

DOI: 10.31648/pw.9023

PAWEŁ PIETNOCZKA

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2970-2132>

University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

## **THE ISSUE OF SECURITY IN THE ELECTIONS PROGRAMMES OF CANDIDATES FOR THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE IN 2019**

**ABSTRACT:** The aim of the article is to present the programme priorities in the field of security policy, announced by each candidate running for the office of President of Ukraine in 2019. In addition, it also attempts to show how they intended to: ensure state security, bring the war in the Donbass to an end, restore the territorial integrity – thus, to regain Kyiv’s control over the Donbass and Crimea, as well as where they were going to look for allies capable of providing support to Ukraine on the path to achieving the above-mentioned goals. An analysis of the elections programmes of each candidate will allow us to answer the questions. Attention was paid to the programme demands of those candidates who received at least a five per cent support in the presidential elections. Hence, the elections programmes of the participants of the second round of the elections, namely those of Volodymyr Zelensky, Petro Poroshenko, and also Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Boyko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Ihor Smeshko as well as Oleh Lyashko, were subjected to analysis.

**KEYWORDS:** Ukraine, issue of security, elections programme, presidential elections

### **1. Introduction**

On 31 December 2018 an elections campaign preceding the choice of the new head of state commenced in Ukraine. The Central Electoral Commission registered a record-breaking high number of 44 candidates. Thereafter, five of them made a decision to withdraw from the elections struggle, thus, ultimately 39 candidates<sup>1</sup> stood to compete for the highest office. A significant number of them constituted the so-called technical candidates whose aim was not to win the elections but solely to make use of the election campaign in order to criticize the most dangerous competitors of the real favourite of the elections. The public opinion polls conducted, among others by the Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation<sup>2</sup>, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp003pt001f01=720.html> (accessed: 09.05.2019).

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=840&page=4> (accessed: 10.06.2019).

Studies named after Olexander Razumkov and the Sociological Group “Rating” (KIIS 2019, 10 and 16-17), clearly indicated that the winner of the first as well as the second round of voting would become a TV comedian and a film actor Volodymyr Zelensky. He was nominated for election rivalry by the Political Party “Servant of the People”<sup>3</sup>, referring to the Ukrainian comedy series in which V. Zelensky played the role of the president of Ukraine. It was to turn out that the film fiction became materialized in April 2019<sup>4</sup>.

The elections campaign, just as the one five years before, proceeded under conditions of the Russian aggression – the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass<sup>5</sup>. It is, therefore, no surprise that among the issues which received a considerable attention during the election campaign was the one concerning security. The purpose of the article is to present the programme demands in the field of security policy, made by the candidates applying for the office of President of Ukraine in 2019; what is more, it aims to show how they intended to ensure the security of the state in order to bring the war in the Donbass to an end and to restore territorial integrity as well as where they were going to look for allies who would give support to Ukraine in the implementation of the above-mentioned goals. The analysis of the elections programmes of each candidate will allow us to answer the above questions. Attention will be paid to the programme demands of those candidates who enjoyed at least a 5% support in the elections. Thus, both the elections programmes of the participants of the second round of the elections, that is: Volodymyr Zelensky’s and Petro Poroshenko’s, as well as the programmes of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuriy Boyko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Ihor Smeshko’s and Oleh Lyashko’s have been subjected to analysis.

---

<sup>3</sup> The group’s formal beginnings date back to March 2016, when the Party of Decisive Changes was registered. The party has been functioning under the current name since 2017.

<sup>4</sup> During the first round of the elections, which took place on 31 March 2019, V. Zelensky received 30.24% support, followed by: P. Poroshenko – 15.95%, Y. Tymoshenko – 13.40%, J. Boyko – 11.67%, A. Hrytsenko – 6.91%, I. Smeshko – 6.04%, O. Lyashko – 5.48, O. Vilkul – 4.15%, R. Koshulynsky – 1.62%. None of the remaining candidates received even a 1% support, and the closest to this “success” was a candidate with the same surname as the leader of “Homeland” – Juriy Tymoshenko, for whom 0.62% of votes were cast. In the second round of the elections, which took place on 21 April 2019, V. Zelensky received 73.22% support, whereas P. Poroshenko – 24.45%; <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp300pt001f01=719.html> (accessed: 09-05-2019).

<sup>5</sup> Concerning Russian aggression towards Ukraine, frequently referred to as a hybrid war see also e.g. Baluk | Dorozko 2017; Horbulin 2017.

## **2. Security of the state in the elections programmes of V. Zelensky and P. Poroshenko**

Volodymyr Zelensky, like the other candidates competing for the office of president, addressed the issue of state security in his elections programme. However, it may be surprising that he did it only during the fourth part of the programme entitled “Human security. State security”. The candidate of the “Servant of the People” declared to take steps aimed at ensuring peace in Ukraine. He announced that he would require from the countries which signed the Budapest Memorandum<sup>6</sup> as well as from the European Union partners to give support to Ukraine in its pursuit to bring the war to an end, to restore territorial integrity as well as to force the aggressor to pay compensation for the damage caused<sup>7</sup>. At the same time, he indicated that the subject of the negotiations could not be Ukraine’s resignation from its territories. Zelensky was in favour of strengthening co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He pointed out that the Euro-Atlantic integration was a guarantee of Ukraine’s security, but he simultaneously recognized that the decision to join NATO should be taken in an all-Ukrainian referendum. As the candidate emphasized, the increase in national security would also promote the development of a professional army. Service in the armed forces would become prestigious, and the budget funds allocated to it would not be used for private purposes by the “cabinet generals”, but they would be intended to provide improved conditions of soldiers’ service. Zelensky guaranteed taking steps aimed at providing soldiers with remuneration at the level of NATO standards (Peredvyborna 2019c). It is worth highlighting that, in his elections programme, Zelensky did not address the issue of the need of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union.

In comparison with the winner of the elections, Petro Poroshenko applying for re-election, devoted much more attention to the issue of security. Moreover, as opposed to Zelensky, he addressed these problematic aspects already in the first chapter of his elections programme. At the beginning of the programme, Poroshenko stressed that the goal of Ukraine was to join the EU as well as NATO. According to the politician, memberships of these organizations was to finally and irrevocably guarantee independence and security to Ukraine. The President expressed his belief that Ukraine had already strengthened the eastern NATO flank as well as it “defended against the Russian aggression not only itself, but also the entire European civilization” (Peredvyborna 2019g, 1). He announced

---

<sup>6</sup> The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances was signed in December 1994. In the light of this international agreement, Russia, the United States and Great Britain committed themselves to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as to refrain from using force against it (Memorandum 1994).

<sup>7</sup> It is worth noting that in V. Zelensky’s elections programme the word “aggressor” was used, but simultaneously the name of the country it referred to was not expressed.

that in 2023 Ukraine would apply for the EU membership and, moreover, it would receive the Action Plan for NATO membership. It is worth mentioning here that so far the only president of Ukraine who has clearly been in favour of joining NATO was Viktor Yushchenko (Mironowicz 2012, 300-312). In Poroshenko's opinion, membership of the UE and the Alliance, would probably translate into ensuring high living standards, rule of law, support for the economic development of the state and individual regions, gaining access to the world's largest market, as well as to the state security, which would be decided upon by the principle behind the Alliance "all for one, one for all" (Peredvyborna 2019g, 1). It is worth mentioning that in Poroshenko's elections programme in the elections five years before, there was no postulate regarding the need of Ukraine to join NATO. However, there was one concerning the need to renew co-operation, mainly the economic one with Russia (Pietnoczka 2016, 126-127.). Poroshenko also stressed that further strengthening of the Ukrainian army was to promote the state's increased security. He also noted that the armed forces had been revived, which allowed them to stop the Russian aggression. At the same time, he acknowledged the continuation of army modernization as an unconditional priority, namely – equipping it with the most modern weapons and military technology. He announced the completion of the anti-missile and anti-aircraft defence system, as well as carrying out the modernization of the sea fleet and air forces. Moreover, he declared an increase in the level of welfare granted to soldiers, as well as an increase in support for the families of combat participants (Peredvyborna 2019g, 2).

The president emphasized that he did not agree to the peace achieved at all costs, namely at the price of losing territorial integrity, as well as resigning from the chosen direction in the foreign policy: "Peace is a complete renewal of territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Peace is an undeniable recognition by Moscow of our right to go our way" (Peredvyborna 2019g, 3). That is why he announced the continuation of the policy whose purpose was to regain control over the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts as well as Crimea. He intended to achieve the above-mentioned goal through the political-diplomatic channel – by means of actions allowing him to maintain the unity of the pro-Ukrainian coalition, applying sanctions, as well as establishing the international UN mission which would cover the territory of the occupied Donbass. Simultaneously, Poroshenko declared that Russia would be held responsible for the repressions which were applied against the Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories. As a consequence, Moscow would be forced to pay compensation for the losses they had suffered. The politician also declared the continuation of activities aimed at freeing all the Ukrainian citizens who had become "hostages of the

Russian aggressor” – both those kept in Russia and in the occupied territories<sup>8</sup>. In his elections programme, Poroshenko also indicated a number of achievements on the part of Ukraine during his presidency. Among them, he enumerated the following ones: strengthening the country’s position in the international arena, creating a strong Trans-Atlantic coalition supporting Kyiv as well as dependency on the elimination of sanctions imposed by Russia from the deoccupation of the Ukrainian territories. The politician also stressed that Ukrainians managed to defend their European and Euro-Atlantic choice, Ukraine signed an association agreement with the UE, as well as it created a free trade zone with it. Apart from these successes, there were others: breaking the Russian trade blockade, resignation from the purchase of gas from Russia, introduction of visa-free travel from the UE, as well as a very close co-operation with the Alliance (Peredvyborna 2019g, 2).

### **3. The issue of security in the elections programmes of the other candidates**

Yulia Tymoshenko, put forward for the elections rivalry by the All-Ukrainian Unification “Homeland” – a grouping functioning on the political stage of Ukraine since 1999, was a leader for a long time, and then a runner-up of the pre-election polls (Pietnoczka 2014, 220-221). The former prime minister had already lost the competition for the highest office in the state twice – in 2010 and in 2014. As it turned out, her participation in the presidential elections in 2019 also was to end in a failure, as she only took the third place in them. Y. Tymoshenko, similarly to P. Poroshenko, addressed the problematic aspects of security already in the first chapter of her elections programme entitled “New strategy of peace and security”. She announced that peace would be restored, as well as regaining Crimea and the Donbass would follow the military-diplomatic path. The task of the Ukrainian armed forces would be to further stop aggression, as well as to strengthen their own manpower, whereas the task of diplomacy headed by the president – to take all kinds of steps aimed at forcing the aggressor to make peace and return the occupied territories. The leader of “Homeland” announced the organization of such a negotiation process which would ensure peace in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum (Novyy kurs 2019, 1). Y.Tymoshenko recognized strengthening of the armed forces as one of the cornerstones of peace and security strategy which would undergo complete modernization according to NATO standards. The strength of the Ukrainian army would rise to the level that would ensure the security of the state. At the same time,

<sup>8</sup> It is also worth noting that in his programme, the president addressed the issue of gaining the tomos by the Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and therefore, autocephalous, independent of Moscow, Orthodox Church of Ukraine was established. As far as the above document is concerned, he described it as the act of spiritual independence of Ukraine (Peredvyborna 2019g, 3).

the leader of “Homeland” announced the creation of European conditions for the service of soldiers, providing housing, free healthcare, decent retirement as well as additional concessions for combat participants and their family members. In addition, the candidate announced that she would carry out an accurate inventory of the damage caused by Russia and bring it to legal liability. The purpose of the above-mentioned actions would be to force Russia to compensate for the losses incurred by Ukraine, its citizens and enterprises (*ibidem*, 1-2). It is worth pointing out that Tymoshenko, like five years before, did not declare in her elections programme the need of Ukraine to join NATO. There was no place for the provision indicating Ukraine’s need to join the UE, either. The lack of this postulate may be surprising in that it was present in the programme which the leader of “Homeland” proposed in the previous presidential elections (*Peredvyborna* 2019e).

Yuriy Boyko – a Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine during Yanukovich’s presidency - took the fourth place in the elections; a politician standing for election with the “Opposition Platform – For Life” party’s support<sup>9</sup>. Boyko made it his personal goal in the elections to gain the support of the pro-Russian voters inhabiting mainly the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. During the period preceding the Euromaidan, these voters most eagerly would have voted for Viktor Yanukovich as well as the Party of Regions. In the elections programme entitled “Plan of a peaceful development for Ukraine”, Boyko, as opposed to the already enumerated candidates, did not declare the need for the integration with the UE and NATO or the need to strengthen the Ukrainian army. However, he emphasized that during the past few years Ukraine stopped complying with the rules of “Declaration of sovereignty” as well as the “Act of declaration of Independence of Ukraine”<sup>10</sup>. He called for respect for the values that were adopted during the independence referendum in 1991, at the same time stressing that Ukraine must be an independent as well as a neutral state. Boyko announced that he knew how to stop the warfare in the east of the country. He intended to achieve this goal by fulfilling all kinds of international commitments by Ukraine, as well as holding direct talks with all the parties of the conflict, which might mean that the politician envisaged the pursuit of direct negotiations also with the leaders of the unrecognized republics (*Peredvyborna* 2019f, 1-2). In the last part of the programme, entitled “Ukraine – a reliable international partner”, Boyko assured that neutrality and non-blocking of Ukraine would be guaranteed, as well as contradictions present in Ukraine’s relations with its neighbours, including also Russia, would be overcome (*ibidem*, 6). It is worth emphasizing that the former Deputy Prime Minister, as opposed to Poroshenko and Tymoshenko,

<sup>9</sup> The result achieved by Y. Boyko in the elections should be regarded as a great success. Particularly, if we take into consideration the fact that during the previous presidential elections only 0.19% voters supported him, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001> (accessed: 09.05.2019).

<sup>10</sup> “The declaration of state sovereignty” was adopted on 16 July 1990, whereas the “Declaration of Ukraine’s independence” on 24 August 1991 (*Hrytsak* 2000, 305-309).

did not describe Russia as an aggressor; he did not state either, like Zelensky, that Ukraine was a victim of an external aggression<sup>11</sup>. In Boyko's programme – in contrast to the programmes of the above-mentioned candidates – we will not find a postulate of the restoration of territorial integrity, a road leading to the recovery of Crimea or the need to pay compensation by Russia for the losses resulting from its aggression against Ukraine. However, the former Deputy Prime Minister stressed the need to ensure the neutrality and non-blocking status for Ukraine, and declared the reparation of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Also, Olexander Hrytsenko – the Minister of National Defence of Ukraine during the presidency of V. Yushchenko – stood up to compete for the highest office in the state. Since 2010 he has been a leader of the Political Party “Civic Position” (Karmazina 2012, 392-393). Hrytsenko took only the fifth place, which means that his candidacy, like in 2014, ended in a failure<sup>12</sup>. He devoted the second chapter of the programme to the issue of security entitled “Honest president – safe state!”. In it, he announced that Ukraine would regain the Donbass, but not on the terms of surrender by which he understood granting a special status to this region, but by using diplomatic, military, and economic measures as well as sanctions. The above measures would be used in co-operation with foreign partners. The leader of the “Civic Position” declared that regaining control over the Donbass was possible during the 5-year term of office of the head of the state. At the same time, he stressed that Ukraine would not resign from the right to Crimea since it is inhabited by citizens of Ukraine, and it is a Ukrainian land. That situation would not change – as he stressed – any economic concessions. Addressing the issue of the Ukrainian armed forces, Hrytsenko pointed out that the president would not earn money on the army and the soldiers' blood, but he would provide the necessary equipment for it. At the same time, he concluded that the state procurement would play a stimulating role in the development of modern technologies. The leader of the “Civic Position” spoke in favour of the development of a professional contract army supported by the reserve, as well as the territorial defence system (Peredyborna 2019d). It should be added that Hrytsenko, in his elections programme, did not address the need to join the EU and NATO. He only pointed out that Ukraine would not make empty promises to foreign partners. During Hrytsenko's presidency, the foreign policy would be conducted in a responsible and predictable manner. The purpose of diplomacy, as he stressed, would be to strengthen the security of Ukraine, its defensive capability as well as to free Ukrainian citizens (*ibidem*).

---

<sup>11</sup> Simultaneously, there was no record, as it took place five years before, about the internal conflict (Peredyborna 2019b).

<sup>12</sup> Then, with a 5.48% result, he took the fourth place; <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001> (accessed: 09.05.2019).

Ihor Smeshko – a former head of the Security Service of Ukraine<sup>13</sup>, since 2009 the leader of the Political Party “Strength and Honesty”, took the sixth place in the elections<sup>14</sup>. Already at the very beginning of the elections programme “Seven victories for Ukraine”, I. Smeshko pointed to the internal and external threats of Ukraine. As far as the main ones are concerned, he included de-industrialization and the demographic crisis as well as the Russian aggression. The leader of “Strength and Honesty” addressed the issues in question in the first two chapters of the programme. In the first one entitled “The first victory. Restoring stability and state management”, the former head of the Security Service of Ukraine assured that he would concentrate on taking actions aimed at regaining the annexed Crimea as well as causing the de-occupation of the Donbass. He intended to achieve this goal by diplomatic and economic means as well as the international community, in particular, by using obligations incumbent on the countries which had signed the Budapest Memorandum. Smeshko also announced introducing reforms in the Ukrainian army, as a result of which combat capabilities would increase, and also appropriate conditions for the service and life of soldiers, veterans, and their families would be created (Ihor Smeshko 2019, 1-2).

In the second chapter entitled “The second victory: regaining the Donbass and Crimea”, the leader of “Strength and Honesty” expressed his belief that the victory would be possible when the economy is strengthened, when the standard of living increases, when the army’s combat capabilities increase as well as when the policy of integration with the Euro-Atlantic community is implemented. In this part of the programme, Smeshko once again drew attention to the Budapest Memorandum. Namely, he declared that in the format of the countries that signed the agreement, the main political and diplomatic actions would be taken, aimed at forcing Russia to “execute the guarantee of territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine” (ibidem, 2). The candidate also declared that he would take steps intended to provide soldiers with better service conditions, including remuneration, at the level of standards of the countries neighbouring Ukraine and simultaneously belonging to NATO. He announced fight against corruption present in the area of defense as well as solving the housing problem concerning soldiers, and taking steps so that Ukraine would gain the Action Plan for NATO membership. Moreover, he was in favour of creating a professional army as well as operational and strategic reserves whose basis would be territorial defence formations. What is more, he pointed to the need for the state to provide support for the displaced persons from the annexed Crimea as well as from the occupied Donbass. It is also worth noting that Smeshko drew attention to the need to ensure energy independence

---

<sup>13</sup> He was the head of the Security Service of Ukraine in the years 2003-2005.

<sup>14</sup> The party was registered on 29 December 2004. Initially, it functioned under the name “Liberty” (Karmazina 2011, 531).



of Ukraine. He was going to achieve this goal through a greater use of renewable energy sources, the modernization of nuclear power as well as increasing natural gas production (ibidem, 2, 4).

Oleh Lyashko, the leader of the Radical Party since 2011, took the seventh place (Karmazina 2012, 462). The politician received a weaker result in comparison with the presidential elections of 2014, in which he took the third place<sup>15</sup>. The leader of the Radical Party addressed the issue of state security only in the seventh part of his programme entitled “Strong army – strong state”. He stressed that he was ready to do everything in order to bring about peace by the end of the war in the Donbass, during which people were still losing their lives. However, he excluded capitulation as a price for achieving the above-mentioned goal. The road to victory would be paved with a strong economy since – as the politician indicated – “no one in the world respects the weak”. At the same time, he expressed a belief that no one was interested in the improvement of the situation in Ukraine: “They are trying to take away land, forests, employee potential from us, to freeze our economy in exchange for loan slavery” (Peredvyborna 2019a, 5). Lyashko announced an absolute defense of Ukraine’s national interests, including taking actions aimed at making Kyiv’s partners implement the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum. The leader of the Radical Party reminded that Ukraine, by signing the document in exchange for the guarantee of security, resigned from the world’s third-largest nuclear potential. Therefore, according to Lyashko, in a situation when the provisions of the Memorandum ceased to be observed, Ukraine receives the right to renew the status of a country possessing nuclear weapons. The leader of the Radical Party sees a way to ensure security for Ukraine also in concluding a direct military agreement with the United States. In addition, the politician called for support for soldiers fighting on the front. He announced a delivery of the most modern weapons, ensuring better nutrition, increasing remuneration as well as providing their families with welfare (ibidem). It is worth noting that Lyashko was critical of the International Monetary Fund and the conditions imposed by it on Ukraine. He called to care for the interests of the Ukrainian nation, and not the implementation – as he put it – of the demands of the International Monetary Fund harmful to the state (ibidem, 3). It should be emphasized that the leader of the Radical Party, similarly to Tymoshenko and Hrytsenko, did not refer in his programme to the issue of the integrity with the EU and NATO.

---

<sup>15</sup> O. Lyashko received 8.32% votes then; <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001> (accessed: 09.05.2019).

## 4. Conclusion

The analysis of the election programmes allows us to conclude that each candidate paid a considerable attention to the problematic aspects pertinent to security. The majority of them designated separate chapters to this issue (V. Zelensky, P. Poroshenko, Y. Tymoshenko, A. Hrytsenko, I. Smeshko and O. Lyashko). Three of the candidates – Poroshenko, Tymoshenko and Smeshko – treated the problematic aspects of security as a priority since they started presenting their election programmes beginning with this very issue. Among the postulates which were present in the candidates' programmes, those concerning the end of the war in the Donbass could be found, which does not come as a surprise. However, the way to ensure peace was perceived differently on many occasions. Zelensky wanted to achieve this goal with the help of the countries that have signed the Budapest Memorandum as well as with partners from the EU. Tymoshenko announced that peace would be restored by military-diplomatic means and in accordance with the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum. However, Boyko proposed that securing peace would be possible in the event of fulfilling international obligations by Ukraine as well as holding direct talks with all the parties of the conflict.

Particular attention in the election programmes was also paid to the need to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, to the need to regain by Kyiv the control over the Donbass and Crimea (Zelensky, Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Smeshko, Hrytsenko). Zelensky and Smeshko acknowledged that the renewal of territorial integrity ought to ensue with the help of the countries which had signed the Budapest Memorandum. In Poroshenko's opinion, the renewal of control over the Donbass and Crimea would be possible if the unity of the pro-Ukrainian coalition was maintained, sanctions were still applied and an international UN mission was set up, which would encompass the territory of the Donbass. Tymoshenko pointed to the need to further stop the Russian aggression by the Ukrainian army with all kinds of simultaneous steps taken by the diplomacy to regain the occupied territories. However, Hrytsenko announced regaining control over the Donbass within 5 years, and he intended to achieve this goal in co-operation with foreign partners by means of diplomatic, military and economic resources as well as sanctions. The candidates paid a great deal of attention in the election programmes also to the issue of the Ukrainian armed forces, whose significance, in the context of assuring the state's security, is extremely important. They were in favour of development of a professional army (Zelensky, Hrytsenko, Smeshko), modernization of the army (Poroshenko, Tymoshenko, Hrytsenko, Smeshko, Lyashko), improvement of soldiers's service conditions (Zelensky, Tymoshenko, Smeshko, Lyashko), an increase in the level of welfare granted to soldiers (Poroshenko, Tymoshenko) and an increase in remuneration (Zelensky, Smeshko, Lyashko). Addressing the issue of soldiers' earnings, Zelensky emphasized that it should be at the level of NATO standards, whereas Smeshko

siad that it should be at the level of the NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine. It is also worth noting that two candidates spoke in favour of creating a formation of territorial defence (Hrytsenko and Smeshko).

In the context of assuring security for Ukraine, some of the candidates pointed to the need for a Euro-Atlantic integration (Zelensky, Poroshenko and Smeshko). Simultaneously, only Poroshenko argued clearly for Ukraine joining NATO. Smeshko stated that integration with the Euro-Atlantic community was indispensable, but he did not determine whether it would end in Ukraine's accession to NATO. However, Zelensky noted that eventually the decision to join the Alliance must be taken during an all-Ukrainian referendum. A completely different path to ensure state security was perceived by Boyko – a candidate who concentrated mainly on the fight for the electorate of the south-eastern part of Ukraine. Namely, he was in favour of the neutral and non-blocking status of Ukraine – thus, he clearly opposed the integration with the Alliance. Three of the candidates – Tymoshenko, Hrytsenko and Lyashko did not specify their stances towards the integration of Ukraine with NATO. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the leader of the Radical Party saw the way to ensure security in concluding a direct military agreement with the USA. Finally, it is important to stress that the only candidate who was in favour of Ukraine joining the EU was Poroshenko, applying for re-election, treating membership in this organization, just like the membership in NATO, as Ukraine's final and irreversible guarantee of independence and security. The winner of the elections, however, was V. Zelensky; and it was his election programme that was to be implemented, which was later supported by the pro-presidential majority in the ninth-term Verkhovna Rada, elected as a result of the early parliamentary elections in July 2019. Against the backdrop of Russia's continued hybrid war against Ukraine, it was the implementation of the demands of state security, ensuring peace and restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity that attracted a considerable attention both on the part of Ukrainian and international public opinion in the following months. By contrast, the launch of a new stage of the war by Russia on 24 February 2022 – the invasion of Ukraine – only confirmed that it was right for individual Ukrainian politicians, including the candidates in the presidential elections, to have focused particular attention on issues of state security, such as the necessity of a Euro-Atlantic integration and the strengthening of Ukrainian armed forces.

## References

- BALUK, W. | DOROSZKO, M. (red.) (2017), *Wojna hybrydowa Rosji przeciwko Ukrainie w latach 2014-2016*. Lublin.
- HORBULIN, V. (ed.) (2017), *Svitova hibrydna viyna: ukrayins'kuu front*. Kyiv. [Горбулін, В. (ред.) (2017). *Світова гібридна війна: український фронт*. Київ.]
- НРУТАК, Y. (2000), *Narys istoriyi Ukrayiny. Formuvannya modernoyi natsiyi XIX-XX stolittya*. Kyiv. [Грицак, Я. (2000), *Нарис історії України. Формування модерної нації XIX-XX століття*. Київ.]
- KARMAZINA, M. (ed.) (2011), *Derzhava, vlada ta hromadyans'ke suspil'stvo u dokumentakh politychnykh partiy Ukrayiny (kinets' 1980-kh – persha polovyna 2011 rr.)*. Kyiv. [Кармазіна, М. (ред.) (2011), *Держава, влада та громадянське суспільство у документах політичних партій України (кінець 1980-х – перша половина 2011 рр.)*. Київ.]
- KARMAZINA, M. (ed.) (2012), *Ukrayins'ka bahatopartiynist': politychni partiyyi, vyborchi bloky, lidery (kinets' 1980-kh – rochatok 2012*. Kyiv. [Кармазіна, М. (ред.) (2012), *Українська багатопартійність: політичні партії, виборчі блоки, лідери (кінець 1980-х – початок 2012 рр.)*. Київ.]
- Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (2019), *Za tyzhden' do vyboriv prezidenta: reytnyhy kandydativ, motyvatsiyi vyboru, ochikuvannya hromadyan*. [Київський міжнародний інститут соціології (2019), *За тиждень до виборів президента: рейтинги кандидатів, мотивації вибору, очікування громадян*]. In: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=840&page=4> (accessed:10.06.2019).
- KIIS, Razumkov Centre and the Sociological Group “Rating” (2019), *Monitorynh elektoral'nykh nastroyiv ukraintyiv*. [КМІС, Центр Разумкова та Соціологічна група “Рейтинг” (2019), *Моніторинг електоральних настроїв українців*].
- MIRONOWICZ, E. (2012), *Polityka zagraniczna Ukrainy 1990-2010*. Białystok.
- PIETNOCZKA, P. (2014), *Partie polityczne w niepodległej Ukrainie 1991-2007*. Olsztyn.
- PIETNOCZKA, P. (2016), *Problematyka bezpieczeństwa w programach wyborczych kandydatów na urząd Prezydenta Ukrainy w 2014 r.* In: Ambroziak, T. | Czwolek, A. | Gajewski, S. | Nowak-Paralusz, M. (red.), *Problemy bezpieczeństwa Europy i Azji*. Toruń, 113-127.

## Documents

- Ihor Smeshko (2019), *Ihor Smeshko. Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata v Prezidenty Ukrayiny “Sim peremoh dlya Ukrayiny”*. [Ігор Смешко. *Передвиборна програма кандидата в Президенти України “Сім перемог для України”*]. In: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp005pt021f01=235pt001f01=720.html> (accessed: 25.05.2019).
- Memorandum (1994), *Memorandum pro harantiyi bezpeky u zv'yazku z pryuednannam Ukrayiny do dohovoru pro nerozpovsyudzhennya yadernoyi zbroyi vid 5 hrudnya 1994*. [Меморандум про гарантії безпеки у зв'язку з приєднанням України до договору про нерозповсюдження ядерної зброї від 5 грудня 1994.] In: [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=998\\_158](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=998_158) (accessed: 22.06.2019).
- Novyy kurs (2019), *Novyy kurs Ukrayiny. Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post Prezidenta Ukrayiny Tymoshenko Yuliyi Volodymyrivny*. [Новий курс України. *Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост Президента України Тимошенко Юлії Володимирівни*]. In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001> (accessed: 21.03.2019).
- Peredvyborna (2019a), *Peredvyborcha prohrama kandydata na post Prezidenta Ukrayiny Lyashka Oleha Valeriyovycha*. [Передвиборча програма кандидата на пост Президента України Ляшка Олега Валерійовича.] In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001> (accessed: 27.05.2019).

- Peredvyborna (2019b), Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post prezydenta Ukrayiny Boyka Yuriya Anatoliyovycha. [Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост президента України Бойка Юрія Анатолійовича.] In: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001.html> (accessed: 09.05.2019).
- Peredvyborna (2019c), Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post prezydenta Ukrayiny Volodymyra Zelens'koho. [Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост президента України Володимира Зеленського.] In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001> (accessed: 21.03.2019).
- Peredvyborna (2019d), Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post Prezydenta Ukrayiny Hrytsenka Anatoliya Stepanovycha. [Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост Президента України Гриценка Анатолія Степановича.] In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001> (accessed: 22.03.2019).
- Peredvyborna (2019e), Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post Prezydenta Ukrayiny Tymoshenko Yuliyi Volodymyrivny. [Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост Президента України Тимошенко Юлії Володимирівни.] In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2014/wp001> (accessed: 04.04.2015).
- Peredvyborna (2019f), Peredvyborna prohrama kandydata na post Prezydenta Ukrayiny Yuriya Boyka "Plan myrnoho rozvytku dlya Ukrayiny". [Передвиборна програма кандидата на пост Президента України Юрія Бойка "План мирного розвитку для України".] In: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/wp005pt021f01=216pt001f01=720.html> (accessed: 25.03.2019).
- Peredvyborna (2019g), Prohrama kandydata na post Prezydenta Ukrayiny Petra Oleksiyovycha Poroshenka "Velyka derzhava vil'nykh i shchaslyvykh lyudey". [Програма кандидата на пост Президента України Петра Олексійовича Порошенка "Велика держава вільних і щасливих людей".] In: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2019/WP001> (accessed: 21.03.2019).

