave of migration from Africa to the European Union. The research includes consequences of the problem of migrant's dangerous routes as well as prospects and difficulties they face after their arrival in Europe. The source of these problems will be investigated based on the theoretical framework of push and pull factors. During the last decade, thousands of refugees from Africa crossed the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. Political and social instability, violence, economic decline and persecution in Sub-Saharan African states are among some of the factors which contributed to the refugee crisis. This problem pushed migrants towards more dangerous routes. As a result, many African refugees have lost their lives. In the meantime, the fate of those who crossed the European Union border has been uncertain. In addition, in this article, the lack of unanimous position, regarding the refugee problem within EU member states, which led to unexpected EU policy crisis will be discussed.

Key words: Africa, migration, refugee crisis, European Union, asylum policy

Chapter 4.

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AFRICA AND MIGRATION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN DESCENTS IN THE WORLD SOCCER CIRCA 18TH – 21ST CENTURIES

Introduction

Football has become the most lovely, popular and funny sport in the world, and probably the leading investment in sports. Though it is difficult to know the number of football fans in the world, it is the most worldwide popular sport. Its impact has may be categorised into psychological, economic and social. Evidently, today's tournaments are globally enjoyed through technological achievements that characterise the global world. As the world is made smaller in scope through the use of internet, interaction has been simplified whereby tournaments are lively shown to football fans. Technology also in some countries has been managed to solve challenges which faced referees in decision making during the game such as the use of Video Assistance Referee (VAR).

It has been portrayed by many that football originated in England. Matthew Taylor noted that the most celebrated club founders were the British. Industrial advancement was said to have impacts on leisure as football emerged as one of the then new forms of leisure, which became synonymous with the British working class¹. So during industrial capitalism, football emerged as a form of leisure, as something which could be done when one has free time², therefore, it was perceived as a pastime sport. But, despite being depicted as pastime sport, later, it became a form of identity and finally a source of income to individual talented people and opened employment to other people as well as improving the livelihood of dependents. Therefore, this sport evolved from pastime to a form of work, disciplined time, which provided and still provides the players, managers and football fans with material wealth. As long as migration engenders personal betterment and empowerment for individuals and the host societies³ football has vividly portrayed the role of professional African football migrants to European countries such as Spain, France, Portugal and non-European countries including the USA, Japan and Saudi Arabia only a few to mention.

Previously, football was considered as leisure but today it has been a very active source of income for individuals at local, national to international levels. Football also was considered as one of the instruments for strengthening communal identities which involved class expression and communal rivalries and in broad categories between colonisers and colonised, football became a means of brin-

¹ *The workshop of a new society*, "The Economist" 23 December 1999, in: J. Mitchell & H. Mitchell Buss (eds.) (2005), *World History*, vol. 2, 1500 to Present, Boston: McGraw Hill, p. 86.

² A. Horolets (2012), *Migrants' Leisure and Integration*, Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, p. 2.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

ging fun and enjoyment to their lives⁴. Currently, the game has been commercialised. From the 1990s onwards the transformation of football into a business is very clear as demonstrated by the acquisition of football clubs by overseas business people⁵. This leads to migration of professional footballers from place to place as David Storey noted that in recent years, there has been a substantial numbers from other parts of the world arriving in the Premier League and into the lower tiers in the English league system, as they do into countries such as Spain, France and Italy⁶. In addition to that, the status of labour as a commodity is taken to the extreme within the football industry since players may be traded between employers in the same way as machinery or land⁷. Players have been bought and sold.

Football migration has been there and will always be there as Matthew Taylor noted that football migration is nothing new, but has a long and complicated history, and it should not be isolated from general migratory trends and patterns⁸. The question is why do the professional footballers migrate? The significant number of players move from continent to continent pushed by the poor economic state of their homeland the amateur status of the game they played and pulled by the financial promise⁹. Economic incentives have been the most determinant of football labour, as it has been taken as a movement of sporting labour from the economic periphery to the economic core

⁴ L. Fair (1997), 'Kickin' It: Leisure, Politics And Football In Colonial Zanzibar, 1900s–1950s, "Africa: Journal of the International African Institute" 67(2), p. 225.

⁵ D. Storey (2011), *Football, place and migration: foreign footballers in the FA Premier League*, "Geography" 96(2), p. 87.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ P. McGovern (2002), *Globalization or Internationalization? Foreign Footballers in the English League, 1946–95*, "Sociology" 36(1), p. 25.

⁸ M. Taylor (2006), *Global Players? Migration and Globalization, c.1930–2000*, "Historical Social Research" 31(115), p. 8.

⁹ C. Eisenberg (2003), *From England to the World: The Spread of Modern Football, 1863–2000*, in: M. Taylor (2006), *Global Players? Migration and Globalization, c.1930–2000*, "Historical Social Research" 31(115), p. 8.

where the playing talented players move from Africa and Latin America to Europe. Africa comprises of many weak economies therefore push players out while Europe comprises of the wealthiest European leagues pull by offering unrivaled financial rewards¹⁰. However, it has been debated whether the wealthiest countries are the one attract football migrants at the highest point, but it looks more complex when the leading world economies, USA and China cannot be compared to Spain, France, Denmark, Uruguay and Brazil only a few to mention. It seems that it is more than the wealth status of the country, priority and tradition on the sport may have an impact on the success in sport. The United States is the leading economic country but has little concern if football as has France or Croatia, but she has so many basket tournaments.

To a large extent, football seems to be spread in the world from Britain as many instances show. Football arrived in Brazil in 1894, when Charles Miller, a Brazilian-born Englishman, returned to Sao Paulo from his studies in England with ball and rulebook in hand¹¹. Charles Miller emigrated to abroad and immigrated back to his home country, bringing with him a new sport idea.

Football and colonial Africa

The question one may ask is, if colonialism was an aspect of migration, how colonial administration was involved in football? The response is evidently drawn from the role played by the colonial administration in the former colonies which have been taken as examples; Gold Coast, Tanganyika and Zanzibar (the latter two now are represented by single state name Tanzania) and South Africa.

¹⁰ M. Taylor (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹¹ G.P. Bocketti (2008), *Italian Immigrants, Brazilian Football, and the Dilemma of National Identity*, "Journal of Latin American Studies" 40 (2), p. 278.

In East Africa, football is thought to have been introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century, in Zanzibar, Laura wrote, "Football, field hockey and cricket were introduced into the islands of Zanzibar, in the late 1870s, by workers employed by the British-based Eastern Telegraph Company who came to the isles to lay the cable linking Zanzibar with England¹². This was one of the impacts of migrants who despite their prospect of establishing a link between the two areas which their relationship was based on colonial prosperity in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

In Zanzibar, one of the European sports which was introduced by members of the colonial service, missionaries and company managers was football. There was European team in Zanzibar, 'Bila Jina' no name. In addition, by the mid-1920s several leading members of the English community, Zanzibar began to advocate European supervision of football¹³. The late nineteenth century was the period of the partitioning of Africa among European nations. The colonists used football to indoctrinate discipline to the working class. Laura in her work, revealed that members of colonial service in Africa advocated the spread of European sports, such as field hockey, cricket and football as one means of inculcating respect for the value of time, discipline and authority within the minds and spirits of the colonized¹⁴. It was no longer leisure; football was a work (a discipline time). Colonists wanted to build a disciplined workforce through though

¹² R. Lyne (1905), *Zanzibar in Contemporary Times*, London: Dart, p. 71; Kamati Maalum, cited in L. Fair (1997), 'Kickin' It: Leisure, Politics And Football In Colonial Zanzibar, 1900s–1950s', "Africa: Journal of the International African Institute" 67(2), p. 225.

¹³ H. Kindy (1972), *Life and Politics in Mombasa*, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, p. 97; D. Anthony (1983), *Culture and Society in a Town in Transition: A People's History of Dar es Salaam, 1865–1939*, Ph.D. dissertation, Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin, p. 125; P. Martin (1991), *Colonialism, youth and football in French equatorial Africa*, "International Journal of the History of Sport" 8 (1), pp. 61–63 cited in L. Fair (1997), op. cit., p. 231.

¹⁴ L. Fair (1997), op. cit., p. 224.

not limited to sport. Footballers are guided with ethics and rules which make them obedient to their team leaders, managers, coaches and referees. Rules and regulations make the also play in a good manner as stipulated in FIFA's booklet¹⁵. The sporting behaviour contributes toward building a disciplinary working class. Laura Fair explained that during the early twentieth century, colonisers across African began laying increasing emphasis on the role of sports in moulding a disciplined working class from the mixed assortment of individuals living in urban Africa¹⁶. It is through this, players who avoid unsporting behaviour to break the rules and regulations in their other working places.

In the Gold Coast, Paul Darby considered football as a British sport as revealed that football was among the British sports which were transported to the Gold Coast in the 1870s though it was a less prominent sport to British settlers compared to cricket¹⁷. Probably, without British settlers' presence in the Gold Coast, football would not be known to the indigenous people of the Gold Coast. It was during colonialism, in 1903, the first club emerged in the Cape Coast Excelsior, but it was possible due to the work of colonial educationalist, A.G. Fraser who was a Jamaican-born¹⁸. Therefore, two migration trends are observed here, the first being the presence of Jamaican-born in Gold Coast and the second being the introduction of colonial education that led to elite Africans who also adopted this foreign sport. Gold Coast; therefore, becomes one of the earliest African countries to have football clubs. During colonialism, in Gold Coast,

¹⁵ *The Laws of the Game 2015/2016* (2016), The International Football Association Board/Fédération Internationale de Football Association, 6 March, Zurich, pp. 22, 37–40.

¹⁶ L. Fair (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 224.

¹⁷ P. Darby (2013), *Let Us Rally Around The Flag: Football, Nation-Building, and Pan-Africanism in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana*, "The Journal of African History" 54(2), p. 225.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 226.

there were different clubs founded which included Accra Invincibles in 1910 and Accra Hearts of Oak in 1911¹⁹. In Gold Coast, colonial administration initiated a formal league in 1920 and in 1922 Governor Sir Fedrick Gordon Guggisberg donated a silver trophy, the Guggisberg Shield, for this quickly became the most sought after prize for local football²⁰. These clubs and the league organisation, evidently provide clear football historical trends in colonial Africa

In South Africa, concerning women footballers, the sport is said to be first played by women of European descent when the sport was dominated by English-speaking women in the 1970s 1980s²¹. The history of Europeans in South Africa was a result of migration from the mercantile era, as far back during the Portuguese expedition led by Bartholomew Dias and Vasco da Gama in 1488 and 1497 respectively, as history tells us that in that period, sixty Portuguese were killed by the Khoikhoi²². The history of peopling of Africa reveals that, Africans particularly the San are the original inhabitants of South Africa, Europeans are migrants in South Africa as historical sources suggest. So, agreeing with the female European descents that are the first women football players is to suggest that football was instilled in the minds of black South African women by migrants.

In spite of the role of immigrants in transferring football to Africa, colonial Africa was characterized by African football emigrants in Europe. Colonies became mined areas for football talent by the European Professional clubs. Cases may be France and Portugal

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 227.

²¹ C.P. Pelak (2006), *Local-Global Processes: Linking Globalization, Democratization, and the Development of Women's Football in South Africa*, "Africa Spectrum" 41 (3), p. 375.

²² L.D. Ngcongco (1997), *Southern Africa: Its Peoples and Social Structures*, in: J. Ki-Zerbo & D. T. Niane (eds.), *General History of Africa*, vol. 4, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, p. 235; R.O. Collins & J.M. Burns (2007), *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 280.

where the former imported players from Northern African territories of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, while the latter fetched their professional players from Angola and Mozambique²³. The Algerians, Ali Benouma and Kouider Daho, were among the first employees in the newly professionalised French national league in 1932. The most famous Portuguese footballer of all time, Eusebio da Silva, was born in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), Mozambique in 1942²⁴. If monopoly capitalism turned colonies the areas for providing cheap labour, it did not mean industrial labour force only, but also, football labour from which the metropolitan states or their clubs accumulated profit, as in another business firm.

France, for example, not because it won a 2018 World Cup, but because it has a long history of using professional footballers of African descent for her either clubs or national team, has been among the best football actors. From the 1930s-40s Raoul Diagne and Ben Barek were players in the French National team while in the 1990s, people like Zinédine Zidane and Patrick Viera played a significant role in the French football game as Geoff Hare was cited by Matthew Taylor²⁵. It is beyond the reasonable doubt that Africa's contribution to the world soccer, is of great importance.

Neo colonists' dependence on post-colonial Africa' professional footballers

The colonial masters seem to have many influences on the development of football in Africa by employing professional African footballers in their clubs or national teams. Though André Gunder Frank's thesis utilizes development underdevelopment, the authors

²³ M. Taylor (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 17–18.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

of this paper, present the paper in a way that is opposite from a theory. The little paid to the African professional footballers is more than amount could be paid when these players would remain playing matches in home countries. It has been shown how long after decolonization these post-colonial connections were still strong.

In 2000, 69% of the Africans in Portuguese football were from the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Likewise, in France, 59% of the 162 African players were from former French territories while even in Belgium, which had developed more generally over the previous two decades as a 'first stop' for African footballers and agents looking to develop a career in Europe, the equivalent figure was still 31%²⁶.

During neo-colonialism, as it was revealed in other labour and material wealth extraction of the low-developed countries by the Developed countries, football labour has been extracted but scholars have not given the appropriate weight in their discussion compared to other forms of labour such as industrial, electronic and mechanic labour force. Former colonial masters did not under-estimate the importance of their former colonies in sourcing them with football labour. It seems that the first world prospers through the under-development of the third world, as the most insightful way of explaining the processes at work when African footballers move to European clubs²⁷. This has advantages to sides, the source and the host countries benefit. Football academies are seen to produce football talent for export and have been criticized as the engines of quenching thirsty for cheap football labour by European teams, and it was expressed by the president of the *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) in an interview with *the Financial Times* in 2003 that European clubs are neo-colonists²⁸. For him, the fetching of African footballers

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 18–19.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 10.

²⁸ P. Darby (2013), op. cit., p. 266.

was a negative factor for the development of African football, joining those who argue on the loss of African football resources.

However, there is evidence that some African players in Europe have been allowed to return to their home country to play for their national teams but their national team performance never improved to an extent that they can compete with European teams effectively. It is of paramount important to consider optimistic view the African footballers allows individual to fight in lines of alleviating poverty at an individual level and bring potential development at home²⁹. Professional footballers of African heritage become one of the factors for the development of their countries of origin.

Globalisation and changes in the exploration of Africa professional footballers/globalisation and the transfer of football labour

It has been explained that the modern game of football spread outward from Europe to the semi-periphery of South and Central America, the periphery of Africa, and the external area of Asia, Oceania and North America³⁰. Other parts of the world adopted football and the game became very popular. European countries continue to fetch football talented Africans. The victory of France National Team in the 2018 World Cup in Russia was an output of but not limited to France African stars when the heritage was drawn from nine different African countries, namely Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal, DR Congo, Mali, Angola, Togo, Morocco and Algeria with people like Samuel Umtiti, Paul Pogba and Kylian Mbappé as some of the fourteen France stars with African heritage³¹. With such a large amount of African

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 266.

³⁰ M. Taylor, (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

³¹ D. Kappel (2018), *14 European World Cup Stars With African Roots*, 23 December, Soccer Laduma, <https://www.soccerladuma.co.za/news/articles/>

football labour heritage, Africa has to receive its honour status in the world soccer. The Belgium striker, Romelu Lukaku, who is a Congolese origin and William Carvalho of Portugal who was born in Luanda, Angola have also played a significant role in the 2018 World Cup tournament³². Alongside with these, there others football stars whose contribution to the 2018 World Cup tournament should not be underestimated.

Premier League clubs during the 2009-2010 season revealed the reach of Africa in football talents as players were fetched from African countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa³³. The exportation of African professional footballers to play for European leagues is a justification that Africa plays vital roles in this type of sport.

African referees have been appointed to arbitrate matters in international games in Europe. For the 2018 World Cup in Russia tournament officials were selected from Algeria, Senegal, Guinea, Egypt, Zambia and Ethiopia and assistant African referees from Morocco, Sudan, Burundi, Senegal, Angola, Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa³⁴. Therefore, with this multi-disciplinary involvement; football professionalism showed by African footballers on one side and African officials and assistant referees on the other side, arguably, Africa is part of the world soccer.

George Klay Kieh Jr shows that we live in the phase known as new globalisation, with the increased use of ICT³⁵, tournaments in Africa

international/categories/african-watch/14-european-2018-fifa-world-cup-stars-with-african-roots/297433, 3/2/2020 [accessed 14 May 2019].

³² Ibidem.

³³ D. Storey (2011), *op. cit.*, p. 86.

³⁴ J.P. Díaz (2018), *Six African referees selected for 2018 World Cup finals*, 30 March, https://en.as.com/en/2018/03/30/football/1522445678_631599.html [accessed 3 February 2020].

³⁵ G.K. Kieh Jr (2008), *Introduction: From the Old to the New Globalisation*, in: G.K. Kieh Jr. (ed.), *Africa and the New Globalisation*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 6.

are lively seen, therefore, Africa is exposed to the external football world. This increases the opportunity for the professional African footballers to play for the world teams in Europe as well as other parts of the world. Professional footballers are watched therefore attract developed team agents to negotiate terms and conditions as the initial stage to join the European and other developed football sports countries.

Success and challenges facing African descendant footballers in abroad

Some African professional footballers have entered into commercial relations with a business firm, for example, Mohammed Salah is in contract with Pepsi Company to promote Pepsi products. Others have been promoting their countries' natural wealth in abroad. The today's Tanzania professional footballer, Mbwana Ally Samatta, is a Tanzania tourism goodwill ambassador due to his popularity within Tanzania and abroad³⁶. Others have developed their careers into the political ground and their political prospects have been achieved by taking the highest political position in their home country. George Weah, the former AC Milan player and who also played for other European teams in France, Italy and England, became popular through his football talent, now is a politician and a president of Liberia³⁷. Football has become an engine to propel the players towards other potential careers.

Some African professional footballers are among the best players in the world. Between 1945 and 1962, many Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians among others played in the top level of French football.

³⁶ <https://www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz/en/highlights/view/ttb-and-samatta-sign-an-agreement> [accessed 27 January 2020].

³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Weah [accessed 27 January 2020].

The movement of footballers as another type of migration has been revealed by Matthew Taylor as being affected by economic and political processes; by restrictions of states and governments and by regulations of the national and international federation³⁸. Each state, despite following international human rights, has its own ways of regulating migration. European Union (EU) employment laws mean that footballers are entitled to work in any member state and are treated as any other workers, players in outside the EU face certain restrictions³⁹. This is due to the fact that, the world today, with the increasing interactions of people facilitated by globalisation theories, is characterised by a state of fear and anxiety.

Africa has been benefited from its emigrant football players also through educational services facilitated by those players. Players of Senegalese origin, Bernard Lama who played for the French national team in the 1990s and Jimmy Adjovi-Boco who was a key figure at RC Lens, founded a French Based Academy with branches in Senegal and South Africa and expecting to open another in Tanzania aiming at imparting soccer skills to youngsters and offer ordinary education to talented players⁴⁰. It is what the optimists argue for, as these senior African professional footballers contribute to the development of their fellows in their homeland.

Most African footballers lack direct recruitment. Many footballers of those who hail from some of the unusual locations such as Africa and Latin America, are hired after they have established careers in other European union and not through direct recruitment due to the regulations surrounding work permits for players from outside the European Union⁴¹. Between the two ways of obtaining football labour, transfer and recruitment, most of the African football labour in Europe

³⁸ M. Taylor (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 13.

³⁹ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁰ <https://www.goal.com/en/news/89/africa/2009/10/22/1576276/french-stars-set-to-open-a-football-academy-in-tanzania> [accessed 27 January 2020].

⁴¹ P. McGovern (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 30.

is of transfer form and recruitment is in-service training. Although these measures of work permits are applied to workers outside the European Union, intend to prevent cheap foreign imports from taking employment from British/European players⁴².

Another challenge which becomes the most headline among the media is racism. Segregation has been revealed especially over African footballers. Some of the African footballers who faced racial challenges are: Samuel Eto'o in 2006 when he was harassed by Real Zaragoza, the same year, Adebowale Ogungbure (Nigerian) faced the continuous racial abuse hurled his way by Hallescher FC supporters and Mario Balotelli was the victim of racial abuse hurled at him by sections of the Bastia fan base in 2017⁴³. In analyzing the pull and push sides of pessimism and optimism, we can look at the impacts of football professional migration to the source country in two sides: first as potential and second the agent of widening economic gap between the global North and the global South.

For those who join pessimist ideas think that the sending societies are negatively affected as skilled migration include professional football migrate provide valuable resources abroad while deepening poverty and global inequality and damage sociocultural aspects of the sending societies⁴⁴. However, the authors are not supporting pessimist ideas. Would the African football players in abroad stay in their homeland gain as much as or more than what they get in the foreign countries? Still would continue to rely on the little payment they used to receive in the local tournaments and finally would not be encouraged and advance their talents. Authors stand up for the optimistic idea that capital could be captured and gains accrued by donors through remittances, the return of migrants and associated

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ <https://www.soccerladuma.co.za/news/articles/international/categories/international/10-footballers-who-ve-been-victim-to-racism/650136-July-2019-0056> [accessed 27 January 2020].

⁴⁴ P. Darby (2013), *op. cit.*, p. 265.

brain circulation, rising wages, and transnationally minded Diasporas are potential engines and agents of development⁴⁵. The authors of this paper, agree that a walking man is not like a sitting man, along his movement can pick something potential. The emigrant African footballers may and do bring a lot to their homeland.

Recommendation

As it has been noted that states and governments' restrictions are among the challenges facing football players to move to their countries of choice to make their dreams true, the ability to play is a talent that remains an inborn character. Although human beings have a role to play to enable a person to be a professional footballer, it is taken as an advance of the not making but already made in-born character. Fear which dominates among indigenes of some countries regarding the domination of foreign employees at the expense of indigenes is of less importance in football and generally, it is irrelevant. Countries should regulate regulation on permit release on the professional footballers unless their presence in the host countries is a threat to that particular country's peace and security.

There is an observation of the direct recruitment of African footballers. Young talented Africans would be trained from their early age. If investors would spend their resources on training than buying football labour, Africa would have a leading if not, a better status in soccer than it is today. There are a lot of young people in Africa, whose talent is trapped by poverty hence unable to advance. If they would be financially assisted, more than little, Africa would have many professional footballers.

As football academies are of paramount importance, Africa should encourage the establishment of this institution for empowering youths

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

to advance their talents. Additionally, young people, especially at the primary and secondary education level should be trained in a way that their talents are identified and assisted to develop. Parents should be optimists and caring for their children's talents. Once they are grown in a way they develop their talents, the plan on becoming professional footballers become possible.

African professionals; officials and referees should be the key players in waging wars against corruption. The right way to give rights to a particular individual player or club is to give the rights one deserves. Normally, corrupt scandals have been heard over referees and federation officials in Africa. These have been involving themselves in receiving a bribe as a way of empowering a certain team to win through granting a certain award not deserving, for example, unnecessary foul punishments or awarding the penalty to the opponents. Corruption normally leads to wrong awarding which leads to the underdevelopment of African soccer. Rumours on prior plans which team has to win a certain tournament have been subject to most African football fans that need a research for justifying whether is true or not.

Generally, from colonial to post-colonial, Africa remains one of the significant sources of labour in football as in other capitalist economy whose aim is to accumulate profit. Migration of football labour will continue as far as transfer mechanism that is relative wage level in European football labour market with the availability of capital continues to attract professional African footballers. Migration of professional footballers from Africa to abroad support Borjas' perspective which state that migration occurs when individuals act on a cost-benefit calculation, which recognizes that there are greater returns to human capital where labour is scarce⁴⁶; however, it is not scarce to an extent that it is not available but somehow football labour is still demanded. The attempt to accumulate more profit

⁴⁶ P. McGovern (2002), *op. cit.*, p. 25.

increases the seeking of more football labour. Football has become one of the best investments in the world and team agents cast their eyes on the emerging talented young African as well. Thanks to FIFA for its efforts to strongly oppose any form of racial discrimination in the world soccer. However, it is an indignity for any soccer stakeholder to be suspicious of racial scandals. From individual to national and international level, every segment should be an ambassador for racism prevention.

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Africa and Migration: The Contribution of African Descents in the World Soccer circa 18th – 21st Centuries

Abstract

Much have been presented on the inclusion of Africa in the capitalist world, basically on its contribution to feeding of metropolitan industries in terms of raw materials and industrial labour force, markets and its host status of capital investment. This paper, therefore, tries to reveal the role which is played by Africans in capitalist world system basing on African footballers in diaspora. It does not aim to reveal the status of Africa in the world soccer but to reveal the significance of its people in sports, soccer in particular and challenges which have been observed. Some reasons for the presentation of this paper as historical are that; the origin of the sport has been considered as a foreign based. It has been expressed as among the impacts of the improved European working class livelihood during industrialisation. Its transfer to Africa has been taken as the effect of colonial occupation, and the presence of African descent players as the results of disperse of African descents in abroad forcibly or voluntarily, all of which would not be unless the global migration. It shows evidence how Africans began to be involved in international football, how both the host and the home countries benefit from these migrants and which challenges African footballers face both at home and abroad.

Key words: African descents, soccer, Diaspora, migration, commodification of football labour

Chapter 5.

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WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS EMIGRATION AFTER THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID: SCALE, DIRECTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

The beginnings of white emigration from South Africa

South Africa almost always belonged to the country to which many white people from Europe, and sporadically also from the United States and Canada came (including the beginnings of white settlement or “fever” of diamonds and gold in the second half of the nineteenth century). Remigration processes, i.e., white people left South Africa after a temporary stay there, e.g., in connection with the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), were exceptional.

In the 20th century, with varying degrees of intensity, the wave of white arrivals in South Africa definitely prevailed over departures from that country. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, thousands of skilled workers were needed to develop the South African economy. The apartheid system, formally in force since 1948, assumed racial segregation and heavyweight segregation for non-whites, especially for Africans (blacks), largely prevented education and professional advancement (higher positions in administration and industry, services were reserved only for whites).

More mass emigration of whites from South Africa began even before the dismantling of apartheid in the late 1980s, which related to an economic downturn and political instability, including the introduction of the state of emergency in 1986-1988. Already in 1985, the official number of people leaving South Africa permanently amounted to 11 020 compared to 9 562 in the previous year¹. In 1986, the number of these departures increased to 13,711 (in that year a negative balance between immigration and emigration – 6,717 persons). In 1987, this number fell to 10,823 people.

Moreover, in the earlier period, the determinants of white people leaving South Africa were the consequences of tragic internal events such as the massacre in Sharpeville (1960) and events in Soweto (1976).

Scale and directions of white South Africans emigration

At the beginning of the 1990s, when President Frederick Willem de Klerk initiated a radical turn in state policy aimed at dismantling apartheid, white emigration from South Africa amounted to over 4,000 people per year (1990 – 4,694, 1991 – 4,153, 1992 – 4,181). The breakthrough came in 1993, a year before the date of the first democratic general elections (it was influenced by the atmosphere created after the assassination of Chris Hani, one of the leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and the leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the armed arm of the ANC “Spear of the Nation” (*Umkhonto in Sizwe*), considered to be the successor of Nelson Mandela, on 10 April 1993)).

¹ *Net migration in South Africa: 1983–2002* (2003), Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

In 1993, emigration from South Africa doubled (8,152 people). According to the official data of the South African Statistical Service, over the following years it amounted to around 8–12 thousand emigrants per year (1994 – 10,235, 1995 – 8,725, 1996 – 10,347, 1997 – 8,942, 1998 – 8,276, 1999 – 8,487, 2000 – 10,280, 2001 – 12,114, 2002 – 10,890)². According to this office, 304,112 white citizens emigrated from South Africa in 1986-2000, 133,782 in 2001-2005, 112,046 in 2006-2011, and 95,185 in 2011-2015. In total, 645,125 white citizens left South Africa permanently in that period.

However, there are significant differences in the estimation of the scale of this emigration³. These differences are mainly due to the fact that the majority of emigrants left South Africa without declaring it officially. It can be concluded that the official statistics do not reflect the real scale of white emigrants from South Africa. Moreover, the main statistics of the country, Pali Lehola, in mid-2015, stated that the South African statistical office did not conduct any studies on this emigration⁴.

White emigrants, when going abroad permanently, for practical reasons, used the forms to indicate the purpose of their trip, e.g., tourism or business matters. The official statistical data should be multiplied by two or three in order to obtain an approximate picture of the scale of this emigration. It is estimated that in the 1990s, about 20-30 thousand white people left South Africa every year, half of whom were Afrikaners (earlier called Boers). This means that under the ANC rule in the 1990s, around 165,000 people left South Africa.

² Data of the Statistics South Africa from years 1993–2000 (Reports No. 03-51-03 <1993–2000>).

³ E. Sidiropoulos (2000), *SA Education for the 21st Century. Liberation from the Skills Shortage*, in: *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/2001*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, p. 17.

⁴ *How many whites have left South Africa in the last 5 years* (2015), News-24Wire, 23 July, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/93995/how-many-whites-have-left-south-africa-in-the-last-5-years/> [accessed 10 December 2017].

Although some scientists, such as Bill R.W. Johnson, historian and head of the Helen Suzman Foundation, estimated that 250,000–500,000 people emigrated from South Africa after 1994⁵.

Cognitively interesting insights into the scale of white emigration from South Africa can be drawn from data from the 1985 and 1996 South African censuses⁶. In 1985, according to the census, there were 4.9 million white people in South Africa. If the birth rate in this group fluctuated between 1–2% in this period, the inflow of immigrants was about 130,000 and emigration from South Africa amounted to 100,000 people, then the white population in South Africa should number 5.5 million people. However, the 1996 census quoted 4.2 million white people living in South Africa. The comparison shows that the official statistics “lack” about 800,000 white people. Other calculations indicated a loss of 127,000 white people in the South African population⁷. Officially, the white South African population decreased from 4.27 million in 1992 to 4.24 million in 2003 (decrease by 0.7%), which was mainly caused by the emigration of this population from South Africa⁸. According to the British weekly “The Economist” from 2008, since 1995 more than 800,000 white people have emigrated from South Africa⁹.

⁵ “The Sunday Times” 5 September 1998; “The Sunday Times” 22 November 1998.

⁶ J. van Rooyen (2000), *The New Great Trek. The Story of South Africa’s White Exodus*, Pretoria: UNISA Press, p. 33.

⁷ *How many South Africans have left the country?* (2012), 14 August, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/how-many-south-africans-have-left-the-country> [accessed 10 December 2017].

⁸ M. MacFarlane (2004), *Demographics*, in: J. Kane-Berman & J. Tempest (eds.), *South Africa Survey 2003/2004*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

⁹ *White Flight from South Africa: Between Staying and Going* (2008), “The Economist” 25 September, <https://www.economist.com/node/12295535> [accessed 19 December 2018].

In 2006, think-tank South African Institute of Race Relations estimated – by comparing figures from official statistical surveys of 1995 and 2005 – the following (as well as analysing other data) – that 841,000 white South Africans left the country during this period¹⁰.

It should also be noted that the official South African data differ significantly from the official data of the statistical offices of the countries to which white people emigrated from South Africa. South African statistics showed that between 1990 and 1999, 82,000 South Africans emigrated to five main target countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada). On the other hand, statistical data of the target countries gave the number of 233,000 South Africans emigrating there¹¹. Moreover, according to South African sources, approximately 29,000 South Africans emigrated to the United Kingdom in the years 1984-1993, while British statistics provided 100,000 people for this period¹².

In the years 1989-1997, 233,000 qualified people left South Africa (the white population of that country at that time was about 4.5 million people)¹³. The scale of re-migration (returning to South Africa) was relatively small and estimated at about 5%¹⁴.

According to the official Stats SA over 612,000 white South Africans will have left the country between 1985 and 2021 – 430,000 of which will have left in the 20 years period between 2001 and 2021 (at a rate

¹⁰ *How many South Africans have left the country?* (2012), op. cit.

¹¹ D. Kaplan, J.-B. Meyer & M. Brown (1999), *Brain Drain: New Data, New Options*, “Trade and Industry Monitor” September, pp. 10–13.

¹² “Die Burger” 11 June 1997.

¹³ B. Goodall (2001), *Loss of Skilled Manpower is Staggering*, “The Citizen” 10 April, p. 12.

¹⁴ J. van Rooyen (2000), op. cit., pp. 22–23.

of 21,000 a year)¹⁵. The same source of data stated that in total, 644 940 white people have left the country over 30 years¹⁶.

Emigration of white South Africans have accelerated over the last few years.

Directions of white South Africans emigration

As far as the directions of white South Africans emigration are concerned, five main countries, mentioned above are where these emigrants settle, the so-called Big Five. These are: United States, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. At the end of the 1990s, among these five countries, the percentage of emigration from South Africa was as follows: the United States (24%), Australia (22%), the United Kingdom (15%), New Zealand (12%) and Canada (11%).

In the second half of the 1990s, Australia was one of the main destinations for white South African emigrants, with 4,280 people born in South Africa arriving in 1997/1998. According to Scott Firsing's research¹⁷, the scale of emigration from South Africa to Australia decreased. In the period from July 2014 to May 2015, this emigration amounted to 2,384 South African citizens with plans of permanent settlement in Australia. The last two years mentioned above showed a significant decrease, as in 2012-2013 (in the same months) 3,274 South Africans emigrated there. In 2018 Australian Department of Home Affairs considered fast-track visas for white South African

¹⁵ *4 real facts about emigration in South Africa* (2018), 28 August, <https://businesstech.co.za/news> [accessed 25 August 2019].

¹⁶ *SA government wants to stop the brain drain*, <http://crown.co.za/> [accessed 10 December 2019].

¹⁷ S. Firsing (2017), *Africa at LSE – Are South Africans on the move?*, 5 September, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/11/16/aresouthafrican-sonthethemove/> [accessed 10 December 2019].

farmers which was strongly criticised by the South African government¹⁸.

Canadian statistics showed that 988 South Africans emigrated to Canada in 2005. In 2014, the figure was 1,001, and in 2006-2013, between 900 and 1,300 people emigrated from South Africa to Canada each year. The trend of emigration in the next years maintained at the same level or even increased¹⁹.

Regarding New Zealand, there has been a sharp increase in the number of South African emigrants in recent years. In the 12 months to July 2013, 1,191 people emigrated there. The number increased to 1,519 in 2014 and 2,036 in 2015. In the years 2016-2017 around 6,038 South Africans arrived in New Zealand, dropping to 5,842 in 2017-2018, In 2019 this jumped to 7,857 – an increase of over 2,000 people²⁰.

The scale of emigration from South Africa to the United States was also changing, and over the years it has become an increasingly attractive destination for this emigration. In 1980-1989, 1,555 South Africans obtained a permanent residence permit there. This number increased from 21 964 persons in the years 1990-1999 to 32,221 persons in the years 2000-2009. Emigration from South Africa to the United States ranges from 2,700 to 3 000 annually (2,705 persons in 2010, 2,754 persons in 2011, 2,960 persons in 2012 and 2,693

¹⁸ P. Karp (2018), *Australia considers fast-track visas for white South African farmers*, "The Guardian" 15 March, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/mar/15/south-africa-criticises-australian-plan-to-fast-track-white-farmer-visas> [accessed 10 December 2019].

¹⁹ *More South Africans are moving to Canada – here's how much it costs* (2019), 12 January, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/wealth/271397/more-south-africans-are-moving-to-canada-heres-how-much-it-costs/> [accessed 15 December 2019].

²⁰ *This is how many South Africans are moving to New Zealand every month* (2019), 6 June 2019, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/321947/this-is-how-many-south-africans-are-moving-to-new-zealand-every-month/> [accessed 15 December 2019].

persons in 2013). In the next years emigration from South Africa to the United States increased significantly²¹.

The statistics on emigration from South Africa to the United Kingdom, especially white people, are more complex due to nationality, the number of South African white people with dual citizenship and changes in the immigration policy of the United Kingdom. It is reported that 9,385 South Africans emigrated to the United Kingdom in 2004 and that there was a downward trend in the following years: 7,532 in 2010 and 3,213 in 2014. The data from the UK's Office for National Statistics (January 2019) showed that approximately 7,300 people emigrated from South Africa to the UK in 2017²².

To sum up, 10-20,000 South Africans emigrate from South Africa every year to these five countries (the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada).

According to the Pew Research from 2018 among the total number of 900,000 emigrants from South Africa: to the UK emigrated 210,000 persons, to Australia 190,000, to the United States 100,000, to Canada 60,000 and to New Zealand 50,000²³.

Estimates of white South Africans emigration are supported by data on the number of people who live permanently and were registered in 19 OECD countries as being born in South Africa. In 2010, at least 588,388 persons in these countries were registered as being born in South Africa, but the actual number was probably higher, as Canada and New Zealand had data for 2006 and since

²¹ N. Andersen (2017), *2018 set to bring new emigration record for South Africans*, 21 November, <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/author/nic-andersen/> [accessed 12 August 2019].

²² *This is how many South Africans have moved to the UK* (2019), 3 November, <https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/349577/this-is-how-many-south-africans-have-moved-to-the-uk/> [accessed 19 December 2019].

²³ T. Head, (2018), *Five huge effects that mass emigration is having on South Africa*, 30 August, <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/> [accessed 15 December 2019].

then there has been a further influx of South African-born emigrants. The countries with the highest number of South African-born persons were: the United Kingdom (227,000), Australia (155,690), the United States of America (78,616), New Zealand (41,676) and Canada (38,310)²⁴. These figures do not include, of course, children born abroad by parents born in South Africa.

According to the OECD data on the inflow of foreign populations by nationality into the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Canada, 17,840 South Africans emigrated in 1997 (the first year for which full data are available). This trend increased to 44,227 South African emigrants in 2004. Then the trend was slightly downward, especially in the United Kingdom. In 2009 28,933 South Africans were registered as permanent residents of the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Canada. In the same year, for the first time, more South Africans moved permanently to Australia than to the United Kingdom.

In 2000, the South African High Commission for Africa in India estimated that there were approximately 500,000 South Africans, 80,000 in Canada, 300,000 in the United States and 300,000 in Australia and New Zealand living in the United Kingdom²⁵.

* * *

The emigration of whites South Africans to the European Union (EU) in the second half of the 1990s deserved special attention. According to official South African statistics, the EU countries (not including the UK) were the destination for about 1/3 of South African emigrants (some sources say that this percentage was 25%). The overwhelming majority went to the United Kingdom (about 25% of

²⁴ OECD data, <http://stats.oecd.org/> [accessed 15 December 2017].

²⁵ A. Wa Kabwe-Segatti & L. Landau (eds.) (2008), *Migration in post-apartheid South Africa. Challenges and questions to policy-makers*, Paris: Agence Française de Développement, p. 118.

all emigrants). Representatives of ethnic groups from EU countries usually emigrate from South Africa to the countries of their ancestors. To European countries outside the EU emigrated trace amounts, in the order of several or more dozen emigrants. The majority of white South African emigrants were economically active, including about 2/3 of highly qualified people. Most of the emigrants were educated young and in middle age people.

The choice of the EU countries as a destination of emigration is facilitated by, among others, having the citizenship of one of the Member States, family and friends, as well as knowledge of the language. Most often the EU countries are the countries closest to emigrants also culturally. The emigrants were also determined by practical considerations. According to the British consulate in Pretoria, in 1997 at least 800,000 people living permanently in South Africa had British passports²⁶. Such persons had the right to take up legal employment in any EU Member State.

Similarly, to permanent emigration, the United Kingdom was the country where young people most often go for temporary residence. This phenomenon was intensifying, e.g., in 1998. The UK issued 14,000 visas with work permits for South Africans, 23,000 in 1999 and much higher in 2000²⁷. For South Africans who do not have British passports, it is possible to temporarily emigrate by obtaining a 2-year work permit (persons under 27 years of age). If you had a parent or grandparent or grandparent of a British citizen, you could be granted a work permit for 4 years. Others had to have employment contracts.

By far the largest concentration of Diasporas of white South Africans in the EU is the United Kingdom. It was estimated that there are more than 300 thousand or even more than 500 thousand of them living

²⁶ "The Cape Times" 13 June 1997.

²⁷ "The Sunday Times" 13 September 1998.

there²⁸. In the 1990s and the following years, many stockbrokers, financiers, tax advisors and accountants from South Africa found a job in the City of London. The majority of South African immigrant teachers (out of about 1.3 thousand) worked in the UK. From the medical staff, between 1,000 and 3,000 dentists from South Africa were employed in the UK. Only in 1998, 600 white nurses from South Africa applied for registration in the UK²⁹.

Pew Research estimated that at least 900,000 people born in South Africa were living abroad in 2017, including mostly wealthy white, educated professionals³⁰.

Causes of white South Africans emigration

Factor analysis can be helpful in explaining the causes of external migratory flows, e.g., “push” and “pull” factors.

In the 1990s, and especially in the second half of the 1990s, South Africa’s socio-economic and political spheres underwent rapid changes. After 1994, the new ANC government tried to implement the concept of building a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multicultural society, which was included in the slogan of “rainbow nation”. On the other hand, the so-called “affirmative action” and other racial activities in employment policy were introduced with increasing force. These were programmes of economic development of the country and improvement of the situation of the non-white population, including: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The entry into force of the Employment Equity Act (1998) was expected to directly affect 800,000 whites, who were

²⁸ J. van Rooyen (2000), op. cit., p. 25; “Die Burger” 14 June 2000.

²⁹ “Die Burger” 8 March 1999; “Die Burger” 21 December 1999.

³⁰ *4 real facts about emigration in South Africa* (2018), op. cit.

to be replaced in the country's economy by non-whites, mostly by Africans (blacks)³¹.

It is stressed that one of the possible causes of the increase in racism and xenophobia in South Africa is the impact of government affirmative action programmes on white South Africans. Some young white people feel at a disadvantage when applying for a job because they are not black (they are not Africans)³².

Most often, however, as the primary causal factor of emigration from South Africa extremely high rates of crime (often personally experienced), or the lack of real protection of citizens by the police was mentioned. Johannesburg is considered to be the most dangerous city in the world. South Africa leads the world in statistics on theft, armed robbery, rape and murder³³. Criminal gangs attack banks, corporate offices and farms (more than 1,000 farmers have been killed in the 1990s). Still, white farmers are being murdered there at a rate of more than once per week.

The high number of murders is seen worldwide as an indicator of the country's fragility (in South Africa there are 47 murders per day, the rate of murder in South Africa per capita is now five times higher than the world average)³⁴.

Increasingly, there are cases where white people do not feel safe or even intimidated in contemporary South Africa. An example is the decision of a Canadian court to grant refugee status to a white South African citizen in 2009 due to the real possibility of his or her

³¹ "Die Burger" 3 June 2000.

³² L. Arkley (1999), *Affirmative Action Behind Chicken Run*, "The Sunday Independent" 11 December, p. 1.

³³ In 2000, the South African government classified crime data in the country (it was officially stated that they require new indicators).

³⁴ C. Winbush & R. Selby (2015), *Finding home: South African migration to New Zealand*, "Aotearoa. New Zealand Social Work" 27(1-2), p. 47.

persecution if he or she returned to his or her country of origin³⁵. This decision provoked protests and indignation from the ruling African National Congress in South Africa.

South Africa's economic situation has not been encouraging for two decades. There has been minimal economic growth with relatively high (although single digit) inflation. Tax burdens are rising and interest rates on loans remain at a high level. The value of the rand in relation to world currencies is steadily declining (at the beginning of the 1980s the ratio of the rand to the US dollar was one to one, at the end of 2001 ten rand was equivalent to one US dollar, and in 2020 it was already almost seventeen to one). There is a steady decline in the standard of living. White South Africans can afford less and less. In addition, the level of education has significantly decreased. The social security and health insurance system has deteriorated significantly.

In the survey, the most common main factors of white emigrants from South Africa are uncertainty about their future as members of minorities in the new democratic state, high crime rates and, what is rarely emphasized, high taxes³⁶.

In recent years, whites in South Africa have seen more and more evidence of the progressive disintegration of the state, the degradation and poor effectiveness of state institutions, and the increasing calls from the populist politicians in the power of the ANC and more radical groups for the mere acquisition without compensation of white "wealth" as part of social justice.

Many qualified whites are dissatisfied with the ANC governments, they think they do not represent them, and they do not trust the

³⁵ C. Laird (2009), *Canada grants white South African refugee status*, "The World Today" 2 September, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-09-02/canada-grants-white-south-african-refugee-status/1414832> [accessed 19 December 2018].

³⁶ C. Schuler (1998), *Crime hastens white flight for survival*, "National Post" 20 October, p. 2.

government. White people feel powerless in the face of the hegemony of the ANC government as a minority group³⁷.

Among the “push” exogenous factors determining the emigration of whites from South Africa is the situation in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Negative scenarios assume a similar course of events for this country as in Zimbabwe. In 1999 and 2000, it was observed that ongoing unrest in Zimbabwe (including attacks on white farmers), the country’s economy plunging into chaos, combined with a spiral of crime and rampant corruption, stimulated high rates of white emigration from South Africa³⁸.

In the early 21st century, the following causes of white South Africans emigration were put forward: uncertainty and crime, which now have a significant impact on the white population, which previously enjoyed much better protection in the apartheid period; an affirmative action that “punishes” young white men seeking work in order to correct the blatant imbalance that is the legacy of the apartheid period; the deteriorating state of public education, which is an inevitable consequence, at least in the short term, of the democratisation of access to education; uncertainty about the future, especially for children, in the context of a tense socio-political situation inevitably influenced by events in neighbouring Zimbabwe³⁹.

Most often 25% of the respondents mentioned security as the main reason for planning emigration from South Africa. In addition,

³⁷ E. Louw & G. Mersham (2000), *Packing for Perth: The growth of a Southern African Diaspora*, “Asian and Pacific Migration Journal” 10(2), pp. 303–333.

³⁸ M. Power (2000), *Wave of emigration hits South Africa*, “The Sunday Tribune” 3 June, p. 1; J. Gordin (1999), *Mbeki moves on home affairs chaos*, “The Sunday Independent” 5 December, p. 1.

³⁹ R. Mattes & W. Richmond (2002), *The brain drain: what do skilled South Africans think?*, in: D. McDonald & J. Crush (eds.), *Destination Unknown. Perspectives on the Brain Drain in Southern Africa*, Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa; J.D. van der Vive & P.J.T. de Villas (2000), *Why do physicians emigrate? The migration of South African graduates to Canada: a survey of medical practitioners in Saskatchewan*, “South African Family Practice” 22, pp. 17–22.

the intensity and severity of the crime was the main factor, including the feeling that “life is cheap” and the likelihood of killing during even a minor teasing or theft is considered high. Many white people live with feelings of fear and anxiety and insecurity about their families and homes.

In the last years government’s plans for land expropriation without compensation have caused even more uncertainty among white South African farmers.

This is added with the difficulties in the functioning of urban infrastructure, including interruptions in the supply of electricity and water.

African-American and African researchers see the problem of white emigration from the perspective of the legacy of apartheid. For example, Amadu Jacky Kaba said that in a very similar way to the United States, the richest and most educated people in South Africa are white, and emigration from that country is causing a brain drain. The emigration of an educated or economic elite across international borders to a more prosperous country is a direct consequence of the apartheid system that has been in place for over 40 years in South Africa⁴⁰.

The internal situation in South Africa is influenced by exogenous factors, mainly related to the processes of globalisation. These include: the instability of the South African economy in the global economic system, the volatility of the South African rand; the recognition of South African qualifications in the West, especially in English-speaking countries; South Africa’s integration into the global knowledge-based economy, where competition for skills increased significantly in the 1990s and in the next decades; the activities of foreign recruitment

⁴⁰ See more: A.J. Kaba (2009), *Africa’s Migration Brain Drain. Factors Contributing to the Mass Emigration of Africa’s Elite to the West*, in: I. Okpewho & N. Nzegwu (eds.), *The New African Diaspora*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 109–130.

agencies, sometimes with the support of governments of the target countries, especially in the education and health sectors.

Among the trends in global migration flows, the labour force is beginning to follow hypermobile capital, and the size, structure and direction of migration flows are changing. Along with the increase in the flow of capital and goods, international migration of people is increasing, globalisation, acceleration, differentiation and feminisation of migration are taking place⁴¹. Due to the acceleration of globalization processes in Western countries, the demand for specialists is growing⁴².

Globalisation gives qualified white people from South Africa a chance to find attractive jobs in various parts of the world, especially in the West, including the European Union, as well as in highly developed English-speaking countries⁴³.

Not without significance are also measurable financial benefits, e.g., a surgeon from South Africa can earn three to five times as much in the United States as in his country. However, high salaries abroad are not the main motivation to leave South Africa. Deteriorating

⁴¹ B.B. Haldenwang (1996), *Migration Processes. Systems and Policies. With Special Emphasis on South African International Migration*, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, pp. 2–3.

⁴² R. Gilpin & J.M. Gilpin (2000), *The Challenge of Global Capitalism. The World Economy in the 21st Century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 309–310; M.J. Slaughter & P. Swangei (2000), *Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs?*, in: F.J. Lechner & J. Boli (eds.), *The Globalization Reader*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, p. 117.

⁴³ See more: A. Żukowski (2002), *Exodus białych z Republiki Południowej Afryki do krajów Unii Europejskiej jako przykład międzykontynentalnych migracji doby globalizacji*, in: B. Fijałkowska, A. Żukowski (eds.), *Unifikacja i różnicowanie się współczesnej Europy*, Warszawa: Elipsa Publisher, pp. 349–357; A. Żukowski (2017), *Emigracja białych z Nowej Afryki Południowej*, in: A. Żukowski (ed.), *Afryka i świat a problem migrantów i uchodźców: współczesne studia przypadków*, series „Forum Politologiczne”, vol. 25, Olsztyn: Instytut Nauk Politycznych UWM, pp. 113-142.

working conditions in the public sector (e.g., in public health care and education) are one of the reasons often mentioned.

The factor attracting South African whites to settle in New Zealand is its immigration policy, employment opportunities and the reputation of New Zealand society as safe and friendly.

In some cases, the high financial costs of a settlement permit procedure (with no guarantee of a settlement permit) in a given country, e.g., Australia, should be mentioned as factors affecting the decision to emigrate.

Effects of white South African emigration

Although there is a broad consensus, particularly until recently in the United States, about the mutual benefits of globalisation, the free movement of skilled labour between countries is judged ambiguously. From the point of view of the interests of the South African economy, the phenomenon of white emigration is seen as very negative. There is a heated debate on this issue in the media, and this phenomenon is closely related to the so-called “brain drain”⁴⁴.

Various types of simulations indicate significant financial losses. According to estimates by the Unisa Graduate School of Business Leadership, South Africa lost 8.4 billion rands from income tax in the years 1994-1997 as a result of the “brain drain”, and the GDP decreased by 285 billion rands in that period⁴⁵. The departure of one qualified citizen is a loss of about 100,000 rands a year for the South African tax office.

⁴⁴ See more: B. Brown, D. Kaplan, & J. Meyer (2000), *The Brain Drain: An Outline of Skilled Emigration from South Africa*, “Africa Insight” 30(2), pp. 1–40.

⁴⁵ E. Sidiropoulos (1999), *South Africa. The Challenges of Transformation*, in: *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, p. 20.

In the future branches of industry, such as the computer and IT industries (Information Technology), there was a 57% decrease in employment in the category of highly qualified workers. This emigration also affects the level of unemployment. Every skilled worker in South African conditions creates jobs for six people. In this way, the emigration of white people increased unemployment in South Africa by about 1.5 million.

A large proportion of skilled white emigrants come from the education sector. This is a worrying phenomenon, since the possibilities for Africans or other communities excluded during the apartheid period to replace them are limited, particularly in secondary and higher education⁴⁶.

In addition to teachers, engineers and technicians, the “brain drain” has also included lawyers accountants. Medical staff, particularly doctors and dental specialists, are also a sizeable group. More than 25% of all doctors graduating from South Africa in 1990-1997 decided to work abroad, and at the end of the 1990s, 74% of qualified white people were alarmed that they wanted to leave South Africa⁴⁷. It should be added that a large portion of white South African youth want to study abroad so their permanent return to South Africa is not so sure.

The emigration of so many whites from South Africa since the end of apartheid has caused a significant shortage of highly qualified and qualified workers, who, at least in the short and medium-term, cannot be replaced by Africans or foreigners.

According to estimates of the Enterprise Observatory of South Africa from 2017 at least 400,000 professionals have left South Africa⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ R. Cohen, *Brain-Drain Migration*, p. 2, http://www.polity.org.za:80/govdocs/green_papers/migration/cohen2.htm [accessed 15 December 2017].

⁴⁷ A. Gill (1998), *74% with Skills Want to Quit South Africa*, “The Sunday Times” 13 September.

⁴⁸ *For every skilled professional coming to South Africa, 8 are leaving* (2019), 9 January, <https://www.cbn.co.za/category/news/> [accessed 15 August 2019].

The problem of “brain drain” through emigration from South Africa is not entirely clear. According to Robin Cohen, there is an oversupply of engineers in South Africa and many declared migrants in this category are of retirement age⁴⁹. Sandile Simelane stresses that two-thirds of South Africans declare themselves to be inactive⁵⁰.

According to the Frank Knight Wealth Report from 2018 in the years 2012-2017, South Africa lost almost a quarter of its super-wealthy individuals – those who have a net worth of over 5 million USD – dropping from 13,380 in 2012, to just 10,350 in 2017⁵¹.

Conclusion

In the last three decades, as many as 1-1.5 million (white) South Africans have left South Africa, and hundreds of thousands are considering such a possibility. Estimates are even given that this is the case for 1/3 to 1/2 of South African white citizens. Among the highly qualified staff, this percentage rises to 75%⁵². Thus, despite various statistics, it seems right to say that the majority of white immigrants from South Africa had higher qualifications (73%)⁵³.

There was a trend (2015) that after graduating from the secondary school leaving school, young white people go abroad in large numbers to gain experience⁵⁴. On the other hand, the South African survey of

⁴⁹ R. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 2–3.

⁵⁰ S. Simelane (1999), *Trends in International Migration. Migration Among Professionals, Semi-Professionals and Miners in South Africa, 1970–1997*, p. 10, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/TREND%20IN%20INTERNATIONAL%20MIGRATION.htm> [accessed 15 December 2017].

⁵¹ *4 real facts about emigration in South Africa* (2018), op. cit.

⁵² J. van Rooyen (2000), op. cit., p. XI.

⁵³ J. Forrest, R. Johnston & M. Poulsen (2013), *Middle-class Diaspora: recent immigration to Australia from South Africa and Zimbabwe*, “South African Geographical Journal” 95(1), pp. 50–69.

⁵⁴ *How many whites have left South Africa in the last 5 years* (2015), op. cit.

1.2 thousand young doctors finishing one year of social service in South Africa provides interesting information on the intentions of future emigration. When asked “Where do you intend to work after a year of social service?”, a large number of respondents stated that they were considering working abroad (about 3/4 of them would like to return to South Africa later). The number of young white doctors planning to go abroad is much higher⁵⁵.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, South Africa has enjoyed a great deal of success with a variety of guidebooks on migration opportunities⁵⁶. There are also agencies and offices that provide services in this area.

Apart from the previously presented “push” factors and “pull” factors, the modern world is becoming a global village with a free flow of capital seeking the greatest possible profits and more and more often a labour force. South Africa is no exception. The South African economy has become part of the globalisation process. Many white, educated South Africans emigrate from South Africa because they see South Africa as part of a global village. In emigration, he sees not only economic benefits (mainly financial), but also the possibility of achieving professional goals. Due to their high education and professional skills in the immigration countries, the vast majority of them become successful people.

In conclusion, however, push factors are in most cases more important in the process of decision-making to migrate than pull factors from the destination country.

⁵⁵ *The international mobility of health professionals. An evaluation and analysis based on the case of South Africa* (2004), in: *Trends in International Migration*, Paris: OECD, p. 124, <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/trendsininternationalmigration2003.htm> [accessed 15 December 2017].

⁵⁶ For example, A. Neville (1994), *Emigrating from South Africa to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States*, Cape Town: Glendale Publishing.

The white exodus from South Africa has become a fact, which is part of the intercontinental migration of the globalization era. The free movement of an educated and highly educated white labour force will continue, although the scale of this emigration is difficult to predict.

Re-emigration, the scale of which depends to a large extent on the internal situation in South Africa, seems to be an increasingly strong trend. Twenty years after the ANC's victory in the 1994 elections, the white exodus from that country shows signs of a slowdown or even a reversal (even analysing the official South African five-year statistics, we can see a downward trend, e.g., between 2011 and 2015 16,888 fewer white people left South Africa than in 2006-2010). Estimates are given that between 1994 and 2014, some 340,000 white people returned to South Africa to emigrate from there⁵⁷.

Although ownership in South Africa has been maintained and no private property has yet been confiscated by the state, a large number of white South Africans have left the country for this reason or intend to do so.

The emigration of white South Africans is being politically assessed. The emigrants are accused of leaving the country when it needs their help to build the foundations of democracy and support economic development. In 1998, N. N. Mandela said that "the real people of South Africa say: I am not going to flee my country, I am going to stay and serve my country"⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ *Why white South Africans are coming home* (2014), 3 May, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27252307> [accessed 15 December 2017].

⁵⁸ C. Schuler, op. cit., p. 2.

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Unifikacja i różnicowanie się współczesnej Europy, Warszawa: Elipsa Publisher, pp. 349–357.

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**White South Africans emigration after
the dismantling of apartheid:
Scale, directions and consequences**

Abstract

The chapter began with a presentation of the origin of white emigration from South Africa. The scale and main directions of white South Africans emigration, on the basis of official and unofficial data, are depicted and analysed, with special emphasis on English-speaking countries (US, Australia, UK, New Zealand and Canada) and as well as OECD and European Union countries. The analyses covers the period from the early 1990s until 2018/2019. The political, economic, social and other reasons of white South African emigration are analysed according to the push and pull factors approach. The next topic concerned the consequences of this emigration from South Africa, especially for the South African economy (among others the “brain drain” of skill professionals). The perspectives of future white emigration were also formulated.

Key words: emigration, immigration, white South Africans, South Africa, “brain drain”

Chapter 6.

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THE INFLUENCE OF UNIVERSITIES ON PEOPLES' MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM IRINGA MUNICIPALITY IN SOUTHERN TANZANIA

Introduction

For the last hundred years, a striking feature has been the enormous expansion of University education worldwide¹. Universities are recognized as institutions that offer education and are an important player for local and regional development as well as economic growth². These institutions are seen by societies as crucial for individual advancement and an important form of investment in human capital and the nation's economic development³. They represent a critical factor in innovation, and human capital development and play a central

¹ A. Valero & J. van Reenen (2019), *The economic impact of universities: Evidence from across the globe*, "Economics of Education Review" 68, pp. 53–67.

² R. Garrido-Yserte & M. Gallo-Rivera (2010), *The impact of the university upon local economy: three methods to estimate demand-side effects*, "The Annals of Regional Science" 44(1), pp. 39–67.

³ D.E. Bloom, D. Canning, K.J. Chan & D.L. Luca (2014), *Higher Education and Economic Growth in Africa*, "International Journal of African Higher Education" 1, pp. 22–57.

role in the success and sustainability of the knowledge economy⁴. The history of higher education institutions in Africa showed that there are numerous roles in economic development, Africanization, national-building, and engines of the knowledge economy⁵. Literature showed that Universities have great contributions in a society in the sense that they interact with and offer services such as outreach supports, the solution to local businesses, vital services such as health care, cultural amenities, and sports facilities⁶. Universities also help in uplifting the lives of the surrounding communities through enhancing self-knowledge, employment opportunities and promote civic participation⁷. The presence of Universities in Africa provides opportunities for migrants to make livelihoods and accumulate assets that contributing to human capital development⁸. Though Universities are recognized for their role in the local economy and growth development, there are gaps in the literature on how these institutions can be a pull factor for migration and its associated effects on surrounding communities especially in a developing country like Tanzania⁹. It has been shown that the relationship between human

⁴ D. Dill & F. van Vught (eds.) (2010), *National Innovation and the Academic Research Enterprise: Public Policy in Global Perspective*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁵ E.W. Woldegiorgis & D. Martin (2013), *The changing role of higher education in Africa: Historical reflection*, "Higher Education Studies" 3(6), pp. 3–45.

⁶ S.B. Kraines at al. (2014), *Beyond the third mission: Exploring the emerging university function of cooperation for sustainability*, "Science and Public Policy" 41(2), pp. 151–179; J.W. Jacob, S.E. Sutin, J.C. Weidman & J.L. Yeager (eds.) (2015), *Community Engagement in Higher Education: Policy Reforms and Practice*, Rotterdam: Sense Publisher.

⁷ P. Altbach (2009), *The Giants Awake: the present and future of higher education systems in China and India*, in: *Higher Education to 2030*, vol. 2, Globalisation, Baltimore: OECD Publishing, pp. 179–203.

⁸ M. Awumbila, J.K. Teye & J.A. Yaro (2016), *Social networks, migration trajectories and livelihood strategies of migrant domestic and construction workers in Accra, Ghana*, "Journal of Asian and African Studies" 52(7), pp. 982–996.

⁹ Ibidem.

capital, institutions, and growth is much debated in the literature. Universities can be valuable contributors to economic growth¹⁰ through the consumption of local goods and services from students and staff. Indeed, Universities tend to attract people from different areas to migrate to a University region to study, settle and business opportunities. The movements of human capital, students and employees can contribute to the region's economic growth.

Tanzania has got many Universities which increase from time to time since independence. The University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) was established in 1961, the University of Iringa in 2005, Mzumbe University in 2001, University of Dodoma (UDOM) in 2007 and St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) in 1998 just to mention a few. As the number of Universities is increasing in different regions of Tanzania documenting its effects on people's mobility and the local economy is crucial. In the Iringa region specifically, the attraction of urban migration is largely due availability of local jobs, education, health care, longer life expectancy and greater access to social services¹¹. However, the capacity of urban towns to handle the increasing number of migrants by providing employment and basic amenities are limited¹². Similarly, Universities can be a cause of emerging negligence habits. Studies have shown that an increasing of bandit, prostitution, street children and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and then Human Immune Virus (HIV) are the likely outcomes of emerging University in a region¹³.

¹⁰ A. Steinacker (2005), *The Economic Effect of Urban Colleges on their Surrounding Communities*, "Urban Studies" 42(7), pp. 1161–1175.

¹¹ United Nations Departments of Economic & Social Affairs Population Division 2016, *International Migration Report 2015*.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem; M. Thomashow (2014), *The nine elements of a sustainable campus*, "Sustainability: The Journal of Record" 7(3), p. 174; A.M. Barrett & W.A. Anangisyse (2005), *Professional identity and misconduct: perspectives of Tanzanian teachers*,

Experience elsewhere in Africa also showed that conflicts between the University community and neighboring communities are possible. In North Central Nigeria for example, the Federal Polytechnic Offa (FEDPOFFA) and the Offa community in Kwara State entered into conflicts in May 2000 because of social differentiation¹⁴. Studies that have analyzed the impacts of Universities as a pull factor for migration in Tanzania cities are rare. A study by Lyata Ndyali¹⁵ on the roles of Universities in Tanzania's education system focused on jobless graduates with no focus on its contribution to migration. There are knowledge gaps that exist about the effect of a University on migration and the local economy. Other study impacts have focused on changes in social behavior and especially at the country level while migration patterns and local economic studies are scanty. Given the fact that students and employee activities happening after business hours in a University region can help to revitalize a region's economy, documenting the scale of the change would be useful. This article analyses the influence of University expansion on migration and the local economy residing on the campuses. The study focus to:

- (i) examine the trend of migration from 2000-2018 with the presence of Universities in Iringa Municipality;
- (ii) analyze the opportunities the University offers to pull migration in Iringa Municipality;
- (iii) examine the challenges which face migrants with the presence of Universities in Iringa Municipality. By assessing the effects of Universities on people's mobility and to the local economy would be useful information to policy and decision-makers in

"Southern African Review of Education with Education with Production" 11 (1), pp. 5–22.

¹⁴ J.S. Omotola (2015), *Student-Host Community Conflicts in Nigeria: The Case of the Federal Polytechnic and the Offa Community in Kwara State*, "African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review" (5(2), pp. 113–127.

¹⁵ L. Ndyali (2016), *Higher Education System and Jobless Graduates in Tanzania*, "Journal of Education and Practice" 7(4), pp. 116–121.

designing plans and programs for enhancing local and national economic development.

Methods

Within the scope of the study, a total of 106 respondents from Gangilonga, Kihesa, Ilala, Mtwivila, and Mkwawa wards were involved in this research. The team used questionnaires to interview the respondents between 2018 through 2019, parallel to that specific checklist for focus group discussion and key informant interviews were also used.

Study area and the inhabitants

This study was held in Iringa municipality, located in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. According to the census report of 2012, the population of the Iringa Urban District was 151,345 and the majority of inhabitants are the Wahehe and the rest people from other regions such as Wabena, Wakinga, Wapangwa, Wawanji, Nyakyusa, Chagga and Safwa from Njombe, Kilimanjaro and Mbeya regions¹⁶.

Data and sampling strategy

The study was undertaken using qualitative and quantitative approaches in three campuses in the Iringa municipality namely; Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), Ruaha Catholic University (RUCU) and Iringa University are formerly known as Tumaini University (UoI). A purposive sampling approach was adopted to select the five wards located near the three Universities. The techniques used to collect data were focused on group discussions with small business owners around the three Universities. During the discussion, each group comprised of six to ten (6–10) participants.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

In selecting group members the research team considers gender, age, specialization of a certain economic activity and official positions. Key informant interviews were conducted with relevant individuals who served as key informants for providing relevant information on the opportunities around the University Campuses, migration trends and the challenges faced as a result of the presence of Universities in the Iringa Municipality. People selected for the interviews included Ward Executive Officers from each ward, Heads of Institutions, University administrators, (one from each University), and Medical Officers from the respective institution.

While undertaking Group discussion and Key informant interviews, specific checklists of questions were used to guide the discussion and the participants were free to discuss their views and ideas with regards to the topic. Parallel to that, a checklist of open and close-ended questions was used during interviews with the head of households living residing the University campuses. Household survey questionnaires were administered to 106 households around the University campus where a sample size of 10% of the household population was used. Secondary data was obtained to provide supplementary information to fill the gaps in the primary data collected. The information was obtained from scientific sources and reports from the study district. After completing data collection, cleaning of data was done and then followed by analysis. Microsoft Excel was used for entering the data and Statistical Package for Social Sciences SPSS was to generate descriptive information.

Table 1: Sample Size of the Households

Institution	Ward	Streets	Households	Sample Size
Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE)	Mkwawa	Imanongwa "A"	26	3
		Imanongwa "B"	28	3
		Mkwawa Chuo	9	1
		Itamba	22	2
	Mtwivila	Mtwivila "A"	119	12
Ruaha Catholic University (RUCU)	Gangilonga	Sabasaba	89	9
		Kilimani	20	2
		Wilolesi	159	16
		Kinondoni	72	7
		Gangilonga	90	9
	Ilala	NyumbaTatu	120	12
		Lami B	50	5
		Embakassi	66	7
University of Iringa (UoI)	Kihasa	Sentema "A"	130	13
		Ilebula	25	2
		Sentema "B"	32	3
Total			1057	106

Source: Field Data (2019).

Results and discussion

Population and migration trends in Iringa municipality

The 2002 Population Census indicated that there were 1,490,892 people in the region with an intercensal (1988–2002) increase of 25%. Population growth in Iringa was largely due to population momentum as annual growth rates between censuses have been declining, it was 2.7% in 1967–1978, 2.6% in 1978–1988 and fell to 1.6 in 1988–2002. Projection puts the 2002–2012 annual population growth at 1.1% with Iringa urban having the highest growth at 1.5% due to immigration. According to the 2012 census report, Iringa Municipal Council had a total of 151,345 populations and the average annual population growth rate was 2.7%¹⁷. Therefore, from 2012 to 2019, with that rate, the population was expected to be 2,860,420. This projection was done without considering the emergence of large investments like Universities; therefore population may be higher than this.

The majority of people who migrated into urban areas have settled nearby Universities to conduct different economic activities such as food vending, selling clothes, stationeries shop, hair salons, supermarkets and other commodities shops. The results showed that about 60% of households are migrants from outside Iringa and 30% are coming from other districts like Kilolo, Mufindi and Iringa rural districts which are within the Iringa region and only 10% were indigenous. The natives of the area especially those who are living nearby Universities are mostly involved in formal and informal activities as well as agricultural activities¹⁸. Also, many urban dwellers

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ United Republic of Tanzania (2012), *Population and Housing Census; Population Distribution by Administrative Areas*, Office of Chief Government Statistician President's Office, Finance, Economy and Development Planning.

retain plots in rural areas for the farming of crops and trees¹⁹. This is the case for Iringa municipality since the forestry industry is a key to Iringa's economy²⁰.

The situation of community before the establishment of universities

Respondents indicated that before the establishment of Universities in Iringa, there were low circulations of money as few community members relying on petty business and waged labor as indicated in the Iringa Municipal Development Report of 2012. The major livelihood determinant was agriculture with a minimal market for agricultural products. Also, economic growth was very low before the existence of these institutions due to the low population and people's mobility. A study by Pundy Pillay²¹ revealed a similar observation that regions with no Universities in South Africa reordered a low level of development due to low movement of people and money circulation. Furthermore, the results indicated that, before the establishment of Universities, there were poor social services such as health services, poor transport system, as well as poor education services due to inadequate teaching and learning resources. Interview with local government officers acknowledged that,

“Before the establishment of these institutions near our ward there were very few social services and people were suffering from a long working distance in search of water, even health services were not found here. Also, the few established schools were experiencing poor performance compared to this time”.

¹⁹ H. Wenban-Smith (2014), *Rural-Urban Linkages: Tanzania Case Study*, Working Paper Series no. 127. Working Group: Development with Territorial Cohesion. Territorial Cohesion for Development Program, Santiago, Chile.

²⁰ FinScope Tanzania (2017), *Iringa Regional Report*.

²¹ P. Pillay (ed.) (2010), *Higher Education Financing in East and Southern Africa*, Somerset West: African Minds.

Presence of Universities as Motives for Migration

Growth of money circulation and job creation

The presence of Universities has contributed to the local economy through the consumption of local products and services. The students, staff, and visitors have increased the rate of money circulation through purchasing of local commodities and this has specifically contributed to improving the living standard of the people by 74% as the respondents acknowledged. The results are also supported by a previous study²² that founded similar trends elsewhere in the world. This was further emphasized by ward executive officers in Gangilonga that,

“The presence of Universities within the ward contributed in various aspects such as the increase of job opportunities to the community members and growth of the small business which uplift my communities living standard”.

The respondents also reported having started small businesses around the Universities such as shops, beauty hair salons, restaurants, house renting, stationeries, internet cafes, bars, and grocery services. Others have been engaged in service provisions in the universes such as cleaning services, transportation through motorcycles and town buses while the main targets being students and employees working in the Universities. The role of Universities in the proliferation of business was also raised by informants during the FGD as they emphasized on the establishment and consolidation of petty business centers. As quoted during the discussion, they argued that,

“Businesses are being run due to the Universities, most customers are students and staff. In the absence of the students, during their

²² Ibidem.

vacation, most business centers are greatly affected by a reduction of customers”.

Because of the inadequate or absence of good record keeping, this research could not find the overall trend of customers.


Improved and availability of social services

Another factor that has pulled migration in the Iringa Municipality as a result of University is the improvement of social services. The respondents explained that their place of origin has inadequate social services such as transport, health services, water supply, and electricity. Therefore, for them to find a better life they opt to migrate to University towns to obtain better services. For instance, the presence of a health center at Mkwawa University Campus has attracted people to settle nearby as they are assured to get better health care. Respondents near Mkwawa University revealed that they prefer to attend the center when sick, attend the clinic when pregnant and also bring their children when sick. The situation has minimized the hours they used to spend in searching for the same services from other hospitals such as the regional referral hospital or elsewhere.

Pull factors for migration as a result of Universities in Iringa Municipality

Another way Universities matter in pulling migrants to Iringa Municipality is the availability of opportunities. The increase in the number of Universities in Iringa has created different opportunities in the region as the majority of respondents acknowledged this fact. Business and market opportunities have been the main pull factor for migration in Iringa Municipality followed by improved social services (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Factors Motivating Respondents Migration around Universities



Source: Field Data (2018).

Challenges of migration around Universities

Seasonality of business

Universities have said to attract more investment around. However, all universities have two active semesters each with 120 days. Therefore, the remaining days (125 days) is the period when most of the students are on leave. The system has affected the availability of the market for most of the small businesses. About 80% of the respondents engaged in a small business enterprise mentioned this challenge. They specified that the circulation of money is high during schooling time and decrease during holidays. The situation force most business enterprise like shops, saloon, tailoring, and catering services to stop for a while up until the semester is opened. Such

a trend remained to be a major challenge to most business entities around the University campuses.

Inadequate waste management

Inadequate waste management is another challenge facing the Municipality. The research revealed that in Iringa Municipality there has been an increase of waste materials to the environment such as solid and liquid while the capacity of the Municipality to manage remained the same. This has been contributed to the growing human population while the service to handle remains the same. In most areas around the University campuses, there are many waste materials such as plastic, shabby clothes, nylon bags, glass, and metals. The residents residing at the Universities explained that without appropriate interventions there is the likelihood of the spread of diseases.

Spread of diseases

The wide congestion of people around Universities has accelerated immoral behaviors such as prostitution that triggered a high spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS and STDs. The existence of many newcomers has increased social interactions with the indigenous. This has increased the spread of HIV making Iringa be the top second region (13%) with a high number of newly infected people at a national level²³. For instance, at Mkwawa Health Center, some 380 new infections have been reported in 2014-2019, compared to 102 victims from 2008 to 2013. Though numerous strategies have been taken to prevent new infection cases, the trend has not improved as expected. The challenge is the readiness of community members to accept those preventive measures, poverty among community members as well as human behaviors. Also due to population increase, the number of people around Mkwawa University affected by TB has

²³ United Republic of Tanzania (2019), *Tanzania HIV Impact Survey (THIS) A Population-Based HIV Impact Assessment 2016–2017*.

increased from 6 in 2018 to 20 in 2019. There were no more data recorded in previous years.

Increase of rental charges

The existence of Universities is claimed to push an increment of the prices of rental bills. Before the establishment of Universities, the rental charges for a medium quality room ranged from TZS 10,000 to 15000/= and after the existence of University the rental charges of the same rooms raised to TZS. 40,000 to 70,000. The rental charges are claimed to be high for the local community members who have low earnings and for the students who live outside the University's campus. As we analyze the data, 1 Tanzanian Shilling equivalent to 0.00043 United States Dollar. For example, Mkwawa University has the capacity to host about 1500 students in their hostels per one

Table 2: Number of students admitted at MUCE from 2009/2010 to 2018/2019

Academic year	Number of students enrolled
2009/2010	1121
2010/2011	2853
2011/2012	3353
2012/2013	3581
2013/2014	4061
2014/2015	4064
2015/2016	5456
2016/2017	4395
2017/2018	5450
2018/2019	6849

Source: Field Data (2019).

academic year. However, the number of students has been increased from time to time since 2009 while the capacity of the hostel remains the same (see Table 2).

Conclusion and recommendation

Indeed, the existence of Universities in Iringa Municipality has been a contributor to migration and urban growth as people move in search of social and economic opportunities. Of the positive impacts of Universities includes; progression of money circulation, creation of jobs and market, improvement of social services such as water supply, electricity, health services as well as increased access and support of education to communities. Likewise, there is an improvement of living standard to among the communities' in particular standard houses around Universities. However, the presence of Universities has elicited to the development of delinquency conducts such as prostitution, the spread of STDs and HIV/AIDS, increase in early pregnancies and street children. Other challenges include an increase in rental charges, inappropriate waste management and environmental pollution. Despite the fact that Universities have contributed to the growth of entrepreneur business around universities the business is not sustainable especially during student's vacations. To enhance the livelihoods to be sustainable of the people doing their business residing the Universities campuses, small business operators should be provided with entrepreneur skills on how to manage their market in the absence of students. For example, they should engage themselves in alternative livelihood activities in order to generate income hence sustainable livelihoods. Apart from that, public health education and outreach services need to be strengthened in order to educate the community to have good social practices. Policymakers and planners should adopt the recommendations as suggested in this study so as to steer development processes in the country. These recommendations

should be included in policy briefs, reforms and discussion at different levels of decision making in Tanzania. Understanding these dynamics would be very useful for the growing industrial economy of Tanzania.

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The Influence of Universities on Peoples' Migration: Evidence from Iringa Municipality in Southern Tanzania

Abstract

Universities as centers of knowledge can be a valuable contributor to the city's economic growth in a country but at the same time can be a cause of immoral habits. This study has analyzed the influence of Universities on people's migration and the challenges in the Iringa Municipality. This paper focuses on the trends of human migration, business opportunities the Universities offer and the challenges. To accomplish this study, quantitative and qualitative information were collated from five administrative wards in Iringa municipality where three Universities namely Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), Ruaha Catholic University (RUCU) and Iringa University is formerly known as Tumaini University (UoI) are located. The results showed that about 60% of the respondents interviewed from sampled study sites in the Municipality have migrated from other regions of Tanzania, 30% from districts like Kilolo, Mufindi and Iringa rural in Iringa region and 10% were indigenous. The pull factor for migration is the availability of business opportunities such as the food market, clothing fashion shops, grocery, stationeries shop, hair salons, mini-supermarkets stores, and transport services. The positive impacts are the progression of money circulation, an increase of human population and mobility, availability of formal and informal jobs, improvement of social services such as water supply, transport, health services, housing, and advancement of private medium schools in the region. Besides that, Universities have elicited the emergence of delinquency conducts such as prostitution, the spread of STDs and HIV/AIDS, increased early pregnancies and street children are among the challenges. Inappropriate waste management and environmental pollution are other associated challenges in the Municipality. The case studies suggest that the Municipality must work on the following areas; provision of entrepreneur education to improve service delivery, public health education and outreach services are necessary to educate the community to have good social practices.

Key words: universities, migration, socio-economic opportunities and development, Southern Tanzania

Chapter 7.

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SOCIAL-ECONOMIC NETWORKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR MIGRATION IN MBEYA RURAL DISTRICT FROM THE COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

Introduction

The development of the colonial economy was the cause of labour migration in Mbeya Rural District. The development of the colonial economy in Tanzania was purposely to meet the economic requirements for things such as raw materials, markets and areas to invest their surplus capital. To fulfill these requirements the maximum amount of labourers were required, especially migrant labourers. Thus, a self-sufficient Tanzanian economy and its modes of production were integrated into the colonial capitalist system¹. The most important element in production is human labor-power, which produces value. The colonial capitalists were attentive to this actuality, for ensuring the production of raw materials required to feed metropolitan industries African labour was greatly needed. All the activities established by the colonialist required African labour. Tanzanians

¹ J. Forbes Munro (1976), *Africa and the International Economy*, Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 86.

were compelled to exchange their labour power for wages for which the colonialists created money as the main medium of exchange. Put simply, labor-power was turned into a commodity that could be sold and bought willingly². On the same point, Sharon Stichter (1985) asserted that labour was only obtained for the capitalist market when Africans were made to be “free workers”. This simply implies that people should be dispossessed of the means of production. People were not supposed to own the means of production by which they could support their livelihoods. In these circumstances, they had to find an alternative, and that was by selling their labor-power³. In the case of Mbeya Rural, the selling of labor-power through labour migration continued over years. During colonial time, colonial mechanism played its role but in the post-colonial period, networking had an impact on it. People shared information related to different opportunities especially manual labour which demanded labor-power with their fellow colleagues and relatives. All the period, there were dynamics in labour migration⁴.

Labour migration during colonialism

Labour migration in Mbeya Rural started during the German period. During this period many communities in the Southern Highlands became suppliers of cheap labour in exchange for wages within their region and other areas. All through German colonialism in Tanzania, like other colonies in Africa, the labour question was crucial for the reason that there was stiff competition for getting

² D.F. Bryceson (1980), *The Proletarianization of Women in Tanzania*, “Review of African Political Economy” 17, p. 4.

³ S. Stichter (1985), *African Society Today: Migration Labourer*, London & New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 146.

⁴ P. Kok et al. (eds.) (2006), *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants*, Cape Town: HSRC.

labourers between the colonial government and companies. For example, in Tanzania the Germans allowed peasants, settlers and plantations to operate, and so settlers demanded labourers for their farms. Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Plantagensellschaft (DOAPG), a German company, demanded labourers for their plantations and mining activities and the colonial government demanded labourers for the construction of railways, roads, and other things. Therefore, labour was a crucial issue in Tanzania in view of the fact that Africans preferred to work on their own farms rather than going to work on colonial activities. This created difficulties in obtaining labourers, and alternatives were non-existent. Without labor-power, the demands of the colonialists would be impossible to meet. Therefore, “colonial exploitation required economic development; economic development required the exploitation of African labour”⁵. According to the quotation, during colonialism, this was true, as it was difficult to exploit Africans without using them as labourers.

Hence, German coloniser had to create labour markets in communities which were not familiar with the sale of labor-power. This was because, without African labour, colonial capital investment was valueless and the forcibly acquired land would also be useless. In the beginning, the colonial state created the preconditions for a labour market through conquest, taxation and the like⁶. Hence, farmers and planters used the colonial state to secure African labour through coercion. Sometimes employers were ultimately responsible for procuring their own labour.

In the process of putting into practice effective occupation, German colonialists realised that economic development would depend on cheap local labour. In the beginning, they decided to force local

⁵ J. Koponen (1994), *Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, Helsinki: Finish Historical Society, p. 321.

⁶ W. Rodney (1983), *Migrant Labour and the Colonial Economy*, in: W. Rodney, K. Tambila & L. Sago (eds.), *Migrant Labour in Tanzania during Colonialism*, Hamburg: Institut für Africa-Kunde, 1983, p. 9.

labourers into labor-power, but they realised that local labourers were unreliable. Usually, local people provided labor-power depending on the targeted demands, if they had to work because they wanted something, and so constant pressure and force were needed to drive them to work. Alongside local labour problems such as desertion, absenteeism and many others, a number of measures were taken to create a labour force during the German period. These include using slaves as late as 1901, when the governor of German East Africa, Gustav Adolf von Gotzen, stated that slavery production was so important to the colonial economy that they could not agree to abolish it before getting assurance of who would construct the central railway line⁷. Also, the Germans decided to import workers from abroad. These were Chinese coolies who arrived in June 1892 in Tanga. Likewise, in 1894, Javanese and Malayans arrived. Coolies were harshly treated and many demanded to go back home⁸. All these problems and measures meant that the Europeans had to recruit labourers from far away areas⁹. Recruitment was directed at different areas where labourers could be obtained and where people of those areas had no alternative. Thus, the last way used in the creation of a labour force was the recruitment of migrant labour.

There were several reasons for the development of migrant labour in the German time. First, European plantations were concentrated so heavily in the north-east areas that local people could not possibly supply their labour needs, especially after a succession of epidemics and famines in the 1890s which had halved the region's population¹⁰. From 1890-1914 they opened up over 40,000 hectares for sisal cultivation, two million coffee trees were planted, rubber trees were grown on 80,000 hectares large cotton plantations were established.

⁷ J. Koponen (1994), op. cit., pp. 331–332.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 338.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 349.

¹⁰ J. Iliffe (1980), *Wage Labour and Urbanization*, in: M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), *Tanzania under Colonial Rule*, London: Longman Group Ltd, p. 283.

All these plantations were located mostly in the coastal areas and north-eastern Tanzania. Thus, to bring these agricultural products to the market, cheap labour was required¹¹. Second, planters found migrant labour relatively easy to exploit and control because they lacked, experience and solidarity, while employers did not have to bear the costs of migrant's families, who normally remained at home, and they could easily increase or reduce their labour force by hiring or laying-off these short-term workers as economic circumstances dictated. Third, migrant workers could easily be mobilised to serve as markets for imported commodities from Europe that were necessary for sustaining industrial production in Germany. Fourth, they were expected to contribute to the production of raw materials needed by the growing industries in Germany. Mbeya Rural was also affected by this, and it was easy for the people to be drawn into labour migration as they had neither cash crops nor enough domestic animals to sell to get money for tax and to buy other provisions of life. The only alternative left for the people was to sell their labour power far away.

Levels of labour migration in Mbeya Rural

Mbeya Rural District is one of the districts of Mbeya Region, Tanzania. It is bordered to the north by Mbarali District and Chunya District, to the south by Mbeya Urban District and Rungwe District, and to the west by Mbozi District and East by Njombe¹². In this paper, labour migration involves the movement of people in space, often involving a change in the usual place of residence for work¹³ especially physical work. People in Mbeya started migrating within the region and later on far away.

¹¹ <http://www.germannotes.com/colonies> [accessed 12 May 2019].

¹² United Republic of Tanzania, *Mbeya District Socio-Economic Profile*.

¹³ International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1982, pp. 92–93.

The first level of labour migration involved people working within Mbeya. From 1900, people in Mbeya Rural were forced to pay tax in terms of cash. In 1906, tax stood at three rupees per family¹⁴. To get three rupees at that time people in Mbeya had to find areas where they could work so as to obtain that money, and so employment was sought within the region. In 1905-1910, the Germans established Mbeya estate in Utengule village. It was a big farm where they were engaged in the cultivation of fruit and vegetables and kept a few animals. At that time, the population of that village was small and therefore could not provide enough labour to perform all the activities on the farm. As a result, labourers were demanded for that farm. From that time it was when people from other villages in Mbeya Rural migrated to Utengule so as to work in the estate in order to get money to pay taxes¹⁵. In addition, some people from Isangati, Iwindi, Izumbwe and other villages migrated to Mbeya Town where they participated in the construction of different office buildings. Moreover, some they worked on the construction of roads which were reported to be narrow and often with trees on either side¹⁶. Priya Deshingkar and Sven Grimm (2005) agreed that more people migrated internally in many countries¹⁷.

The second level of labour migration involved people going to distant places. From 1908, taxes caused people from Mbeya Rural to travel to distant places in search of employment. They were forced to go outside the district as local opportunities became limited. Furthermore, in 1910 people from as far as Bisa in Southern Rhodesia,

¹⁴ An Annual Report on the Development of German East Africa for 1902: German East Africa General.

¹⁵ A. Jackson (2009), *Colonial Labour Migration and its Impact in Mbeya District, 1920-1960*, M.A Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, information as provided by informant during the research.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ P. Deshingkar & S. Grimm (2005), *Internal Migration and Development: A Global Perspective*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, p. 10.

Nyasa in Nyasaland and Mambwe in Northern Rhodesia came and worked in the sisal estates in Tanzania¹⁸. As this was also quoted by John Iliffe (1979) “we don’t need black capitalists, we need black workers”¹⁹, this shows how black labourers were needed from different areas to satisfy their demands. The tax became the chief means of subjection and the chief stimulus to participate in labour migration. When sisal was introduced by German planters into Tanzania in 1892, the Pangani coast and the foothills of the Usambara along with the Pangani lowlands in the south were found to be ideally suited for large-scale cultivation of this crop. The effective running of an estate was therefore impossible without external labour. Tanga plantation owners sought to regularise recruitment from elsewhere in Tanzania²⁰. Mbeya became a supplier of cheap labour for coastal plantations²¹. Additionally, in the 1920s, people become aware of the existence of better employment opportunities, not only in sisal plantations in Tanga but also, people migrated in Morogoro Kilosa and later in Iringa. This realisation caused some young men to migrate from Mbeya in order to work in those plantations.

What is more, during the capitalist crisis, there was a shortage of labour in various employment areas in the territory, because a number of men were recruited to participate in the war. The colonial administration instructed that the recruitment of labour through labour agents should be stopped entirely in areas where recruiting for military purposes was taking place but to allow it in other areas.

¹⁸ J. Iliffe (1969), *Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 162.

¹⁹ J. Iliffe (1979), *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, quoted from Eismann to Government, 30 September 1912, Tanzania National Archives (TNA) VIII/J/52a/1, p. 155.

²⁰ K. Tambila (1983), *Migrant Labour and the Colonial Economy*, in: W. Rodney, K. Tambila & L. Sago, *Migrant Labour in Tanzania during Colonialism*, Hamburg: Institut für Africa-Kunde, p. 33.

²¹ J. Iliffe (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 133.

This was done to maintain the economic activities of the country in the production of certain products, such as sisal, which were required for the war effort²², “(...) sisal was required for a number of purposes by the British Navy which could not do without it”²³. Hence, for a long time, big batches of natives from Mbeya were sent by Lorries to the sisal estates²⁴.

On the third level, apart from migrating to the coast, people began migrating to the Lupa goldmines. Mining activities started in the 1920s, following the discovery of gold deposits in Lupa and Ubiwe in Chunya District in 1922. Mining activities at that place attracted labourers from various areas outside and within Tanzania, and Mbeya could not avoid supplying labor-power. Therefore, the demand for tax in Mbeya compelled people in those areas to be labourers as they sought an alternative way of paying taxes. Many men opted to look for wage labour in the areas selected by Europeans as production centres. Thus, during colonial rule, taxation was an important stimulus for the indigenous people to seek employment. Moreover, tax in cash enabled the colonial authorities to absorb a substantial proportion of labour on short-term government projects such as portage, road construction and other projects that needed labour. Taxation consequently helped to sustain the colonial system by providing revenue, as well as monetizing the socio-economic relations in Mbeya Rural.

Following the Great Depression of 1929-1930s agricultural production declined and this reduced the number of people going to the coast. For instance, the sisal estates ceased expanding and

²² TNA, ACC. 77, 16/29, vol. 2, *Labour Recruitment Permits and Licenses*, 1952.

²³ B.C. Nandi (1979), *Colonial Agricultural Policy in Tanganyika Between the First and Second World Wars*, Paper Presented for Discussion at the History Seminar, August 1979, p. 17.

²⁴ *Lupa Labour Shortage* (1944), “The Tanganyika Standard” 4 January – 29 December, p. 5.

instead production and the labour force were drastically reduced. The Great Depression seriously affected the labour sector, in that wages became low, the number of labourers was reduced and working hours increased. In the sisal sector, for example, before the slump workers earned between 18/= shillings to 36/= per assigned task or a labour card (*kipande*), but during the slump, the wages fell to between shillings 10/= to 12/= shillings²⁵. Therefore, the fall in prices of agricultural products and the lowering of wages led to many migrant labourers leaving the plantation sector and being out of work. Hence, in the 1930s, the number of labourers from Mbeya Rural and other areas arrived at the Lupa mining centre due to lack of employment in the plantations. In 1937, there was a sharp rise in the price of sisal. The demand for labour in the sisal industry resumed. However, most of the labourers had taken up work at Lupa mining centre²⁶. In Lupa Goldfield, people from different places in and outside Tanzania were working in Chunya, for example in 1938, 7,700 men from Njombe were working there²⁷. With the resurrection of the sisal estates, some people from Mbeya decided to migrate to those areas because the salaries were higher than in Lupa.

In the period of the Second World War 1939-1945, the value of gold began to decline on the world market which led to a decline in wages. The demand for labourers declined and young men who were looking for jobs could wait for weeks before securing a chance in a mining field. It was from that time that labourers changed direction in accordance with the demands of the colonialists and the salaries of the employees. For example, some labourers were taken purposely to work in Arusha but after the end of the contract, they decided to

²⁵ W. Rodney (1979), *The Colonial Economy of Tanganyika 1890-1930*, in: M.Y.H. Kaniki (ed.), *The Tanzania under Colonial Economy*, London: Longman, p. 189.

²⁶ *Labour Shortage on the Lupa* (1937), "The Tanganyika Standard", p. 3.

²⁷ J.L. Giblin (2006), *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*, Oxford: James Currey Ltd., pp. 114–117.

move to Tanga or Dar es Salaam after they heard about the difference in salaries²⁸.

The fourth level, the British colonial government permitted labour recruitment companies to recruit labourers in Mbeya²⁹. These labourers went to Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Prospective labour migrants could choose to go to any of these places depending on demand and wages. Colonialists regarded wage employment as civilization. When Cecil Rhodes was the Prime Minister of the Cape he impressed upon white settlers the need to teach Africans the value of wage labour. “You will remove them (the indigenous people) from the life of sloth and laziness, you will teach them the dignity of labour and make them contribute to the prosperity of the state, and make them give some return for our wise and good government”³⁰. Because in many parts of Africa, including Mbeya and other places of Tanzania, people were not willing to engage in labour migration before the introduction of money, Africans were compelled to engage in labour migration because there was no alternative opportunity to earn cash to meet the demands of colonialism.

Moreover, in South Africa, free rations, housing and other amenities were considerably better than those in Tanzania. This attracted some young men to migrate. Some even decided to abandon school because of the stories. One informant reminisced: “I abandoned school and went to South Africa as a labour migrant. I had a big strong physique, and I lied about my age. The Europeans recruited me as a migrant labourer to work in South Africa”³¹. Young men seemed to believe

²⁸ TNA, Ref. 18/L 1/20, *Labour Reports of Requisition*, 1939.

²⁹ TNA, ACC. 460. 8/106, Migrating Labour Agency Southern Highlands Province, *Memorandum no. 3/56 for Members of the Labour Board, Labour Migration to South Africa and Rhodesia*.

³⁰ F. Wilson (1972), *Labour in South African Goldmine 1911-1969*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

³¹ A. Jackson (2009), *op. cit.*, quoted from informant in Mbeya District, p. 86.

that working abroad was better than working in Tanzania. In contrast to the high wages and better working conditions abroad, stories about terrible working conditions underground abounded. Underground work was arduous, terrifying, sordid and took a long time. One of the informants believed that the expectation of getting enough money enslaved men in poor working and living conditions, oppression, and exploitation, but those bad stories were not reported by ex-migrants³². Some migrant labourers overstayed their time abroad because they lacked return fare. Labour recruiting agencies in South Africa organised transport for their labour migrants. Thus, the interesting story had a minor role, but the main issue was money.

Likewise, during the Second World War people from Mbeya were recruited to join King's African Rifles (KAR) as soldiers, carrier corps and other military personnel. People from Mbeya responded to this as it was announced to those who were in need of employment. Registration took place in the Mbeya District office. After registration, they were given a course of training for one month and then taken to the battlefield. The group from Mbeya was taken to South East Asia, particularly Burma, where they fought intensively against the Japanese who were against the British and in the end Japan was defeated. 1945 marked the end of the Second World War. In 1946 the Mbeya participants were sent back home with only an allowance to expend on the way. As a result, many soldiers who served in the war returned home without anything. They were promised that their money would be given to them after returning to their respective areas, but nothing happened. Thus, upon their return, they faced many problems in getting money to meet their basic needs. Many of them opted to migrate to South Africa because they were in great need of money and they had heard about the high wages in that place³³.

³² Ibidem.

³³ A. Jackson (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 96.

The large-scale flow of migrant labourers from Tanzania to South and Central Africa began in 1946. This was because after the Second World War there was a struggle between European nations about compensation for the economy destroyed during this war. Also, in Tanzania different agricultural schemes were introduced and, in other economic sectors which had existed before the Second World War mechanisms for improvements were employed to boost the British economy at home. Therefore, the introduction of new schemes and the improvement of those sectors demanded a number of migrant labourers to satisfy their needs. However, the need for labourers in South Africa after the Second World War was greater than the need in Tanzania. For that reason, the period after this war saw a shift in the direction of labour migration from Mbeya District to South Africa due to the high salaries. John Mbuba, one of our informants stressed: “The salary in South Africa was from 100-120 shillings, with 40 shillings withheld for a pension which was enough for us”³⁴. In comparison, Philip H. Gulliver (1957) maintains that the post-war flow of labourers to South Africa was due to returning soldiers, high wages in mining industries and a decline in demand for labourers in Lupa³⁵. Thus labourers were after money and not after a good job.

In the 1950s, was the period when the Wamalila and Wasafwa ethnics from Mbeya Rural concentrated on migration, especially to South Africa, and a few were moving within Tanzania. For instance, in the late 1950s, sisal prices increased and plantations expanded their workforce and increased wages. Therefore, some people from Mbeya Rural District decided to migrate to the sisal estates where the monthly wage of a sisal cutter, which was only shillings 9/ – in 1938, reached 27/ – in 1951³⁶. All in all, after the war, the proportion of men absent from Mbeya exceeded pre-war levels.

³⁴ A. Jackson (2009), op. cit.

³⁵ P.H. Gulliver (1957), *Nyakyusa Labour Migration*, “Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Journal” 21, p. 35.

³⁶ J.L. Giblin (2006), op. cit., p. 110.

The fifth level, in 1948, there was an increase in labour recruitment from Mbeya as labourers by the Northern Province Labour Utilization Board (NPLUB) in Arusha, the Sisal Labour Bureau (SILABU), and many other places. All these companies demanded labourers from the Mbeya Recruiting Company. Labourers were demanded by Tanganyika Planting Co Ltd from Mbeya Recruiting Company in 1951 after which, 540 adult males were recruited of whom 131 were sent to Arusha Chini³⁷. In the same period, in 1951, greater demand for labourers within Tanzania forced industry owners to recruit men, women, and children. These included the Timber Industry in Kili-manjaro, Lucy Estate at Arusha, Mica mining at Morogoro, Tanganyika Planting Company and General Plantation Work (Veterinary Department) at Arusha. All those companies employed in total, 171 men, 16 women and 35 children, who were recruited from Mbeya³⁸. In 1953, women from Mbeya escaped to Northern Rhodesia in order to find jobs, although the colonial government had prohibited them but it did not succeed. But, the prohibition of women was contradictory because the government discouraged the employment of women while companies and employers allowed women to move with their husbands at their own expense, especially within Tanzania, Northern and Southern Rhodesia³⁹. Employers encouraged women's migration because of the great demand for labourers, and because of competition among employers.

All in all, women had delayed entering the labour market, unlike men. Several reasons account for this, which can fall into categories of capitalist interests and social impediments. Capitalists are always after the maximisation of profits. With this ambition, they strived their best to make sure they increase production with low costs. In this regard, the mining companies, for instance, preferred male migrant

³⁷ TNA, ACC. 33. L1/1, *Labour Policy of Instruction*, 1951.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ A. Jackson (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 98.

labourers⁴⁰. It was also reported that factory managers generally viewed women workers as incapable of handling machinery of any complexity. They, therefore, regarded women as weak creatures. In the nutshell, the studies revealed that they considered women workers to be far less productive than men due to absenteeism during menstruation or childbirth⁴¹. Under social impediments, because of the social division of labour, women were to remain at home to bear and rear children. Apart from that, the social order needed women to remain under man's subordination, but when the problem of labour was serious, impediments counted as nothing.

At the sixth level, after independence, different nations reassessed the question of labour migration to other countries. Also, in Tanzania, the late President Julius K. Nyerere demanded all migrant labourers to return at home. In the case of production within Tanzania, the government inherited everything which was under colonial rule, which included the plantations and mines. These sectors still demanded labourers even after independence. People from Mbeya District and other areas kept on migrating after the government had announced the end of labour migration. In 1961, the late J.K. Nyerere forbade his young men to migrate outside Tanzania. However, one informant claimed:

“It was not a simple task because some of the people in Mbeya District reached the point when they thought that the only means of getting money was through migration, especially outside Tanganyika. So we decided to move to Malawi where we decided to take, up citizenship and migrated to South Africa”⁴².

⁴⁰ G. Chauncey Jr. (1981), *The Locus of Reproduction: Women's Labour in the Zambian Copper Belt, 1927-1953*, “Journal of South African Studies” 7(2), p. 135.

⁴¹ D.F. Bryceson (1980), op. cit., pp. 20-21.

⁴² A. Jackson, (2009), op. cit., p. 100.

After independence, it was easy for people from Tanzania to move to Malawi and take up citizenship because the Kamuzu Banda's regime had vigorously supported the recruitment of labour by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA). Banda continued to grant and maintain WENELA's monopolistic position as the main recruiting agency in the country, even after independence. For example, in 1968, WENELA started using electronically equipped master statistical files in the administration of migrant labour schemes⁴³. "By 1974, WENELA had recruiting stations in Malawi and was still operating under conditions not different from those granted by the colonial government in 1934"⁴⁴. Therefore, like many ethnicities of Tanzania, Mbeya provided labour migrants in the colonial period for five decades. In all that time migrant labourers were exploited but they kept on migrating all the time because the money which they obtained did not satisfy their own needs. Thus, patterns of migration were determined by economic as well as sharing of information from those who migrated. The emergence of a need for labourers and skills in the newly economic cite changed the pattern.

Social-economic networking and the development of labour migration in the post-colonial period

In the post-colonial period, the people of Mbeya Rural continued to migrate to different areas of the country. Given that during the colonial time, colonial condition determined their migration, but in the post-colonial period, socio-economic networking played its role. These people were those who migrated in order to sell their physical labor-power for wages in areas where there were job opportunities, goods and services. Labour migration in Mbeya Rural in the post-

⁴³ P. McFadden (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 144-145.

colonial period is much determined by the socio-economic need of the individual or group of people. Networking as an exchange of information with others remained so important for people to migrate. People in Mbeya Rural were able to get information related to job opportunities, goods and services from relative working in certain region, their schoolmate and other people whom they meet accidentally in different places. Networking remained incredibly important during migration and enabled connections to areas where labourers were needed in a given time. Networking also remained important for commercial contacts across a variety of lucrative markets⁴⁵. Networking and cooperation among the people facilitated the movement of people across the world⁴⁶.

In Mbeya, information on labour needs to be passed from one person to another in the area even after independence. Many of the younger generations believed that labour migration was the best source of getting money and the means of escaping problems in the villages. Measures taken after independence to check labour migration from Mbeya were unsuccessful because the government was looking only at prevention without finding a solution to make young men settle and produce. Thus, the practice of labour migration continued after independence, when a good number of people moved to Lupa, Mbalari, Tanga, Morogoro, Songea, Arusha, Iringa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Mbeya Rural, socio-economic networking enabled people to migrate within the country and some few outside the country. Patterns of labour migration were also common in this period⁴⁷. Push and pull factors determined people's migration as it was believed by Ernest Ravenstein.

⁴⁵ M.D. Bennett (2018), *Migration*, in: W.A. Pettigrew & D. Veevers (eds.), *The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global History, c. 1550-1750*, Leiden: Brill, p. 74.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 88.

⁴⁷ E. Murrugarra, J. Larrison & M. Sasin (eds.) (2011), *Migration and Poverty toward Better Opportunities for the Poor*, Washington: The World Bank, p. 13.

E. Ravenstein is widely regarded as the earliest migration theorist. He, an English geographer, used census data from England and Wales to develop his “Laws of Migration” (1889). He concluded that migration was governed by a “push-pull” process; that is, unfavorable conditions in one place (oppressive laws, heavy taxation, etc.) “push” people out, and favorable conditions in an external location “pull” them out. Ravenstein’s laws stated that the primary cause for migration was better external economic opportunities; the volume of migration decreases as distance increases; migration occurs in stages instead of one long move; population movements are bilateral; and migration differentials (e.g., gender, social class, age) influence a person’s mobility⁴⁸. This study followed this theory as life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one’s present situation was also present in Mbeya Rural and attributes of distant places that make them appear appealing, people were able to get it through networking and these forced people to migrate.

The origin of the socio-economic network goes back when the whole process of monetization of the traditional economy during colonialism. This resulted into a change in attitudes, ideas and social relations. The acquisition of basic production and reproduction needs were organised through monetary transactions⁴⁹. The introduction of the money economy in Tanzania took different forms and its impact differed from one place to another. Thus, people in Mbeya sought money to meet various needs. The problem was how to obtain cash, as a result, that people decided to migrate in order to earn cash to buy goods and services. In Mbeya, people continued to find money using different effort, economic networking enabled people to get

⁴⁸ D. Bennett & O. Gade (1979), *Geographic Perspectives in Migration Research*, in: Serie: “Studies in Geography” 12, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.

⁴⁹ E.P.A.N. Mihanjo (1989), *Capital Social Formation and Labour Migration: A Case Study of the Wampoto in Mbinga District 1900-1960*, MA Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, p. 179.

information which enabled them to migrate in order to get money for survival into different phases in the post-colonial period. Katoto argued that the need of money forced many young people from Mbeya Rural to migrate into different areas in Tanzania and in the end they returned home with nothing. He provided evidence of young people who migrated to Mbarali in rice farm that every season they kept on migrating⁵⁰.

Accomplished labour migrants brought back home some of the goods such as phones, bicycles, radios, iron sheets and such like. The uninitiated youth in the village admired these things. They shared information about how they succeeded to get it, when the opportunity arose they also engaged in labour migration. They could not easily get these things in Mbeya Rural, and some thought that being labourers was the main chance to obtain them⁵¹. Similar to Mbeya Rural, some migrants from Njombe who migrated to Tanga succeeded in coming back home with money and some goods which they showed off and this encouraged others to migrate⁵². That is why even some parents encouraged their sons to migrate to Malawi, Zambia, Tanga, and Chunya in order to acquire luxury things. Kenani Yisega agreed to some extent that migration enabled the young to get some goods; he provided evidence that his migration to Chunya enabled him to buy some goods and later on he was able to marry⁵³.

Those migrants who had systematically spent their incomes on commodities like sewing machines, phones, clothes, and radios might be regarded as simply improving their present standard of living and attracting others to migrate without considering the longer-term benefits. Many of the labourers who migrated within Tanzania and outside Tanzania were poor because the assets they had acquired were luxury goods and not capital goods which could be invested.

⁵⁰ Interview with Anyelwisye Katoto, Iswago-Mbeya: 25 May, 2019.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² J.L. Giblin (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁵³ Interview with Kenani Yisega, Iyunga Mapinduzi-Mbeya: 26 May, 2019.

Thus, migrants improved their life for a short period, in a different season of production they kept on migrating with their fellow whom they shared information⁵⁴.

In a social relationship, returning home young men told stories about their experience. Most of the stories were about their work experiences. Within Tanzania labour migrants told stories about cultivation, harvesting, driving tractors or lorries and domestic chores. From Zambia labour migrants told stories about better living and working conditions and high wages compared with Tanzania. Moreover, in Zambia free rations, housing and other amenities were considerably better than those in Tanzania. This attracted some young men to migrate. Mzumbe provided the experience that they decided to migrate as a group of five young from Mbeya Rural to Zambia because of the information shared with our colleague related to good living conditions. Depending on the nature of the work which they performed they served nothing and returned home⁵⁵.

Good life compared to some family members in the village, the labour migrants were 'better off' than others. The families of those young men who migrated showed some changes compared to the parents of young men who did not migrate. Those families whose sons migrated and returned successfully convinced their fellow young men to migrate to distant areas such as Tanga, Morogoro, Lupa, Songea, Arusha, Iringa, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia. As one of the Malila in Isangati argues: "All my friends go off to work and come back rich why should I not"⁵⁶. It is true that the returning migrants from Zambia managed to save some money and when they came back were able to help their families for a short time. Some migrants succeeded to reduce poverty due to migration⁵⁷. It is true that labour migration enabled some people to solve some problems ranging from

⁵⁴ Interview with Anyelwisye Katoto, Iswago-Mbeya: 25 May, 2019.

⁵⁵ Interview with Emmanuel Mzumbwe, Iswago-Mbeya: 25 May, 2019.

⁵⁶ P.H. Gulliver (1957), *op. cit.*, as reported by Nyakyusa informant, p. 25.

⁵⁷ E. Murrugarra, J. Larrison & M. Sasin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 2.

economic to social, but “I have never met with rich person in our village as ex-migrant”⁵⁸. Aron reported differently by providing his own experience that they migrated with their fellow to Chunya for mining activities they succeeded to get money and he was able to buy a car for business. Lack of experience in such business ended up in failure. So, “I kept on migrating year after year to get another chance for money but, the chance is not mine for years now”⁵⁹. But, some informants in Mbeya Rural recounted that labour migration enabled them to get luxury goods which were not possible to obtain within the district. It is true that the things they got had less value but they had a great impact on encouraging the majority to become labourers. To have those luxury goods was a prestige among labourers. Luxury goods did not contribute anything in terms of development. Rather, they left the Africans seasonal migrants.

According to Eginald P.A.N. Mihanjo (1989), in the research conducted in Wampoto in Mbinga District 1900–1960, the need for adventure attracted only five percent of all the people who migrated⁶⁰. In fact, people migrated for many reasons, but mostly economic. A small percentage of young men took part in labour migration for different reasons like adventure and luxury goods. In Mbeya Rural, in the post-colonial period majority migrated for economic reasons, when they succeeded to solve a certain economic problem facing them they returned home.

Although various mechanisms were employed to recruit labourers during the colonial period, during the post-colonial period many of them migrated voluntarily. Migration into those areas varied from season to season and they performed different activities according to demand. Also, it was difficult to get exactly the number as individual or group migrated when they succeeded to get some network. Hence,

⁵⁸ Interview with Tukosa Mwaigombe, Iyunga Mapinduzi-Mbeya: 25 May, 2019.

⁵⁹ Interview with Ezra Aron, Isangati-Mbeya: 26 May, 2019.

⁶⁰ E.P.A.N. Mihanjo (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 167.

in the post-colonial period, labourers controlled themselves. Juma also provided his experience of migration that, he is involved in construction, but when the chance for construction declined especially during the rainy season I migrate especially to Mbarali or Kyela within the region in order to add income for the family⁶¹.

Migration patterns are a collective expression of millions of individual and family decisions. They reflect the fact that the world as a whole has become more tightly knit by trade, communication, travel and culture. Both internal and international migration is driven by population growth and by inequalities between areas. The rural sector is declining in importance and in its contribution to national economies and pushing people to migrate. Migration is one of the choices which shape people's lives and the destiny of nations⁶². Hence, migration left origin and destination areas with different impacts.

Impact of labour migration

Labour migration reduced shortages and expanding the labour supply: Migration helped to relieve labour shortages in farms, forest farms, mining, construction and help to control wage inflation. For example, recruitment of labourers from outside the region is important to many who were in need of them, and evidence indicates that they currently make a positive contribution to the economy. But, to one side labour migration affects the labour supply, as it increases the pool of labourers in certain sectors of the economy for a certain time. In Mbeya, Rural males migrated much compared to women. This increases women's work burdens and compounds their difficulties with basic survival. The additional source of income through

⁶¹ Interview with Juma Kibona, Mbalizi-Mbeya: 27 May, 2019.

⁶² *Commentary: Migration a Global Phenomenon* (1994), "Peace Research" 26(4), pp. 73–76.

remittances does not substantially change the economic status of the family nor helps it come out of its subsistence level. A little more food and a few basic needs to reduce their poverty are all they get in return for prolonged displacement of family life, emotional deprivation and insecure future, except for a possible bridge for their children to migrate in the future time⁶³.

Income flow (remittances), remittances sent home by migrants add profit at home, this was somehow true for some few migrants who migrated to Malawi and Zambia. There is a growing literature that documents the importance of labour migration and remittances for economic wellbeing in many developing contexts⁶⁴. Some migrants succeed to get some jobs which were not easy for them to return home for short period. They continued to work and send money home for development. But, some remained and left their family suffers and women taking care of it⁶⁵. Thus, labour migration affected income flow to both sides, solved the problem of employment and vice versa.

As Nigel Harris connected migration with development by looking at changes of attitudes towards migration. Formerly migration was seen as evidence of chronic social and economic breakdown, while currently internal migration is now seen as a major mechanism for the redistribution of resources from richer to poorer localities and a vital means of raising the incomes of the poor. The same revision of view is affecting international migration. Remittance flows have become major components in the foreign exchange earnings of a number of countries. After some reluctance, governments have

⁶³ S. Jetley (1987), *Impact of Male Migration on Rural Females*, "Economic and Political Weekly" 22(44), pp. 47–53.

⁶⁴ J.M. Gallego & M. Mendola (2013), *Labour Migration and Social Networks Participation in Southern Mozambique*, "Economical" 80(320), p. 722.

⁶⁵ Interview with Shusa Mwambialo, Isangati-Mbeya: 27 May, 2019.

come to embrace labour migration, to facilitate and reinforce its effects on the alleviation of poverty⁶⁶.

Fresh skills, migrants provide complementary skills where they migrated and increased productivity. The study noticed that migrants were able to provide their own skills where they were working and able to imitate skills in the field. Those who migrated for agriculture activities returned back with skills to cultivate certain products in their areas which were not there before. Some of these migrants when obtained such skills it was the end of migration and kept on producing in their own areas. Also, some were able to get mining skills, but remained with that skill until the chance occurred.

Through labour migration, some people from Mbeya blamed that they were exploited intensively in such a way that they were not able to save anything which could sustain them in the current global world. So, labor-power enabled them to get money which through circulation returned to the market. Hence, because the people of Mbeya Rural had no major cash crops to sell and big land to invest in, they kept on migrating to the farms and mining centres, but migrants tended to be selective when it came to choosing where to migrate to. They were sensitive to issues of wages, food, fare and accommodation.

Many ex-migrants families of a few people, who were involved in labour migration, remembered the goods which they enjoyed at the time when their parents migrated. These people saw a positive impact on labour migration. Their ideas were similar to those of Philip H. Gulliver who claimed that migrants brought home considerable wealth and were able to reach a higher standard of living than would have been possible otherwise⁶⁷. Normally, migrant labourers worked intending to achieve specific objectives, such as money for buying

⁶⁶ N. Harris (2005), *Migration and Development*, "Economic and Political Weekly" 40(43), pp. 4591-4595.

⁶⁷ P.H. Gulliver (1957), *op. cit.*

different goods or paying debts. After earning this money they would leave. So, to have a good standard of living was difficult, because those who succeeded in buying some goods while working found it difficult to invest their income as capital.

Conclusion

Labour migration is a historical event. During colonialism that labour migration was part and parcel of economic activities developed by German and British colonialism in Tanzania and Mbeya in particular. Therefore, labour migration produced chronic problems in Mbeya. People who migrated a high proportion of them were men who left their wives and families. Wives were responsible for reproduction and production work within the community. This became a habit of some men in Mbeya Rural when they face economic hardship. They left all the responsibility of looking after the family with their wives. Also, it should be understood that the legacies of colonial labour migration still exist and many young men do not struggle to find other mechanisms on how to develop, but find information for chances and opt for migration, especially from rural to town, or from a less developed district to a more developed region. Therefore, labour migration should be looked at as a historical issue that can be solved by tracing historical factors that led some people to migrate. Because migration is a continuous, often repeated process rather than a single event, it is difficult to measure as people migrate legally as well as illegally.

Recommendations

The study recommends the systematic study of migration in Africa, given that migration studies are of interest to a wide range of

disciplines. Given that, social anthropologists in Central, West, East and South Africa have laid the foundation for understanding the sociology of migration in Africa. The causes and rationalization of migrations have been elaborated upon by geographers and economists in relation to agricultural, industrial development and urbanization. Migration is a continuous process and the study should be the same. Labour migration can be examined from many points of view: from that of the migrant, his community of origin, his place of work, or the nation as a whole; as an aspect of internal welfare, as well as of foreign relations. The focus of interest may not relate directly to individual welfare but to the advance of knowledge, seeking to learn more about individual and group behaviour and many aspects. Thus, some of the information will provide knowledge but also will provide a basis for governmental policy.

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Social-Economic Networking and the Development of Labour Migration in Mbeya Rural District from the Colonial to Post-Colonial Period

Abstract

The transformation in economic, political and social activities in the second half of the nineteenth century led to the origin and development of labour migration in Mbeya rural and other places in Tanzania. Given that there were different mechanisms applied to force people into labour migration during colonial period, in the post-colonial networking played its role. This paper examined the importance of social-economic networking and the continuation of labour migration in Mbeya in the post-colonial period. Social-economic networking plays a central role in the transmission of information about job opportunities, goods and services. The countless ways in which network structures affect our well-

-being are well seen in labour migration. The study integrated written and oral information in reconstructing labour migration in Mbeya. The study revealed that colonialists thought that in Africa they would find a number of labourers who would perform their established activities in Africa during colonial period, but this was not the case. The colonialists then tried to solve the problem by introducing labour migration. In different phases sharing of information, insurance of security, seasonal benefit, cost efficiency and workgroup remain as a push factor for people from Mbeya Rural to migrate. The paper noticed that labour migration affected income flow to both side, solved the problem of labour power and vice versa and provided skills. Persistence of labour migration in Mbeya led to the development of certain culture especially to men. When they faced certain problems in their areas they opted for migration and left women behind taking care for their families.

Key words: social-economic networking, labour migration, Mbeya Rural District, Tanzania

Chapter 8.

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COLONIAL MALE OUTMIGRATION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO WOMEN POTTERS AND TRADITIONAL POTTERY INDUSTRY IN TANZANIA: A REFLECTION FROM PARE POTTERY PRODUCING COMMUNITIES

Introduction

Traditional pottery among the Pare of Kilimanjaro is one of the crafts of the ancient Tanzanian people generally that is still practiced in most parts of the country today. It is the ancient Tanzania's most cultural material that has caught the attention and interest of early archaeologists like Robert Soper, whose work of excavation of these precious fired clay objects has been outstanding, but humongous¹. Traditional pottery is the art of forming objects of clay in a moist plastic condition using the hands and then drying them by either exposure to sun or air and fire. They are formed in various types like cooking vessels, food bowls, storage pots, drinking cups, flower pots,

¹ R. Soper (1971), *A General Review of the Early Iron Age of the Southern Half of Africa*, "Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa" 6(1), pp. 5–37; R. Soper (2002), *Nyanga: Ancient fields, settlements and agricultural history in Zimbabwe*, Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa; R. Soper (2006), *Terrace builders of Nyanga*, Harare: Weaver Press.

decorative pots and frying or drying pots. Oral and written sources show that pottery production was a completely female activity except in a few cases where men engaged in potting for economic gain². Women made pots for consumption and exchange with few which were sold for money³. In this case, pots from Upare dominated markets in Moshi and Arusha. Isaria N. Kimambo pointed out that pre-colonial Pare predominantly a subsistence economy with the bulk of local trade commodities consisting of foodstuffs, iron implements, pots and baskets, livestock and much later in the 19th century, slaves. It was noted that there was a relationship between agricultural and crafts which encouraged the creation of a regional market apparently held every week or every month⁴. While surplus production and barter trade evolved in response to tribal specialization and provoked the use of intertribal, pottery spreading from hand to hand within a network of interpersonal relations was atypical phenomenon of early indigenous pottery trade before colonialism.

During colonialism (1800 to 1960s in most countries), Tanganyika and other parts of Africa were deeply integrated into the world capitalist economic system. Some regions were transformed into producers of agricultural commodities and others into providers of migrant laborers. These colonial initiatives had a positive and negative impact on craft production. Men who were responsible for iron production, hunting, defense to mention just a few were taken to work in colonial plantations left their activities to decline particularly iron technology. A few studies have shown how during colonial time, indigenous pottery production demonstrated considerable resilience and not only survived but actually expanded in spite or even because

² Ibidem.

³ I.N. Kimambo (1969), *A Political History of the Pare of Tanzania, C 1500–1900*, Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.

⁴ I.N Kimambo (1991), *Penetration and Protest in Tanzania: the Impact of the World Economy on the Pare, 1860–1960*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, p. 27.

of colonial presence. Pare pottery industry of northeast Tanzania, the subject of this paper, provide an eloquent testimony to the resilience and resourceful of Tanzanian women under colonial rule. A similar situation was reported by Simon E. Majuk *et al* while working with pottery production among Bakor women in colonial southern Nigeria⁵. Male out-migration had a negative impact it increases women's burden and difficulties of basic survival. Women were responsible for both their own and their husband's duties, tasks and roles. This increased stress and strains on women due to increased management responsibilities. However, women could benefit economically through remittances but it was too little to substantially change the economic status of the family. Moreover, male out-migration could lead to divorce, family disintegration and lower ability to monitor children, loneliness to mention just a few. Despite the growing literature on the impact of colonial male out-migration to women, little has been done to address the impact of the same on women potters and the traditional pottery industry in general.

Brief history of traditional pottery

The art of pottery is practiced all over the world. It was found to be a common sign in developed, developing and underdeveloped nations as well as in cities, towns and villages. The oldest known body of pottery comes from Dolní Věstonice in the modern-day Czech Republic dating to 29,000 – 25,000 BC while in the Jomon period in Japan pottery date back to c. 10500 to 400 BC. Chinese potters are known to have developed characteristic techniques of pottery production by about 5000 BC. By about this period too ancient

⁵ S.E. Majuk, P.O. Erim & Rev. J.O. Ajor (2010), *Bakor Women in Pottery Production in Colonial Southeastern Nigeria*, "Journal of International Social Research" 3(11), pp. 416–420.

Egyptians were also already practicing pottery. Excavations in the Middle East have revealed that primitive fired-clay vessels were made there more than 8,000 years ago. In Africa pottery is reported to date back to 10,000 BC⁶. Elisabeth Y. Ihugh argues that Nigeria provides evidence of the oldest of these practices in the continents. She continues to argue that the terracotta objects from the Nok civilization that developed in central Nigeria provide evidence of pottery practice by about 500 BC in the valleys of the Niger and Benue Rivers⁷. Although pottery use dates back to ancient times, its craft is still alive in many parts of the world, including Tanzania. The earliest reports on pottery production in Tanzania were recorded by explorers, missionaries and early European administrators and settlers who described various aspects of the craft in connection with the general observation of indigenous African ways of life. The origin of pottery among the Pare is traced back to the period of the Iron Age⁸. Archaeological studies indicate that pottery and iron making practiced in Upare date back to the first millennium AD⁹. However, pottery production is considered as one of the oldest crafts of humankind which has been carried on since the dawn of civilization whenever suitable clay existed. Consequently, it is a craft which has passed through a number of phases depending on the society and economic context in which it is manufactured¹⁰. In spite of the prevalence of this art tradition in

⁶ N. Barley (1994), *Smashing Pots. Feats of Clay from Africa*, London: British Museum, p. 9.

⁷ E.Y. Ihugh (2018), *Traditional Pottery Production among the Tiv people of Benue State from the Pre-colonial Era to 2000: the role of women*, "Research on Humanities and Social Sciences" 8(20), pp. 28–29.

⁸ K. Odner (1971), *Usangi Hospital and other Archaeological Sites in the North Pare Mountains Northeastern Tanzania*, "Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa" 6, p. 122.

⁹ R. Soper (1971), *Early Iron Age Pottery Type from East Africa: Comparative Analysis*, "Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa" 6, pp. 39–51.

¹⁰ S.H. Mteti (2015), *Engendering the History of Pottery Industry in Tanzania: Comparative Study on the Kisi and Pare, 1930–2000*, PhD Thesis submitted for

Tanzania, however, the pottery traditions do not seem to have been sufficiently researched to ascertain in the extent to which historical factors and changes have impacted its survival. This paper, therefore, attempts to examine the implication of colonial male out-migration to Pare women potters and traditional pottery production in Tanzania which was an aspect of economic development.

The concept of migration

Migration as the movement of people over defined space and time is a phenomenon that has been part of humans from creation. It has been argued that there were approximately 185 million trans-national migrants worldwide at the turning of the 21st century¹¹. It is more stated that by 2005 over 176 million people who were living in a country other than the country of their birth. According to the United Nations, in 2017 there were 258 million international migrants globally, an almost 70% increase compared to the year 1990. Of those, approximately 68 million were forcibly displaced persons, including over 25 million refugees and 3 million asylum seekers. Additionally, there were more than 40 million internally displaced people¹². The issue of the movement of people from one place or country to another country is not new. Archaeologists noted that migrations of people begun approximately 1million years ago when *Homo erectus* moved from Africa to other parts of the world. Again

the fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Philosophy, University of Dar es Salaam, p. 155.

¹¹ M. Suarez-Orozco & C. Suarez-Orozco (2005), *Globalisation: Immigration and Education : Recent United States trends*, in: M.S. Sorondo, E. Malinvand & P. Lena (eds.), *Globalisation and Education: Proceedings of Joint Working Group*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, p. 96.

¹² United Nations, *Migration*, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/migration/index.html> [accessed 15 May 2019].

Homo sapiens also migrated roughly around 300,000 years ago from Africa¹³. It is suggested that the anatomically modern humans again originated in Africa and colonized Asia and Europe roughly from 70,000 to around 50,000 years ago. During this time migration was facilitated with ecological balance, search for subsistence food, shelter and greater security.

According to Nicholas D. Kristoff migration was more prevalent in the 19th century than it is now. He continues to argue that labour is less mobile today than it was in the 19th century when 60 million Europeans moved to the Americas, Australia and elsewhere. Furthermore, it was noted that rapid globalisation in the last 30 decades has resulted in increased volumes and complexity of movement between countries and regions¹⁴. W. John Morgan, Amanda Sives and Simon Appleton added that globalisation facilitated the migration of high skilled labour forces including health and education professionals. According to them, migration is therefore an old global phenomenon that has influenced and continues to influence the development of all nations¹⁵. Marcel Suarez-Orozco and Carola Suarez-Orozco also have considered globalisation as the backdrop for understanding migration and particularly labour migration which was a feature of colonialism¹⁶. In this case, Farhad Nezhad Haj Ali Irani and Mohammad Reza Neruzi define globalisation as a process by which different economies and societies become more closely integrated. They continue to argue that through globalization different regional economies are incorporated into one system and free

¹³ K. Harvati et al. (2019), *Apidima Cave fossils provide earliest evidence of Homo sapiens in Eurasia*, "Nature" 571 (7766), pp. 500–504.

¹⁴ R. Kock (2006), *Education and training in a globalised world society: Conforming-Resistance-Ego Boosting*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, p. 30.

¹⁵ W.J. Morgan, A. Sives & S. Appleton (2005), *Managing international recruitment of health workers and teachers: Do Commonwealth agreements provide the answer?*, "The Round Table" 94 (379), p. 227.

¹⁶ M. Suarez-Orozco & C. Suarez-Orozco (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 96.

movement of researches including labour¹⁷. For Penina Mlama, globalization can be perceived as increasing interdependence of economic, social and political activities across national boundaries. This implies that through globalization the world becomes smaller and closer links between countries and regions¹⁸. Globalization is connected with migration as labour tends to follow trans-national capital flows which are a major characteristic of globalization and this stimulates migration; availability and affordability of mass transportation; availability of foreign workers among others. It was through globalization that colonialism was established in Africa¹⁹.

Mohamed A. El-Khawas argues that migration is a global phenomenon caused not only by economic factors but also social, political, cultural, environmental, health, education and transportation. It commonly takes place because of the push factors of fewer opportunities in the socio-economic situation and also because of the pull factors that exist in more developed areas. In Africa, for example, push factors such as economic conditions such as low wages, high level of unemployment, rural underdevelopment, poverty and lack of opportunity fuel out-migration²⁰.

In Tanzania, studies to examine the implication of colonial male out-migration to women potters and pottery industry have not been conducted thus far. Most of the studies in the country focus on the impact, causes and patterns of migration. Kathleen Beegle, Joachim De Weerd and Stefan Dercon conducted research in the Kagera

¹⁷ F.N.H.A. Irani & M.R. Neruzi (2011), *Globalisation and Challenges: What are the globalization's Contemporary issues?*, "International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences" 1(6), p. 216.

¹⁸ P. Mlama (2002), *Local perspectives on globalisation: The cultural domain*, in: E. Jansen, J. Mwapachu & J. Semboja (eds.) *Local perspectives on globalisation: The African case*, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota. p. 120.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 121.

²⁰ M.A. El-Khawas (2004), *Brain drain: putting Africa between a rock and a hard place*, "Mediterranean Quarterly" Fall, pp. 38–40.

region of Tanzania in order to describe the patterns of migration. They focused on several aspects of migration including who migrates, why people move, household characteristics associated with individual moves, and, finally, the implications of this mobility on economic outcomes. They find that tracking individuals outside their villages are crucially important for assessing welfare changes²¹. Milline J. Mbonile and Hellen A. Lihawa conducted studies of rural-urban female migration in Tanzania for the case of the Dar es Salaam city to determine the causes of migration. The study noted that female migration from rural to urban was due to uneven distribution of resources in various regions of Tanzania²². Athumani J. Liviga and Rugatiri D. K. Mekacha's study on the youth and poverty alleviation for petty traders in the Dar es Salaam city realized that the decision to migrate is not voluntary but influenced by problems experienced at home. Furthermore, the study indicates that rural-urban youth migration has a negative impact on both out-migration and the in-migration areas²³.

Migration and pottery production during pre-colonial Africa

Africa is central to human history. It is the continent where our species arose, where some of the greatest ancient civilizations thrive,

²¹ K. Beegle, J. de Weerd & S. Dercon (2011), *Migration and economic mobility in Tanzania: Evidence from a tracking survey*, "Review of Economics and Statistics" 93(3), pp. 1010–1033.

²² M.J. Mbonile & H.A. Lihawa (1996), *Rural-Urban Female Migration in Tanzania: A Case of Dar es Salaam City*, UTAFITI New Series Paper, 13(2), pp. 169–184.

²³ A.J. Liviga & R.D.K. Mekacha (1998), *Youth Migration and Poverty Alleviation. A Case of Petty Traders (Wamachinga) in Dar Es Salaam*, Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam.

and where dynamic, complex, and innovative cultures confronted a variety of social, political, and environmental challenges. People in pre-colonial Africa were engaged in various economic activities including hunting and gathering, agriculture, mining and simple manufacturing. Men were in charge of agricultural, deciding when and what to plant, directing the work process and taking part in all work activities in the field. Women, on the other hand, participated in the most labour intensive agricultural tasks including weeding, harvesting and threshing and helped with the planting. Women were also in charge of the livestock, all food processing and production tasks along with wood gathering, hauling water, washing clothes and child and sick care. Despite these socio-economic responsibilities, pre-colonial societies had other forms of economies for survival. These included pottery production, iron smelting and smithing, basketry, weaving, to mention a few. These economic activities had gender division of labour especially iron technology was men's task while pottery production was an exclusively female task. This was supported by Oliver P. Gosselain argues that since its inception pottery was distinctly a female art and men were rigidly excluded from pottery and clay pits, and it was believed that men who tried their hand to pottery or showed up at the clay pits would immediately lose their sexual potency²⁴. Similarly, Shakila Halifan Mteti research among the Kisi and Pare noted that since time immemorial, women were consistently making substantial contributions to the development of pottery production in the two communities²⁵. Despite this, pottery has passed through a number of phases depending on the society and economic context in which it is manufactured. In some societies especially among the Pare, pottery production has been reported as a secondary role in which pots were produced for domestic use while

²⁴ O.P. Gosselain (2000), *Materializing Identities: An African Perspective*, "Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory" 7(3), pp. 187–217.

²⁵ S.H. Mteti, op. cit., p. 155.

few were exchanged with food or money²⁶. The exchange of goods or services through a market system dominated the pre-colonial period and has a long history among the Pare. Reviewing the African trade with pots, Nigel Barley noted that a widespread markets convention shows that the price of a pot was the grain that it contains²⁷. Isaria N. Kimambo and Kashingo B. Omari pointed out that precolonial Pare predominantly a subsistence economy with the bulk of local trade commodities consisting of foodstuffs, iron implements, pots and baskets and much later in the 19th century, slaves. It was noted that there was a relationship between agricultural and crafts which encouraged the creation of a regional market apparently held every week or every month²⁸. While describing the dominant trade structures, I. N. Kimambo and K. B. Omari identified a widely spread gender-specific approach to trading with pottery being dominated by women and children who accompanied and assisted their mother²⁹.

The economic activities during the pre-colonial period allowed migration and interaction of people. H. W. Okoth-Ogendo argues that in the pre-colonial era, population movements in Africa were associated largely with the prevailing socio-political and ecological conditions especially warfare, natural calamities and search for farmland or colonisation³⁰. For example, the discovery and production of iron also facilitated the interaction of people as they traveled long distances and across societies looking for iron tools. Population increase also forced people to move to new fertile land for farming purposes. The Pare of northeastern Tanzania, for example, moved from the

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 15.

²⁷ N. Barley, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁸ I.N. Kimambo (1991), op. cit., p. 27.

²⁹ I.N. Kimambo (1991), op. cit., p. 27; K.B. Omari (1975), *Pottery Production and Marketing 1936–1975: Usangi Pare Case Study*, M.A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, pp. 60–61.

³⁰ H.W. Okoth-Ogendo (1989), *The effect of Migration on family structures in Sub Saharan Africa*, "International Migration" 27(2), p. 309.

hills to the low land in order to produce maize and cotton³¹. Another example is the Ngoni whose arrival from the south was perhaps the most important movement of the 19th century. The Ngoni trained from many conflicts with other people in present-day South Africa, made their way up to Lake Nyasa and further north almost reaching Lake Victoria and establishing themselves over a large area of southern and central Tanganyika. Their high level of military organization gave the Ngoni a strong political influence over the area, as they were also the main fighters in the famous Maji – Maji revolt against the German occupation³². In West Africa, it has been noted that in Nigeria there were both international and internal migration during the pre-colonial period. These migrations were facilitated by the movements of indigenes who were involved or victims of slave-raiding and slave trading, inter-ethnic conflicts and warfare. Also, legitimate trading, nomadic herding of livestock, and pilgrimage to religious places in the Arabian Peninsula, brought about diverse human mobility and migration within and across borders of existing empires and kingdoms³³.

Pre-colonial Africa also experienced immigrants from Asia and Europe who come in large numbers and settled along the coast of Africa particularly along the coast of East Africa. In the first millennium, they settled in Zanzibar, Kilwa and Mafia. By the early 16th century, the Portuguese moved in and seized control over a number of the trade along the coast. The trade with Arabs and Portuguese was run by people living far from the coast, like the Yao near Lake Nyasa. By the 19th-century, Arab trade caravans began their regular traffic to the interior of Tanganyika. Later Arabs established trade routes along Ruvuma River to the Lake Nyasa. Another was central routes via

³¹ I.N. Kimambo (1969), *op. cit.*, pp. 14–16.

³² T.J. Thompson (1981), *The Origins, Migration and Settlement of the Northern Ngoni*, “The Society of Malawi Journal” 34(1), p. 7.

³³ A.A. Afolayan (2000), *Trans-border Movement and Trading: A Case Study of a Border land in Southwestern Nigeria*, “Trans-border Studies” 13, pp. 33–48.

Ugogo to Nyamwezi where Arabs established a settlement in Tabora. This route extended as far as Lake Tanganyika and settled in Ujiji. Another route was established by the coastal people themselves along the northern borders of Tanganyika through the Pangani valley in the direction of Kilimanjaro and beyond. The Arabs selected few areas along the trade routes and established trade centers. Usangi among the Pare became one of those centers and it is argued that men who engaged in pottery trade in Usangi during the early period of colonialism included those who became interested in the trade ran by Indian traders in Usangi who started by assisting Indians in selling goods on behalf of Indians³⁴.

Survival of pottery industry during colonialism

Centuries prior to colonialism, Tanzania (by then Tanganyika) had been a colony of Portugal in the 15th century, up until the 17th century when the Sultan of Oman took power. Thereafter, Germany added Tanganyika to its colony list in the late 1800s up to the First World War, after which Britain administered the land under a League of Nations Charter. Nevertheless, December 9th, 1961 is when Tanganyika gained independence from British Colonial Rule. Colonialism is the direct and overall domination of one country by another on the basis of state power³⁵. When we talk about colonialism in Africa we are talking about a phenomenon which took place between the 1800 and 1960s. The main objectives of colonialism included but were not limited to political domination and exploitation of the colonized country. It is suggested that the Portuguese movement to Africa was the desire for Guinea gold and the search of spices. Other

³⁴ I.N. Kimambo (1969), op. cit.; K.B. Omari (1975), op. cit.

³⁵ S.K. Sanderson (2005), *World-Systems Analysis after Thirty Years: Should it Rest in Peace?*, "International Journal of Comparative Sociology" June, p. 186.

scholars suggest that it was the European thirst for adventure in the name of searching for knowledge. Ali Mazrui came up with three broad objectives for the European colonization of Africa. These include gathering knowledge about the unknown continent as they considered Africa as a Dark Continent. So European traveled, observed and recorded what they saw in this Dark Continent. The second objective was to spread Christianity and this helped the European to explore more about Africans and their culture. Third was based on imperialism³⁶. Heather J. Sharkey supports the Mazrui's third objective by arguing that when one talks about colonization in Africa is talking about the phenomenon which took place between 1800 and the 1960s³⁷. Colonialism began as a result of changes in the mode of production in Europe, for example, the emergence of the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution ushered in a new process of production in place of the earlier slave-based economy. The spread of industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to the colonisation of most of the world by the European countries. The notable colonial powers were Italy, Greece, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Denmark whose combined empire covered the whole of North, Central and South America, Africa, Australia, Indonesia and India Sub-continent. In Africa, territories were grouped into different categories: there were colonies that were sources of minerals; colonies for plantation crops; colonies for European settlement and colonies for peasant plantation. Tanganyika was a colony for both plantation and peasant production.

The period after 1910 colonialism became essentially one of consolidation and exploitation. By 1914 whole of Africa was put

³⁶ S. Adem (2014), *Ali A. Mazrui, the Postcolonial Theorist*, "African Studies Review" 57(1), pp. 135–152.

³⁷ H.J. Sharkey (2013), *African Colonial States*, in: J. Parker & R. Reid (eds.), *The Handbook of Modern Africa History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151–170.

under colonial powers³⁸. It is quite clear that most African societies were not read to be colonised so they fought fiercely and bravely to retain control over their countries and societies against European imperialist designs and military invasions. Albert Abu Boahen argues that colonial rule and African initiatives and reactions should be divided into three eras. The first era was from 1880-1919 which marked the period of conquest and occupation which can be termed as the era of the defense of African sovereignty and independence using the strategy of confrontation or alliance or temporary submission. This means European completed the partition on paper and effective partition on the ground and occupation of the conquered area, which signifies the introduction of various administrative measures and infrastructure of roads, railways and the telegraphs for communication purposes. The second era was from 1919 to 1935. This was the era when Africans reacted in terms of resistance or as many historians prefer to call protest³⁹. But the African societies eventually lost out. This was partly for political and technological reasons. The 19th century was a period of profound and even revolutionary changes in the political geography of Africa, characterized by the demise of old African kingdoms and empires and their reconfiguration into different political entities. They were, therefore, unable to put up effective resistance against the European invaders. The technological factor was expressed in the radical disparity between the technologies of warfare deployed by the contending European and African forces⁴⁰. African forces in general, fought with bows, arrows, spears, swords, old rifles, and cavalries; the European forces, beneficiaries of the

³⁸ A. Adu Boahen (1985), *Africa and the colonial challenges*, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 1–18.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ T.O. Ranger (1969), *African reactions to the imposition of colonial rule in East and Central Africa*, in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870–1914*, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 293–332.

technical fruits of the Industrial Revolution, fought with more deadly firearms, machine guns, new rifles, and artillery guns⁴¹. Thus indirect encounters, European forces often won the day. But as the length of some resistance struggles amply demonstrates, Africans put up the best resistance with the resources they had. By 1900 much of Africa had been colonized by seven European powers – Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy. After the conquest of African decentralized and centralized states, the European powers set about establishing colonial state systems. The colonial state was the machinery of administrative domination established to facilitate effective control and exploitation of the colonised societies. In so Africans were integrated into the colonial economy.

The integration of African into the colonial economy led to change in production relation in which people were forced to work independently instead of communal activities existed earlier. The colonial rule had a profound impact on the lives of the people found in the territories occupied by the colonialists. The main change in the economic sphere was the reorganization of the economy into the cash economy and of a capitalist nature. As a principle of prospering market, colonialists focused on economic innovation and growth orientation. This led to the destruction of local crafts in Africa, Tanzania and particularly Upare. The iron technology which was the heart of Pare wealth started to decline during the early years of colonialism. The decline was associated with many factors including competition from mass-produced European iron implements at the beginning of the 20th century. Helge Kjekshus observed the importation of manufactured goods which were sold cheaper than the local ones contributed to the killing of indigenous technology. Despite the fact that in some places (such as Ufipa) local iron was regarded to be of a superior quality, yet by the 1930s it had failed to compete with

⁴¹ G.N. Uzoigwe (1985), *European Partition and Conquest of Africa: An Overview*, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 38–39.

imported ones as local iron hoes cost 4/= against 2/= for imported variety⁴². Isaria N. Kimambo notes that German and British colonial rules transformed both socio-economic and political systems among the Pare. They introduced a system, which unlike the pre-colonial system, had no interest in developing indigenous technologies. The Colonial Government showed little interest in the pottery industry while other indigenous technologies like iron technology were left to die⁴³.

I. N. Kimambo further notes that the disruption of indigenous technologies was done through the imposition of colonial taxation and the establishment of plantations which drew the able-bodied from their villages to work on plantations⁴⁴. Colonialists destructed traditional economic activities through the introduction of cash crops and taxation which reshaped and reoriented a variety of the pre-capitalist system of production and social organization. Traditionally, African men did the heavy labour of felling trees, clearing land, building houses apart from conducting warfare and hunting. They also engaged in craft production including iron smelting and smithing. They abandoned their activities and searched of wage labour or production for export in order to earn the needed cash with which they could pay tax⁴⁵. This is because in sub Saharan Africa prior to colonialism had weaknesses of system of exchange because of lack of money. Therefore, colonialists established cultivation of cash crops for market and particularly the introduction of money forms. Men had to work on the colonial established plantations to get money for

⁴² H. Kjekshus (1995), *Ecological Control and Economic Development in East Africa History: the Case of Tanganyika, 1850-1950*, London: James Curry, p. 89.

⁴³ J. Koponen (1994), *Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, Helsinki: Finish Historical Society.

⁴⁴ I.N. Kimambo(1991), op. cit.

⁴⁵ M.L. Swantz (1985), *Women in Development: a Creative Role Denied – The Case of Tanzania*, London: C. Hurst and Company – New York: St. Martin Press, p. 4.

paying tax. Women remained behind saddled with every necessary for the survival of themselves, their children and even the men as far as food stuffs were concerned⁴⁶. However, women's economic activities did not suffer undue disruptions as they were not required to pay tax so they were not encouraged on out migration.

While iron technology left to die due to harsh colonial environment, pottery industry exhibited considerable growth. Pottery industry did not face the harsh colonial economic environment instead it exhibited considerable growth. Several factors were in favour of pottery industry during colonialism including, first, clay the major raw material for pottery production did not make the list of export items to Europe. Simon E. Majuk et al argue that one reason why some indigenous industries like textile and leather work in Nigeria was that local manufacturers were starved of essential raw materials which were rather exported to feed the industries in the colonial metropole. In contrast to textile and leather, pottery production continued as it was not hampered⁴⁷. Second, the colonial economic policies smothered local industries with colonial manufactured goods such as aluminium pots and pans as well as enamel basin. Africans in general and Tanzanian markets in particular flooded with imported utensils. Shakila H. Mteti observes that there was no perfect imported substitute for clay pots. In this case, pottery industry continued to flourish as locally made pots had an edge over the imported varieties in some respects⁴⁸. Take the storage of water as an example, S. E. Majuk *et al* for water stored clay pots became cooler for a long time and the longer the water stay in the pot, the cooler it became. Also clay pots retained the hotness of the food that was not consumed immediately for several hours. In addition, it was and still is believed that food cooked on clay pots has palatable taste compared to food cooked in

⁴⁶ W. Rodney (1972), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle – L'Ouverture Publication, p. 248.

⁴⁷ S.E. Majuk, P.O. Erim & Rev. J.O. Ajour (2010), *op. cit.*, pp. 419–420.

⁴⁸ S.H. Mteti (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 72.

aluminium pots⁴⁹. S. E. Majuk et al add cultural events contributed to the resilience of pottery industry during colonial period. They argue that the Igbo of Nigeria celebrate many cultural events which it was mandatory for food and drinks to be served in traditional utensils. For instance, during those cultural events palm wine had to be served in clay pots. Even if the wine was brought in an imported container, it had to be poured into a clay pot meant for the occasion. They continue argue that apart from the use of pots during ceremonies and festivals, clay bowl and pots used in numerous religious rituals⁵⁰. Similar observation was made by S. H. Mteti and I. N. Kimambo in their studies among the Kisi and Pare of southwest and northeast of Tanzania where pots were used to carry local bears mean to be sent to bride during marriage ceremony⁵¹. Lastly, pottery survived the hash colonial economic environment as it was the work of women who were not actively encourages paying tax and outing migration.

Furthermore, the introduction of colonial formal education in Tanganyika also facilitated the existence and expansion of pottery industry among the Pare and other potting communities in Tanzania and Africa at large. Marjorie Mbilinyi and Patricia Mbughuni state that the colonial government introduced formal education, which operated in four years of primary school, followed by a further four years of middle school. Those who were successful at that level were selected for secondary education. The majority of the people of Tanganyika fell under the first four years of primary school due to the scarcity of schools. Women faced a worse situation because the colonial system did not favour them. This is evidenced by the fact that during the period of German rule there were no girls' schools and during British trusteeship, the few girls' schools were opened

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pp. 72–73.

⁵⁰ S.E. Majuk, P.O. Erim & Rev. J.O. Ajor (2010), op. cit., p. 420.

⁵¹ S.H. Mteti (2015), op. cit., p. 126; I.N. Kimambo (1969), op. cit.

focused on domestic science and home craft⁵². A tiny proportion of girls were trained as nurses, midwives and primary school teachers. In such circumstances, Pare women joined potting as it did not require any formal education.

It is also noted expansion and consolidation in the pottery industry from the 1930s onwards. This might have been contributed by the intensification of the colonial economy by the colonial government in Tanganyika and other places of Africa, in order to counteract the effects of the economic depression of 1929-1933 and the Second World War of 1939-1945. The intensification of the colonial economy gradually integrated Tanganyika and other parts of Africa deeply into the world capitalist economic system. Peasants were forced to grow both food and cash crops with the hope of increasing commodity outputs. Rules and regulations were imposed to promote and improve agricultural production⁵³. The intensification of the colonial cash economy encouraged the establishment of a transportation system designed to facilitate the exportation of minerals and agricultural products and the importation of consumer goods, equipment, spare parts, and materials for the plantations and mines⁵⁴. Roads and routes were established to transport goods to various places. In turn, these roads facilitated the growth of the pottery industry as they reduced the long head portage of pots⁵⁵. Also, development in the transportation system introduced middlemen who bought pots from potters and resold them in distant markets. The years between 1930 and 1960 marked a major socio-economic transformation including the intensification of the colonial economy in various parts of Africa. Intensification of the colonial economy aimed at combating economic

⁵² M. Mbilinyi & P. Mbughuni (eds.) (1991), *Education in Tanzania with a gender Perspective*, Unpublished Report for CIDA, Dar es Salaam.

⁵³ N.N. Luanda (1992), *Rural Development in Colonial Tanganyika: An Overview*, "Tanzania Zamani: A Journal of Historical Research and Writing" 1(2), p. 15.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ K.B. Omari, op. cit.

and political crises caused by the impact of the Great Depression and the Second World War. These together continued to affect the Tanganyikan economy for a long time. The changes also affected the pottery industry as it adapted itself to modern needs, and sustained itself under the pattern of the colonial economy⁵⁶.

Colonialism, male out migration and pare women potters

The general economic motives of colonisation were the acquisition of raw material for economic development in the colonial countries and it brought a cash economy with it. Colonies including Tanganyika became suppliers of raw materials like mineral and agricultural commodities and buyers of processed manufactured goods. The economic structure that was established by the colonial power had many and far-reaching impacts on pre-colonial African people. In the 19th century, Africa faced European imperialist aggression, diplomatic pressures, military invasions, and eventual conquest and colonization. At the same time, African societies put up various forms of resistance against the attempt to colonize their countries and impose foreign domination. By the early 20th century, however, much of Africa, except Ethiopia and Liberia, had been colonized by European powers⁵⁷.

Colonial changed the gender relation among the Tanzanians as a new economy protested the inequalities and colonial state turned them into conflict-ridden labour. The economy of the Pare and Tanzania general, for a long time, based much on agricultural product. During the pre-colonial period, African people had their own economic

⁵⁶ N.N. Luanda (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁵⁷ I.J. Samuel-Mbaekwe (1986), *Colonialism and social structure*, "Transafrican Journal of History" 5, pp. 81–95.

system where they used to cultivate food crops. They had a communal way of life where they used to share whatever they obtained from their farms. The long-distance trade route developed in northeastern of Tanzania affected the living style of the Pare people. A good example was the coastal trade route which passed through Upare to Kilimanjaro and Masai areas. In 1860 the caravan routes were in contact with Pare and established several camping stations in Pare and Pare became major suppliers of food to the caravan exchanged with other imported goods⁵⁸. In the same year, the Swahili and Arabs were much interested in slaves. It was during this time when the capturing of abled people started and caused Pare people to live in the state of fear of the situation which affected farming activities⁵⁹. In 1890, German established its colony in Pare which affected completely the lineage production system. I. N. Kimambo notes that in Upare the process had various stages which led to the intensive exploitation of Pare labour for capitalist production as between 1891 and 1898 there was occasional recruitment for forced labour and imposition of hut tax. This had impacts as most of the Pare people were looking for a way of earning money for paying taxes. They had to sell agricultural products including maize and rice and livestock, selling their labour force or grow cash crops⁶⁰.

Terence O. Ranger argues that after the establishment of colonial rule in East Africa, colonial power set out to transform the region politically as well as economically. One of the economic activities was to build railway lines in Tanganyika to the Usambara and Kilimanjaro area and in Kenya to link the coast with the Lake Victoria basin⁶¹. The railway helped the immigration of European settlers who aimed to orient East African economies towards export by making

⁵⁸ I.N. Kimambo (1991), op. cit., p. 27.

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ T.O. Ranger (1985), *African initiatives and the Resistance in the face of partition and conquest*, in: A. Adu Boahen (ed.), *General History of Africa*, vol. 7,

the area dependent on economic arrangements in Europe. By 1905, there were 284 white settlers in Tanganyika mainly the Usambara and Kilimanjaro areas. In Tanganyika, Africans were encouraged to take up peasant production of cash crops basically cotton and coffee. Europeans also introduced collective farms for cotton in Tanganyika in 1908. Africans were producing two-third of Tanganyika cotton exports. By 1912, the African coffee production around the Kilimanjaro area had caught up with that of the settlers. The production of coffee led to the employment of wage labour that included the able-bodied male population⁶². By 1914 the organization and utilization of labour in Tanganyika had been redirected towards the creation of surplus which was expropriated by the colonial state and European commerce⁶³.

From 1895 to 1905, the colonial economy changed from trade-based economy to plantation and settler agriculture. At this time East Africa was seen as suitable for plantation agriculture due to the clove plantation in Zanzibar, sugar and coconut plantation which were developed in Dar es Salaam, Lindi, Bagamoyo, Pangani and Tanga. Under plantation agriculture German started by the establishment of German companies such as the German East Africa plantation economy. The companies led to the establishment of plantations to include coffee, tobacco, cotton and rubber plantations established in Usambara, Dar es Salaam and around Lindi. In this case, the German colonial invasion created land scarcity in some of the fertile areas of Tanganyika which were also generously with rainfall where land was alienated for plantation agriculture. For instance, enormous areas of virgin lands were alienated from Usambara which together with

Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, London: James Currey Publishers, pp. 45–62.

⁶² H.A. Mwanzi (1985), African initiatives and resistance in East Africa, 1880–1914, in: A. Adu Boahen (ed.), *General History of Africa*, vol. 7, *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935*, London: James Currey Publishers, vol. 7, London: James Currey Publishers, pp. 153–154.

⁶³ *Ibidem*.

Bonde comprised the centre of plantation agriculture alone, 110 square kilometers of land was alienated from the local land. With the building of the Tanga railway from the town of Tanga which arrive in Korogwe in 1902 and which was eventually be pushed to the town of Moshi on the slope of Mountain Kilimanjaro most of the land along the route was alienated for the sisal plantation industry.

Transport and communication networks were also vital for the development of the colonial economy in Tanganyika. Railways, roads, and ports were constructed to facilitate effective exploitation of agricultural products, natural commodities and human labour. Most of the transportation infrastructure linked the interior to the coast, and production areas to labour-supplying zones. In 1905 there was the construction of the railway which was passed through Upare to Arusha. There was the demand for food to feed workers. This stimulated Indian traders to establish shops on the old caravan route and new railway station. Later the commercial extended beyond the railway stations as in the same year Indian traders established shops in Usangi. This facilitated the buying of grains from local producers while making imported commodities available to the peasant. The majority of Pare then concentrated on cultivating food crops for sale⁶⁴. There was also the railway from Tanga to Maasai which passed through Pare area. The railway construction required labour whose recruitment was not voluntary. Pare people were recruited to work on the railway when it passes through the plain. This railway encouraged the establishment of sisal plantations which also created opportunities for wage employment among the Pare and their neighbours. By 1920, the need for cash forced young Pare men to seek wage labour in the plantations. There was also the establishment of cotton plantations at Himo and Kileo although it failed. As an alternative, therefore the colonial state established coffee plantations in both North and South

⁶⁴ I.N. Kimambo (1991), *op. cit.*

Pare after its success in Moshi. The Pare became the producers of food crops and coffee as well as suppliers of labour⁶⁵.

During the First World War, North Pare became the backdrop for a major scene in East Africa as Germany controlled Kilimanjaro as far as Mozambique. The war-affected both men and women in Usangi directly. It was noted that in 1915 two German companies camped at Nyata in the lowlands, south of Usangi⁶⁶. The purpose of these companies was to defend the northern railways in German East Africa and to harass Uganda railway in Kenya. In the same year, the companies ran a shortage of food and building materials so they had to collect them from Usangi. Therefore, women from Usangi had to carry food and building materials from highland to the lowland also to maintain their pottery production. Young men from Usangi were taken to work for German as porters and servants in the lowland. During this time Usangi was left with a severe labour shortage as many of them were taken to work outside Usangi.

During 1918, the British period and the end of the First World War, Usangi was faced with high political and economic uncertainty. Most Indian shops which were established earlier started to lose their stability and most of them remained bare shelves. From 1918 to 1920, Usangi faced a famine which was caused by the First World War and drought. Young men had to travel to Taveta in Kenya and brought food and sold in Usangi⁶⁷. In 1929, there was another famine which was caused by the outbreak of locust. Many young became labour migrants to avoid locust control work. Between 1933 and 1934, another famine broke it was caused by drought and the outbreak of locus.

However, the economic crisis of 1930–1933 also affected most people controlled by peripheral economy including agricultural

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ D.F. Bryceson & M. Mbilinyi (1979), *The Changing Role of Tanzanian Women in Production*, “Jipemoyo” 2, pp. 85–116.

products such as sisal and coffee, as well as pastoralism, by precipitating the fall in prices of cash crops and animal products. Food crops disappeared in the markets⁶⁸. Sisal production, for example, ceased expanding, hence reducing production and the labour force drastically. Following this, the colonial government introduced Grow More Crops Campaign in order to get Africans to expand the area of production and to increase output, the cash crops were expanded side by side with plantation farming⁶⁹. The depression was followed by the Second World War of 1939 and 1945 which affected the agricultural production and flow of manufactured goods⁷⁰. Although the war marked the stagnation of other economic activities such as agricultural production, the pottery industry continued to flourish. This was observed when in 1943 the colonial state was forced to establish various handcraft industries. Among these, was the Amani Pottery Industry which was established in Tanga. The industry aimed at producing quality products that could be used by colonial masters in the area⁷¹. Men were taken to Tanga and trained on how to make pots using potter wheels. This is because of the patriarchal system established by the colonial system which allowed only men to look for opportunities. Though not intended to benefit natives, it exposed native potters to new pottery designs such as cups and saucers which were added to native's repertoires. Despite the crisis, the pottery industry continued to expand as more women went into potting; middlemen bought pots from them and resold them at distant markets⁷². The introduction of peasant agriculture went hand in hand with the development of the

⁶⁸ W. Rodney (1980), *The Political Economy of Tanganyika, 1890–1930*, in: M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), *Tanzania under Colonial Rule*, London: Longman, p. 150.

⁶⁹ A. Colson (1982), *Tanzania a Political Economy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 48.

⁷⁰ B.D. Bowles (1980), *The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1939–1961*, in: M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), *Tanzania under Colonial Rule*, London: Longman.

⁷¹ K.B. Omari (1975), *op. cit.*

⁷² *Ibidem.*

infrastructure in order to connect production and marketing areas⁷³. Subsequently, the development of the infrastructure facilitated the expansion of the pottery industry. This was the case among the Pare where various roads and routes were developed. It was noted that before the completion of the road from Usangi to Mwangi, Pare men from Usangi used to walk with head-loads of pots and other goods to Himo where they sold their pots for cash.

Conclusion

Pre-colonial Tanzanian and African people in general had their form of production and gender relation. The system witnessed sudden changes shortly after the coming of the white in the late 19th century and early 20th century which led to the breaking of the traditional socio-economic structure. It was during this time when some of the crafts especially ironworking in Tanzania and, particularly among the Pare, started to decline despite the high demand placed on it. The decline of iron facilitated the growth of pottery production which retained market previously used for exchange iron and added more markets. Despite the expansion, Tanzania and Africa in general, became the markets of colonial manufactured goods. This did not bring a threat to the pottery industry due to the significance placed to the earthen pots. Also, it was noted that money circulation during the early period of colonialism was minimal hence the majority of people continued with the exchange system or depended on the cheap earthen pot. However, due to the establishment of plantations facilitated the movement of people seeking for employment hence the development of pottery production. The colonial rule created semi-permanent and reshaped social relation in Usangi whereby young men left Usangi to seek work in Tanga, Moshi and Arusha. The outgoing

⁷³ N.N. Luanda (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 15.

caused the women and daughters to work hard to make up for the labour shortage. The outmigration of Pare male wove the strands of Pare women's dependency on men into a cord that bound them to fewer men and more work. The changes in women's production were most pronounced in crafts and agriculture. According to Nancy Dorsey⁷⁴ men out-migration has provided women with opportunities to organize and participate in income generation activities. This was supported by Jean O'Barr who noted that during this time women had more freedom to participate in public affairs because of the intensity of male outmigration. She also pointed to women's self-help groups, which were a common feature of pre-colonial and colonial agriculture⁷⁵. These groups were formed on an *ad hoc* to provide adequate labour for productive activities in which potters assisted each other in clay transportation, pot making, firing and marketing. Dorrit R. Posel noted that male out-migration led to the decrease of agricultural production or abandoned due to a lack of male labour supply. On the other hand, crop production might increase as remittances are invested in agricultural technology which makes up for the lack of male labour supply. Alternatively, remittances may be invested in cattle rather than crops which leads to the conversion of cropland and/ or forest to pasture. In other cases, women might take on the agricultural task which resulting in the feminization of agriculture⁷⁶. Therefore, male out-migration increases women potters' burden and difficulties of basic survival. This is because they were responsible

⁷⁴ N. Dorsey (1994), *Pare Women and the Mbiru Tax Protest in Tanzania, 1943–1947: A Study of Women, Politics and Development*, PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, pp. 294–295.

⁷⁵ J. O'Barr (1971), *Ten – House Party Cell and their Leaders: Micropolitics in Pare District, Tanzania*, PhD Dissertation, Northwestern University.

⁷⁶ D.R. Posel (2001), *Women wait, men migrate: gender inequality and migration decision in South Africa*, in: P. Webb & K. Weinberger (eds.), *Women Farmers: Enhancing Rights Recognition and Productivity*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 91–117.

for both their own and their husband's duties, tasks and roles. This increased stress and strains to women potters due to increased management responsibilities. However, sometimes, male out-migration led to divorce, family disintegration and lower ability to monitor children, loneliness to mention just a few.

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**Colonial Male Outmigration and its Implication
to Women Potters and Traditional Pottery Industry in Tanzania:
A Reflection from Pare Pottery Producing Communities**

Abstract

Colonialism took place between 1800 and 1960s. It began as a result of changes in the mode of production in Europe with the emergence of industrial revolution. During colonialism Africa and Tanganyika in particular was divided into magnetic and periphery zones. Magnetic zones included areas with plantations, factories and mining. In due regard, people from periphery were taken to work in the plantations, factories and mining to get money for paying tax. This is because colonial government introduced cash crop plantations including coffee, cotton, sisal and tobacco, which forced men to go out to work in them so that they could pay tax which was introduced by colonial government. Male out migration increases women’s burden and difficulties of basic survival. Women were responsible for both their own and their husband’s duties,

tasks and roles. This increased stress and strains to women due to increased management responsibilities. However, women could benefit economically through remittances but it was too little to substantially change the economic status of family. Moreover, male out migration could lead to divorce, family disintegration and lower ability to monitor children, loneliness to mention just few. Using oral and written sources, this paper intends to show the situation faced by women potters and pottery industry in general when their husbands were away working on colonial plantations. The paper noted that pottery industry is among the industry which survived harsh condition during colonialism and generated income which sustained the families. It is further noted that women potters had triple responsibilities as they had to work on their usual responsibilities, their husband's responsibilities and engaged more in pottery production so as to earn living.

Key words: male out-migration, colonialism, women potters, Pare pottery producing community

Chapter 9.

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THE INFLUENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION ON RURAL URBAN LINKAGES IN TANZANIA

Introduction

Entrepreneurship is the attempt to create value through recognition of business opportunity, the management of risk-taking, and through the communicative and management skills to mobilize human, financial, and material resources necessary to bring a project to fruition. Is the capacity and willingness to develop, organize and manage a business venture along with any of its risks in order to make a profit¹. Entrepreneurs have always played a central role in the development of nation-states. The most economically prosperous nations in the world have strong, innovative and competitive business enterprises and entrepreneurs as the bedrock of their economic development and prosperity². The African continent has the highest

¹ N. Bosma & V. Schutjens (2011), *Understanding regional variation in entrepreneurial activity and entrepreneurial attitude in Europe*, "The Annals of Regional Science" 47(3), pp. 711–742.

² A.L. Zacharis, W.D. Bygrave & D.A. Shepherd (2000), *Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: National Entrepreneurship Assessment*, Kansas City: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.

share in the world of individuals starting or running new businesses, but often in sectors where productivity remains low³. One of the most exciting dimensions of Tanzania's transition and development of the past two decades has been its opening and diversification of economic interaction with other African countries⁴. Small Business Entrepreneurship has been seen as a hub in generating income for the majority of urban dwellers with no formal paid employment. Small enterprises are often seen as the backbone of economic development. In Tanzania, entry into small business entrepreneurship is usually not seen as a problem. One can start a small business at any time and in any place⁵. Entrepreneurs created rural–urban linkages might have the potential to decrease spatial disparities through their ability to create economic opportunities in rural areas.

Priya Deshingkar, stated that urban and rural areas are connected through a variety of flows, which may be economic, political, social, informational, etc.⁶ Increasingly rural-urban linkages have gained policy attention because they are seen to help rural areas diversify their economies and ensure urban areas access to critical resources. Such rural–urban linkages may contribute to more sustainable economic development at a macro level because they may counteract strong concentration or depletion forces, by giving rural areas

³ N. Meccheri & G. Pelloni (2006), *Rural entrepreneurs and institutional assistance: An empirical study from mountainous Italy*, "Entrepreneurship & Regional Development" 18(5), pp. 371–392.

⁴ H. Bergmann & D. Baumgartner (2010), *Entrepreneurship in urban and rural Switzerland: Similar or worlds apart?*, in: D. Smallbone, J. Leitão, M. Raposo & F. Welter (eds.), *The Theory and Practice of Entrepreneurship*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 287–311.

⁵ H. Harper (2006), *Small Business in the Third World*, London: John Wiley Sons.

⁶ P. Deshingkar (2005), *The Role of National Banks in Micro Finance: The Report for the Joints Government of Nepal and Malt-Donor Mission on Rural Micro-Financial Services*, "A Journal of Asian Productivity Organization" 15(2), pp. 92–127.

opportunities to develop. When we think about increasing disparities between rural and urban areas, “sustainable development in rural areas is of fundamental importance to preserve the social traditions, (indigenous) cultures and valuable natural amenity space, whilst also reducing territorial disparities, generating a vibrant rural economy, new and diverse employment opportunities and transforming rural spaces into places fit for modern socio-economic realities”. Such a transformation, however, is only possible through rural change agents like entrepreneurs who are rooted in the rural context, yet also possess strong linkages with urban areas⁷.

Urban and rural areas differ in economic, social and environmental terms. Due to the diverging dynamics in urban and rural areas, the social and economic distance between them might increase in the future even more⁸. Rural entrepreneurs with linkages to urban areas are able to bridge the rural-urban divide by accessing some of the urban features, such as knowledge and markets, while at the same time profiting from the advantages of their peripheral location⁹. Rural entrepreneurs with rural–urban linkages develop a sensibility for core market demands and trends, they value rural assets, and they combine rural and urban sources of knowledge for innovation. Through their entrepreneurial activity, rural entrepreneurs with linkages to urban areas might constitute an opposite force to polarizing concentration of economic activities in townships¹⁰.

⁷ S. Lykke (2002), *Agricultural Frontier Settlement Markets: Livelihoods Diversification and Town Development*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁸ H. Harper (2006), *op. cit.*

⁹ J.A. Kuzilwa (2003), *The Role of Credit for Small Business Success: A Study of the National Entrepreneurship Development Fund in Tanzania*, A Paper presented at the MU/AUC International Conference on Entrepreneurship and Business Development, White Sands Hotel, Dar es Salaam, February 26–28 (unpublished).

¹⁰ T. Sorin-George, A. Grigore & P. Marinescu (2014), *Economic Development and Entrepreneurship*, “Procedia Economics and Finance” 8, pp. 436–443.

Rural entrepreneurs are motivated by different factors, they identify a niche in their local communities and act on them, they rely on local raw materials and supplies, and most importantly they are the central force of sustainable community development¹¹. Rural entrepreneurs capitalize on resources either inside or outside of agriculture to create business ventures. Sustainable community development is about sustaining the livelihood and economies of rural areas and small communities, using rural entrepreneurship, self-employment and the development and maintenance of homegrown small businesses¹². The potential contribution of home-grown businesses to community sustainability is influenced by a number of factors including the characteristics of businesses and entrepreneurs, and competitive strategies businesses use for growth and sustainability in the marketplace¹³.

Rural entrepreneurs face severe competition from large-sized organizations and urban entrepreneurs. They incur a high cost of production due to high input costs. Major problems faced by marketer share the problem of standardization and competition from large-scale units. They face the problem of fixing the standards and sticking to them¹⁴. Competition from large scale units also creates difficulty for the survival of new ventures. New ventures have limited financial resources and hence cannot afford to spend more on sales promotion. These units are not having any standard brand name under which they can sell their products¹⁵. This paper focuses on the influence of entrepreneurship and innovation on rural-urban linkages in

¹¹ J.A. Schumpeter (2004), *The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle*, New Brunswick – London: Transaction Publishers.

¹² C. Rakodi (2002), *Urban Livelihoods: A People Centered Approach to Reducing Poverty*, London: Earthscan.

¹³ J.A. Schumpeter (2004), op. cit.

¹⁴ Harper, H. (2006), op. cit.

¹⁵ A.L. Zacharis, W.D. Bygrave & D.A. Shepherd (2000), op. cit.

Tanzania. And its specific objective is: To investigate the nature of rural-urban entrepreneurship in the study area; to evaluate the role of information technology in the activities and operations of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) assist in rural-urban linkages in the study area; to determine the role of microfinance institutions in entrepreneurship and innovations in the study area.

Methodology

The study was conducted at Kibaigwa Township which is one of the administrative wards in Kongwa district of the Dodoma region (Figure 1). The Township was selected because of its rapid development into an urban centre that is largely attributed to the establishment of maize market. The Township authority is a fast-growing in terms of population growth as well as economic activities.




Figure 1: A map showing Kibaigwa township with study wards

The study involved two sub-villages within Kibaigwa Township, namely: Nyerere and Kawawa and two villages neighbouring Kibaigwa (outside the township), namely: Pandambili and Mtanana based on their potential in maize production and access to infrastructure and opportunities at Kibaigwa centre. The study used a mixed-method research design to collect data using structured questionnaires, one-on-one interviews with key informants, focus group discussions (FGDs). A total of 120 farmer respondents were randomly selected and interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The selection of farmers was based on wealth ranking. Wealth ranking conducted by categorising farmers according to the size of the land the owned during a focus group discussion such as: Relatively wealthy farmers own ample land more than 40 acres, medium wealth farmers own a land of less than 40 acres and poor wealth farmers own a land less than 22 acres. Additional information on other aspects under investigation was collected from key informants who were selected using snowball technique. The literature review was also a good source of information for the study. Data from farmer's questionnaire were coded for analysis. The data from key informants were summarized and used along with descriptive and inferential statistics computed from household data.

Results and discussions

Rural-urban entrepreneurs in economic development

Kibaigwa maize market attracts immigrants from different wards and villages around the Kongwa district and other regions, leading to an increase in the number of people and human activities. There are lots of non-agricultural businesses in the study area. There are also other important services such as police stations, schools, electricity, food, and water services which catalyse the growth of Kibaigwa Township. About 65% of respondents in Kibaigwa Township, migrated

from different areas, while at the hinterlands, 51.7% of the respondents migrated from different areas. Migrant's entrepreneurs were moving from the immediate hinterlands to Kibaigwa Township searching urban customers and also other entrepreneurs move from Kibaigwa township to the immediate hinterland to search for marketing opportunities. The importance of rural-urban linkages become clear, as entrepreneurs have to identify urban demand on the one hand and generate authenticity concerning the values attributed to the products on the other hand. The majority (60%) of respondents live in urban areas and emphasize the importance of natural products, traditional crafts and sustainable production some of them even come to the production site in order to experience the values that are attributed to the goods they buy. Rural-urban entrepreneurs with their ability to scan, analyze and identify opportunities in the environment transform them into business propositions through the creation of economic entities.

The reasons for rural-urban entrepreneurship

Results in Figure 2 shows the reason for entrepreneurship in the study area and it was indicated that respondents at Kibaigwa Township (28%) and at the rural areas (20%) stated that the reason to start entrepreneurship business is to generate employment for both rural and urban dwellers also 14% and 15% of the respondents from both areas reported of very low productivity and returns in the available land in the original home activate them to base on non-agricultural entrepreneurs. This implies that entrepreneurial initiative through employment generation leads to an increase in income and purchasing power which is spent on consumption expenditure. Moreover rural-urban entrepreneurs make the possibility of the equitable distribution of national income more realistic by providing employment on a large scale by creating more employment opportunities in both areas. The entrepreneurs and their enterprises are the only hope and source of direct and indirect employment generation. Employment is generated

directly by the requirement of the large enterprises and indirectly by consequential development activities.

Increased demand for goods and services boosts up industrial activity. Entrepreneurs by placing profitable business propositions attract investment to ensure private participation in the industrialization process. The otherwise idle savings are channelized for investment in business ventures which in turn provides a return. Again, the savings are invested giving a multiplier effect to the process of capital formation. The development of the SME sector therefore represents an essential element in the growth strategy of most economies and holds particular significance in the case of Kibaigwa. SMEs not only contribute significantly to improved living standards, employment generation and poverty reduction but they also bring about substantial domestic or local capital formation and achieve high levels of productivity and capability. From a planning standpoint, SMEs are increasingly recognized as the principal means for achieving equitable and sustainable industrial diversification, growth and dispersal.




Figure 2: The reasons for rural-urban entrepreneurship

Technology and innovations

Table 1 shows that in Kibaigwa Township 33.3% of the respondents were using telephone, 5% of respondents were using modern storage facilities, 23% of respondents doing business Knowledge linkages Kibaigwa Township and immediate hinterlands. While Township 27% of the respondents were using telephone, 2% were modern storage facilities, 31% business knowledge linkages Kibaigwa Township and immediate hinterlands. This implies that Entrepreneurs leverage local knowledge sources for incremental innovations and non-local knowledge sources for more radical innovation. Rural entrepreneurs engage in rural–urban linkages utilize a variety of ways to leverage knowledge outside of their location. They engage in networks, they leverage contacts with suppliers. Located in urban regions. Through this ability to complement local with non-local

Table 1: Technology and Innovation

Technology and innovation	Kibaigwa township (n=60)		Immediate hinterlands (n=60)	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Uses of telephone	20	33.3	16	27
Modern storage facilities	3	5	1	2
Products advertisement	7	11.7	2	3
Communicate with customers	7	11.7	10	17
knowledge linkages	14	23.3	19	31
leverage contacts with suppliers	9	15	12	20
	60	100	60	100

competencies, rural entrepreneurs may be better able to retain their business' competitiveness. Most (23.3%) of the new urban entrepreneurs were able to establish knowledge linkages already before they migrated to the rural area. Local forms of knowledge exchange might be more important for incremental innovation, while external linkages might be used to source technology and know-how that cannot be accumulated in rural areas.

Information technology usage by entrepreneurs in Kibaigwa is finding fast usage due to many priorities such as cost deduction, effective and rational promotion, faster communication, faster realization of products and services etc. Kibaigwa Township, in particular, information technology growth and development are being driven by the private sector and private businesses. The innovative activity in the new economy appears to come from small firms and gain access to new markets and new opportunities. Information technology usage support SME's to gain a competitive advantage by creating value and competing with large organizations.

Problems facing rural-urban entrepreneurs

Figure 3 shows that most (33%) of respondents and (40%) of respondents of the rural-urban entrepreneurs fail to get external funds due to the absence of tangible security and credit in the market. The procedure to avail the loan facility is too time-consuming that its delay often disappoints the rural entrepreneurs. low level of purchasing power of rural consumer (5%) of respondents said sales volume is insufficient, lack of finance to start a business, reduced profits due to competition, pricing of goods and services, 5% of respondents said that 15% of respondents stated that Financial statements are difficult to be maintained by rural entrepreneur, stringent tax laws, lack of guarantees for raising up of loans, difficulty in raising capital through equity, dependence on small money lenders for loans for which they charge discriminating interest rates and huge




Figure 3: Problem facing rural-urban entrepreneurs

rent and property cost. These all problems create a difficulty in raising money.

Information technology is not very common in rural areas. Entrepreneurs rely on internal linkages that encourage the flow of goods, services, information and ideas. The intensity of family and personal relationships in rural communities can sometimes be helpful but they may also present obstacles to effective business relationships. Business deals may receive less than rigorous objectivity and inter-community rivalries may reduce the scope for regional cooperation. Decision-making process and lines of authority are mostly blurred by local politics in rural areas.

Most of the entrepreneurs of rural areas are unable to find workers with high skills. Turnover rates are also high in this case. They have to be provided with on-the-job training and their training is generally a serious problem for the entrepreneur as they are mostly uneducated and they have to be taught in local language which they understand easily. The industries in rural areas are not only established just to take advantage of cheap labour but also to bring about an integrated rural development.

Conclusion

The problem of rural-urban entrepreneurs will be reduced by the government to instate policy that creates favourable conditions and investment opportunities in urban and rural areas through: Improving and increasing roads, health centres, primary schools and secondary schools, rural electrification; water services and transportation services between villages and townships. Constructions of big markets in villages will be encouraging more entrepreneurs to be engaged in entering- trade of goods from farming practices and non-farming practices this will cause the economy of immediate hinterlands to be improved and more people will tend to be engaged in employment opportunities created in the original home and not migrated to Kibaigwa township.

Entrepreneurs create and actively develop rural-urban linkages can play a key role in developing sustainable vital rural economies and connecting these economies to the wider national and even global markets. Such entrepreneurial rural-urban linkages might play an important role in decreasing spatial disparities between centers and peripheries. As our rural-urban linkages from an entrepreneurial perspective can take on three functions. First, such linkages help entrepreneurs create a sensibility for core market demands and trends. Second, rural entrepreneurs strategically utilize rural-urban linkages to value rural assets that have traditionally been perceived as backward, disadvantageous, burdensome, etc. Third, when entrepreneurs use ICTs in rural-urban linkages can lower transaction costs reducing information asymmetries and opening up market possibilities for rural inhabitants, which can result in additional network externalities. Rural-urban linkages are used to combine rural and urban sources of knowledge for innovation, which, in turn, puts a competitive edge on rural businesses.

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The influence of entrepreneurship and innovation on rural urban linkages in Tanzania

Abstract

In Tanzania, emerging urban centers are shaped by local agricultural value chains and can play an important role in rural poverty reduction by providing access to non-farm jobs. Small urban centers remain largely ignored in national policies and global debates. Policymakers often overlook small towns that are often the most dynamic urban centers, playing important roles in rural regions as market nodes and providing non-farm employment. Rural people are steadily moving out of farming and local economies are becoming more diversified, offering alternative income-generating opportunities in services and industry. This paper highlights exploratory results from quantitative interviews with rural-urban entrepreneurs, and maize farmers (producers). There is evidence that on the whole, rural urban linkages as a positive impact on rural poverty reduction and economic growth. In many cases inequality increases and that poor and vulnerable groups with limited assets and low skills become further marginalized. Poor migrants in many cases must send money home to repay debt and to support their families, and this makes it difficult to invest in housing and education in the urban areas. Due to the diverging dynamics in urban and rural areas, the social and economic distance between them might increase in the future even more. For poor migrants coming from rural areas affected by drought and irregular rainfall, moving to the townships can often mean living in informal settlements, where environmental hazards are extremely high.

Rural entrepreneurs with linkages to urban areas are able to bridge the rural–urban divide by accessing some of the urban features, such as knowledge and markets, while at the same time profiting from the advantages of their peripheral location. The interactions between agricultural, industrial and service sectors have also intensified, and are closely linked to processes of urbanization with activities often located in and around urban centers. Rural entrepreneurs with rural–urban linkages develop sensibility for core market demands and trends, they value rural assets, and they combine rural and urban sources of knowledge for innovation. Through their entrepreneurial activity, rural entrepreneurs with linkages to urban areas might constitute an opposite force to polarizing concentration of economic activities in urban areas. Hence, rural entrepreneurs with urban linkages might contribute to sustainable economic relationships between urban and rural areas.

Key words: rural-urban, complementarities, entrepreneurship and innovation, Tanzania

Chapter 10.

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THE EFFECT OF CLIMATIC VARIABILITY ON RURAL – URBAN MIGRATION IN TANZANIA

Background to the research problem

Numerous studies have suggested that climate variability and climate change can have adverse impacts on global food production and food security. Climate variability driven by major interannual-scale climate modes, such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, often lead to droughts and a decrease in crop yields that could further result in famine in some food insecure regions¹. Climate change studies consistently show that many of the world's regions may experience increased frequency and severity of droughts and floods, increased inter-annual and inter-seasonal rainfall variability, and

¹ J.W. Hansen, S.J. Mason, L. Sun & A. Tall, (2011), *Review of seasonal climate forecasting for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa*, "Experimental Agriculture" 47(2), pp. 205–240; D. Maxwell & M. Fitzpatrick (2012), *The 2011 Somalia famine: Context, causes, and complications*, "Global Food Security" 1, pp. 5–12; T. Iizumi, M. Yokozawa, G. Sakurai, M.I. Travasso, V. Romanernkov, P. Oettli, T. Newby, Y. Ishigooka & J. Furuya (2014), *Historical changes in global yields: major cereal and legume crops from 1982 to 2006*, "Global Ecology and Biogeography" 23(3), pp. 346–357.

warmer temperatures². Also, A. Araya found that climate change is a threat to the survival of the human being as it has significant impacts on the environment, crop production, water resources, and livestock production³.

Climate change will cause population movements by making certain parts of the world less viable to live in; by causing food and water supplies to become more unreliable and increasing the frequency and severity of floods and storms⁴. The Sustainable Development Goals (13 – Climate Action) lay out a way for countries to work together to meet this urgent challenge. The worsening impacts of climate change in three densely populated regions of the world could see over 140 million people move within their countries' borders by 2050, creating a looming human crisis and threatening the development process⁵. As average temperatures increase, causing coastal flooding and prolonged droughts, upwards of 140 million people globally are likely to become displaced⁶.

Climate change is expected to bring about significant changes in migration patterns throughout the developing world. Increases in the frequency and severity of chronic environmental hazards and sudden-onset disasters are projected to alter the typical migration

² S.M.S. Maliondo, E.J. Mpeti & J. Olson (2012), *Climate Change and Food Security in Tanzania: An Analysis of Current Knowledge and Research Gaps and Recommendations for a Research Agenda*, iAGRI Reference Background Paper.

³ A. Araya, A. Girma & F. Getachew (2015), *Exploring impacts of climate change on maize yield in two contrasting agro-ecologies of Ethiopia*, "Asian Journal of Applied Science and Engineering" 4, pp. 27–37.

⁴ International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2008), *Migration and Climate Change*, Geneva.

⁵ World Bank (2019), *Climate Change Could Force over 140 Million to Migrate within Countries by 2050*, Washington.

⁶ A. Marcus, (2018), *Climate Migration: A Growing Global Crisis*, Climate Institute Publication, New York.

patterns of communities and entire countries⁷. Less rain would have particularly serious impacts for Sub-Saharan African agriculture which is largely rain-fed: the 2007 IPCC report of the Second Working Group estimates that yields from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50% by 2020. “Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries and regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate variability and change⁸. In countries where individuals are not extremely poor, a decline in agricultural income strengthens the incentives to migrate to cities or abroad. Decreasing agricultural productivity may encourage a mechanism that ultimately leads to the economic success of migrants, benefitting their country of origin and shifting people out of agriculture into urban environments⁹.

Farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly vulnerable, in part because they mostly rely on rain-fed agriculture instead of irrigation. In central Tanzania, the rainy season typically lasts from November through April, after which the weather becomes too dry to support growing crops. Every year, farmers need to produce enough food from their single annual harvest to feed their families until the next season. In good years, farmers have enough grain left over to sell as income, but when crops fail, families often experience an annual “hunger season”, a time of meal skipping and substitution until the next harvest¹⁰.

⁷ C. Raleigh, L. Jordan & I. Salehyan (2008), *Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict*, Washington: Social Development, The World Bank.

⁸ J. Petree & N. Baruah (2007), *A Study of Migrant-Sending Households in Serbia Receiving Remittances from Switzerland*, IOM Migration Research Series, no. 28, Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

⁹ World Economic Forum (2019), *How does climate change affect migration?*, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/how-does-climate-change-affect-migration/> [accessed 15 May 2019].

¹⁰ One Acre Fund (2019), *What Climate Change Means for Agriculture in Africa*, <https://oneacrefund.org/blog/what-climate-change-means-agriculture-africa/> [accessed 15 May 2019].

In developing countries where the majority of people reside in rural areas, the impacts of climate change on their livelihood are likely to be high because of high dependence, directly or indirectly, on rain-fed agriculture¹¹, and agriculture being vulnerable and sensitive to climate change and weather conditions¹². An empirical analysis of rainfall and temperature suggests a trend of decreasing rainfall between 1922 and 2007, whereas temperature means and temperature extremes increased by 1.9 and 0.2 °C respectively¹³. In rural areas, specifically, environmental change has immediate and direct effects on the health and well-being of millions of households that depend on natural resources for their basic livelihoods¹⁴.

When weather changes reduce families' livelihood options, these changes can act as a "push" factor: People leave resource-dependent rural areas and create new migration patterns¹⁵. In the face of climate-related environmental change, such as the decline of productive agricultural land, rural residents may be forced to migrate in search of work. Migrants who find work often remit portions of their salary

¹¹ P. Nyanga, F. Johnsen, J. Aune & T. Kalinda (2011), *Smallholder Farmers' Perceptions of Climate Change and Conservation Agriculture: Evidence from Zambia*, "Journal of Sustainable Development" 4(4), pp. 73–85.

¹² G. Nelson, M. Rosegrant, J. Koo, R. Roberson, T. Sulser, T. Zhu, C. Ringler at al. (2009), *Climate Change Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation*, Food Policy Report, Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute.

¹³ M.A. Lema & A.E. Majule (2009), *Impacts of climate change, variability and adaptation strategies on agriculture in semi arid areas of Tanzania: The case of Manyoni District in Singida Region, Tanzania*, "African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology" 3(8), pp. 206–218.

¹⁴ I. Koziell & J. Saunders (2001), *Living off Biodiversity: Exploring Livelihoods and Biodiversity*, London: International Institute for Environment and Development; C. Shackleton & S. Shackleton (2004), *The Importance of Non-Timber Forest Products in Rural Livelihood Security and as Safety Nets: A Review of Evidence from South Africa*, "South African Journal of Science" 100, pp. 658–664.

¹⁵ D. Bates & T. Rudel (2004), *Climbing the Agricultural Ladder: Social Mobility and Motivations for Migration in an Ecuadorian Colonist Community*, "Rural Sociology" 69(1), pp. 59–76.

back home. Their families in the home communities may use the remittances to buy substitutes for goods previously produced or harvested from the local environment. For example, store-bought food may substitute for food previously grown on homestead plots¹⁶.

Migration refers to the movement of people from one place in the world to another for the purpose of taking up permanent or –semi-permanent residence. People can either choose to be active (voluntary migration) or be forced to move (involuntary migration). There are various types of migration such as internal migration, external migration, emigration, immigration, return migration, chain migration and seasonal migration. Migration determinants can simply be defined as factors or forces existing at the macro, meso and micro level, which influence the decision to migrate¹⁷.

A link between migration and climatic factors, such as temperature and precipitation, has been documented in several rural regions of developing countries. In Burkina Faso, for example, residents of dry, rural areas are likely to migrate to rural regions with greater rainfall. In this way, migration may be a long-term response to the threat of recurrent droughts. Still, only short-distance moves appear affected by climatic factors, since international migration tends to be less common in a period of rainfall shortage, perhaps because of the investment required for an international move¹⁸. In Bangladesh, household-level crop failure does not result in migration due to loss

¹⁶ L.M. Hunter, W. Twine & L. Patterson (2007), *Locusts are Now Our Beef: Adult Mortality and Household Dietary Use of Local Environmental Resources in Rural South Africa*, “Scandinavian Journal of Public Health” 17(5), pp. 1–10.

¹⁷ R.E. Msigwa & J.E. Mbongo (2013), *Determinants of Internal Migration in Tanzania*, “Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development” 4(9), p. 28.

¹⁸ S. Henry, B. Schoumaker & C. Beauchemin (2004), *The Impact of Rainfall on the First Outmigration: A Multi-Level Event-History Analysis in Burkina Faso*, “Population and Environment” 25(5), pp. 423–460.

of assets needed to migrate, as well as the requirement for increased labour during the crisis¹⁹.

Despite the debates, many poor nations especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tanzania included) are still struggling to meet the needs of rapidly growing populations amid huge disparities between the rich and the poor²⁰. In addition, more people are vulnerable to food insecurity, water shortages, and weather-related disasters, thus undermining their welfare. For Tanzania, despite having achieved relatively high economic growth (GDP increasing from 1.6% in 1992 to 7% in 2007) little has changed in terms of human welfare²¹. The country 2010 MDG report further indicated a low reduction in poverty and skewed distribution of wealth. Farmers in Tanzania, are particularly vulnerable to extreme climate events and rainfall variability due to their high dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods, limited knowledge of climate change, limited resources for adaptation; and institutions with limited capacity to mitigate the impacts. In general, the state of preparedness against the adverse impacts of climate change in Tanzania and Africa, in general, is limited²².

¹⁹ C.L. Gray & V. Mueller (2012), *Natural disasters and population mobility in Bangladesh*, "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America" 109(16), pp. 6000–6005.

²⁰ T. Zuberi & K.J.A. Thomas (2012), *Demographic Projections, the Environment and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Working Paper 2012–001, United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Africa.

²¹ United Republic of Tanzania (2011), *Country Report on the Millennium Development Goals 2010*, Dar es Salaam.

²² S.M.S. Maliondo, E.J. Mpeta & J. Olson (2012), op. cit.

Statement of research problem

The rural population in Tanzania depends on farming for their livelihoods therefore climate change has an impact on crop productivity. Crop production is highly sensitive to climate mainly rainfall and temperature. Therefore, if there are crop failure people will be to move in urban areas seeking for other alternatives. The increase in population in urban areas is not mainly caused by fertility but also migration. The youth constitute a large percentage of migrants from rural to urban areas. Little is known to what extent climatic variability leads to the migration of people. This study will investigate the extent to which rainfall and temperature variability influence the movement of people from rural to urban.

Research questions

- Is there climate change (rainfall decrease and temperature increase) in Tanzania?
- What are the effects of climate change on crop production?
- To what extent does low crop production force people to move from rural to urban areas?

Migration approach and theory

A systems approach to rural-urban migration is concerned with why people migrate, and the implications and ramifications of the process. The approach is designed to answer such questions as: why and how does an essentially rural person become a permanent city resident; what changes does he/she undergo in the process; and what effects do these changes have both on the rural area from which

he/she comes and on the city to which the individual moves. The most important subsystems are the rural and urban control subsystems. A system comprises not only matter (the migrant, the institutions and the various organizations) but also energy. In the physical sense energy is simply the capacity of a given body to do work to forms of energy that are relevant here: potential energy and kinetic energy. In a theory of rural-urban migration, potential energy can be likened to the stimuli acting on the rural individual to move. The major issues concern not only the act of moving but also the cost distance and the direction of the movement. Rural-urban migration is an open system involving not only an exchange of energy but also of matter (in these cases persons) with the environment. The concomitants of the continued interaction between the system and its environment will be the phenomenon of growth in the system²³.

Economic theories of migration stress the decisions made by individuals and households to relocate. The famous Harris and Todaro model predict that individuals from rural areas will move to urban areas as long as the expected wage in the town or city is greater than the actual rural wage²⁴. The expected urban wage depends on the wage differential, the amount of unemployment in the urban sector and the individual's risk behaviour. Given the element of chance in finding a well-paid formal job, the model explains why people move to cities in the hope of getting such a job, only to add to the ranks of those formally unemployed who survive by informal and illegal means.

²³ A.L. Mabogunje (2010), *Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migration*, "Geographical Analysis" 2(1), pp. 1–18.

²⁴ J.R. Harris & M.P. Todaro (1970), *Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis*, "American Economic Review" 60(1), pp. 126–142.

Results and Discussion

Global warming and precipitation patterns have gradually affected crop productivity and finally resulted in food insecurity for the over increasing population across the globe²⁵. The climate of Tanzania varies from place to place in accordance with geographical location, altitude, relief and vegetation cover. Predictions show that the mean daily temperature will rise by 30°C – 50°C throughout the country and the mean annual temperature by 20°C – 40°C. There will also be an increase in rainfall in some parts while other parts will experience decreased rainfall. Predictions further show that areas with bimodal rainfall patterns will experience increased rainfall of 5% – 45% and those with unimodal rainfall patterns will experience decreased rainfall of 5%–15%. It is also noted by “Country Report on the Millennium Development Goals 2010” that, due to climate change, the mean annual temperature for Tanzania is projected to increase by 1.7°C over northeastern areas of the country and by 2.5°C over Western parts of the country²⁶.

A study by Pamela W. Levira on trends in seasonal rainfall patterns in selected cities across that, Tanzania revealed drastic consequences on the production of crops for the entire nation²⁷. Rainfall and temperature trends are presented to justify the situation and the climate change is the one responsible for the shifting of the seasonal rainfall, making rainfall come at a time not required, or when crops have already been damaged. The results showed that, temperature trends in selected cities have been dramatically increasing, and this

²⁵ J.T. Houghton et al. (eds.) (2001) *Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis*, Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁶ United Republic of Tanzania (2011), op. cit.

²⁷ P.W. Levira (2009), *Climate change impact in agriculture sector in Tanzania and its mitigation measure*, Tanzania Meteorological Agency, Department of Climatology and Climate Change, Dar es Salaam: IOP Publishing Ltd.

is responsible for increased evapotranspiration in the soil hence making crops fail to reach maturity due to lack of enough moisture in the soil hence the shortage of food.

A study by Jackson Sawe, Claude G. Mung'ong'o and Godfrey F. Kimaro in Manyoni District (Singida Region) found that heads of households perceived that rainfall had decreased while temperature had been increasing²⁸. Furthermore, the findings revealed that climate change and variability have impacted crop farming systems in different ways such as damaging crops and persistently low yields, reduction of crop varieties and species, decreasing soil fertility, increasing crop pests and diseases and drying of water sources. Farmers in Tanzania are particularly vulnerable, in part because they mostly rely on rain-fed agriculture instead of irrigation. One Acre Fund revealed that, in central Tanzania, the rainy season typically lasts from November through April, after which the weather becomes too dry to support growing crops²⁹. Every year, farmers need to produce enough food from their single annual harvest to feed their families until the next season. In good years, farmers have enough grain left over to sell for income, but when crops fail, families often experience an annual "hunger season," a time of meal skipping and substitution until the next harvest. Every year has its own challenges, but thanks to climate change, farmers are now facing greater difficulties from three main threats: extreme weather, pests and diseases and hotter temperatures.

A new World Bank Report (2018) projects that tens to hundreds of millions of people fleeing the gradual effects of climate change will shift centres of population within many countries in Latin America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa³⁰. If emissions of greenhouse

²⁸ J. Sawe, C.G. Mung'ong'o & G.F. Kimaro (2018), *The impacts of climate change and variability on crop farming systems in Semi-Arid Central Tanzania: The case of Manyoni District in Singida Region African*, "Journal of Environmental Science and Technology" 12(9), pp. 323–334.

²⁹ One Acre Fund (2019), op. cit.

³⁰ World Bank (2018), *Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, Washington.

gases remain high, as many as 143 million “internal migrants” might move within their own countries, comprising as much as 3.5% of the total population of the studied regions by 2050, according to the report. According to the report, such movements could accelerate after 2050. Furthermore the report noted that many migrants will relocate within their countries from lowlands to higher ground, forced to move by rising sea levels and storm surges, along with lowered crop productivity due to increasing heat and declining water availability. The effects will be evident by 2030 and gradually increase. The report is the latest in a growing body of research predicting that climate change will soon displace large numbers of people. In any scenario, the highest numbers of migrants are expected to be in Sub-Saharan Africa, where people are often already living on the edge and would not be able to adapt to further climate-related pressures.

In Tanzania, the mean annual temperature has increased by 1.0 °C since 1960, an average rate of 0.23 °C per decade . This increase in temperature has been most rapid in January and February and slowest in June, July, August and September. Daily temperature observations show only small increasing trends in the frequency during hot days, but much larger increasing trends in frequency during hot nights. The average number of ‘hot’ days in the country has only increased significantly in December, January and February when the average number of hot days in December, January and February as increased by 2.5 days per month (an additional 8.2% of December, January and February days) between 1960 and 2003³¹. Observations of rainfall over Tanzania show statistically significant decreasing annual trends in June, July, August, September, March, April and May. Annual rainfall has decreased at an average rate of 2.8mm per month (3.3%) per decade. The greatest annual decreases have occurred in the

³¹ C. McSweeney, M. New & G. Lizcano (2006), *UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles: Tanzania*, New York: United Nations Development Programme.

southernmost parts of Tanzania. March, April, May, June, July, August and September rainfalls have decreased by 4.0 and 0.8 mm per month per decade respectively (3.0% and 6.0%). Trends in the extreme indices based on daily rainfall data are mixed.

Reasons for migration are very diverse. Typically, migration decisions cannot be traced back to only one category of causes. Instead, different causes interact and form the basis for migration decisions. Important causes include economic, political and social factors. Environmental causes increase economic incentives for migration, especially if they directly affect incomes³². It was observed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (2018) that, migration from, to, and between rural areas is an important component of both international and internal migration³³. The reallocation of labour from less productive to more productive sectors of the economy is an integral component of economic development. Migration from rural areas is thus part of the process of structural transformation of economies in which the importance of agriculture for income and employment generation declines relative to other sectors.

In Tanzania, the migration of residents from rural (village) to urban areas is higher compared to those from town to cities. The results by Robert E. Msigwa show that in 2006, 66.9% of residents in migrated from rural to urban while 30.7% moved from town to cities, and the remaining, which is about (2.4%) migrate to other countries such as Kenya, Uganda, American, and Europe)³⁴. Furthermore, the study shows that migration within the countries is high among the low-income earners (69.7%) followed by middle-

³² Waldinger, M. & Fankhauser, S. (2015), *Climate change and migration in developing countries: evidence and implications for PRISE countries*, Policy paper, ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

³³ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2018), *The State of Food and Agriculture 2018. Migration, agriculture and rural development*, Rome.

³⁴ R.E. Msigwa & J.E. Mbongo (2013), op. cit.

income earners (27.7%). This implies that the disruption of economic characteristics has a tendency to influence residents' decisions to migrate from either rural to urban or town to the city seeking good life and other opportunities available in urban areas. Migration within Tanzania from both rural to urban and town to the cities is dominated by young adults aged between 25-34 and adults aged 5-64, which is 9% and 61.2% respectively. The migration that occurs in Tanzania is dominated by young adults without skills (98.5%) compared to those with skills (1.6%). The migrants, therefore, are usually young adults who have completed primary school education and a few with secondary education.

Furthermore, it was noted by R.E. Msigwa that in Tanzania this move is significant because only subsistence agriculture, fishing and small scale mining are invested in rural areas while the remaining economic activities such as industries are located in urban areas and cities, which are believed to be the magnets to attract migrants to cities and urban areas seeking for better life or. In view of this, migration in Tanzania is very high among males (81.0%) compared to females (19.0%)³⁵.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Crop production has always been deeply dependent on the weather, with farmers needing a steady mixture of sun, warmth, and rains in order to reliably produce the food needed for survival. Good weather will enable farmers to produce crops in the required amount for the family and surplus for sale hence improve the quality of life in rural areas. This can help in reducing the large number of people moving from rural to urban areas because through farming they can sustain their lives. Both government and individuals have an important role

³⁵ Ibidem.

to play in maintaining the climate and reduce climate change impacts hence reduce rural-urban migration.

This study recommends on the following: First, instead of depending on only one source of income, farmers should involve in other income generation activities such as mining, business and fishing. Thus, when harvests are poor due to bad weather they will have other sources of income hence reduce the rural-urban migration. Rural residents shift to the urban areas to find income for their livelihoods. Second, the establishment of more irrigation systems, as the country is endowed with water resources such as rivers and lakes these can be used for irrigation. The government must be responsible for the construction of irrigation infrastructure. These will enable farmers to cultivate crops throughout the year and get the required amount of crops. This will ensure food security and they will sell and to meet their family needs such as paying school fees and medical care. Third, provision of Environmental Education to farmers to enable them to explore environmental issues, engage in problem solving and make responsible decisions, thus they will take action to improve the environment. It is through Environmental Education that farmers will get knowledge on sustainable farming, thus reduce adverse impacts of climate change through proper cultivation methods and the use of fertilizers. Fourth, improvement of social services such as water, electricity, roads, health services (health centres and hospitals) with important facilities both physical and human resources and medicines. Moreover, schools should be equipped with important facilities and enough teachers.

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The effect of climatic variability on rural – urban migration in Tanzania

Abstract

This study investigated the extent to which temperature and rainfall change fuel rural-urban migration. The study employed review of related literatures on migration, climate change and crop production. Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migration and Economic Theories of Migration were used in determining reasons for the movement. The study found that there is higher migration of people from rural areas to urban areas than there is from urban to rural areas. The study further found that there are complex and mixed reasons exacerbating migration from the rural areas. Poor environmental conditions and its impact on food security has been one of the key factors fueling migration to urban areas assumed to provide more opportunities for livelihood than in the rural areas.

Key words: climatic elements (temperature and rainfall), systems approach to theory of rural-urban migration, economic theories of migration, crop production and rural-urban migration in Tanzania



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